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ISLAM, HUMANITY AND 
THE INDONESIAN IDENTITY
Reflections on History
Islam exists in global history with its richly variegated cultural and social 
realities. When these specific cultural contexts are marginalized, Islam is 
reduced to an ahistorical religion without the ability to contribute to humanity. 
This limited understanding of Islam has been a contributing factor in many 
of the violent conflicts in the present day.
Reflecting on Islam in Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy, 
supporting the largest Muslim population, Ahmad Syafii Maarif argues for 
an understanding that is both faithful to Islam’s essential teachings and open 
to constantly changing social and cultural contexts. Building on this, he then 
addresses critical contemporary issues such as democracy, human rights, 
religious freedom, the status of women, and the future of Islam. Through 
this book the breadth and depth of the ideas of one of Indonesia’s foremost 
Muslim scholars are made accessible for English language readership.
Ahmad Syafii Maarif is professor emeritus at Yogyakarta State University 
and founder of MAARIF Institute for Culture and Humanity. He was the 
chairman of Muhammadiyah from 1998 to 2005.
Ahmad Syafii Maarif is one of the most percipient and profound Muslim 
thinkers of our age. His book should be read not only by those interested in 
the future of Indonesian Islam but by every Muslim who cares about Islam, 
and as importantly, by every person who cares for the future of humanity. – 
Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Omar and Azmeralda Alfi Professor of Law, UCLA 
School of Law.
Are Islam and democracy compatible in a 21st century nation-state? This 
book’s unequivocal answer is yes. Its author, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, for decades 
Indonesia’s most distinguished Muslim thinker, develops here his most 
authoritative argument. – R. William Liddle, professor emeritus of political 
science, Ohio State University.    
Syafii Maarif’s principal message that authentic Islam is properly seen as 
peaceful, tolerant of diversity, and accepting of change will be of considerable 
interest to those, especially in the West, who have become all too accustomed 
to rather different sorts of views. Here is a man worth paying careful attention 
to, and it is heartening to see that this English edition of his major work 
will make that possible for a great many more readers around the world. – 
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Foreword
On the morning of February 11, 2018 at 6.30am, a young man wielding a
sword assaulted several churchgoers near St. Lidwina Church in Sleman,
Yogyakarta. He then burst into the church, attacked the pastor, who was
leading the choir, and slashed statutes of Jesus and Mary. He had already
wounded four people when a policeman, unsuccessful in his attempt to
negotiate with him, fired a warning shot. When the young man did not
respond, the policeman shot him in the leg. The news of what was feared
to be another attack by an Islamic extremist went viral across the globe.
What did not reach international media was the reaction of Ahmad
Syafiʾi Maarif, one of Indonesia’s most prominent Muslim public intellec-
tuals and author of this book. When “Buya” Maarif, as he is affectionately
called, learned what had happened, he immediately went to the church
and then visited the young man in hospital. There he spoke with him for
some time, exchanging ideas about Islam. A few days later, Buya spoke
in public about the incident, commenting that, “This young man is a
victim of stupidity … he uses religious ideas and sentences to practice
his ideology of death … I have spoken to him, to Suliyono … it seems
he already regrets it …. he is one of many Indonesians who have fallen
victim to this ideological trash that is imported from the Middle East,
and which unfortunately many people buy …. even worse, it is already
considered trash over there, but here it is valued …. And, ironically,
politicians deliberately make use of it.”
Soon afterwards, Bishop Robertus Rubiyatmoko visited Buya Maarif
at his home to thank him, and said “Buya’s visit helped to calm us
down. What emerged after the incident was instead a strong sense of
brotherhood”. Maarif, happy to welcome the bishop to his home, said “I’m
only a small cog that is striving to promote logic and healthy thinking in
this country.”
Unfortunately, attacks by organized groups of extremists, or by
‘lone wolves’ – as Suliyono turned out to be – have become common
worldwide. Maarif argues in this book that Indonesian Islam is affected
by international forces in a troubled world. Yet, to fulfil the promise
its founding fathers believed in, Indonesia needs to reconnect to what
he argues is the essential spirit of Islam, that is, its advocacy of justice,
equality, welfare, freedom and moderation.
As professor Herman Beck aptly puts it in his Introduction to this
book, Maarif has for decades been one of Indonesia’s foremost Muslim
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scholars. The breadth and depth of his ideas, however, are hardly known
to the outside world since he has written almost exclusively in Indonesian.
We should therefore be grateful to the translator, George Fowler, and
those who made this publication possible.
In this book Buya Maarif calmly makes important arguments about
contested theological, social and political issues, drawing upon a wide
range of religious texts, scholars and academic sources. Some of these
arguments concern the past and future role of Islam in Indonesia, while
others relate to the Muslim world as a whole. For example, he argues on
religious grounds that Islam is perfectly reconcilable with democracy, and
states that “Indonesia is one of the fortunate nations, because from the
start the majority of its people chose a democratic system to govern their
new born state.” And, indeed, today Indonesia is one of the world’s big
democracies, although, as he comments, for “four decades (1959–1998),
democracy was consciously murdered.”
Maarif has apologized for not having sufficiently emphasized in the
first edition of this book thatwoman andmanhave equal rights.He thanks
one of his critics, the scholar K.H. Husein Muhammad, for pointing out
this mistake. After explaining Verse 97 of Surah Al-Nahl (“The Bees”)
“Whoever does righteousness, whether male or female …,” the author
concludes that “the discriminatory treatment meted out against women
is no different from opposing the commands of the Quran.”
Buya Maarif is famed for his views on tolerance and pluralism. Global
Islam in his view simply cannot be monopolized by any one group,
one culture, or one current of thought. In the end, religion is primarily
about sincerity. He shares his experience that the ‘heart-to-heart contact’
with adherents of other religions is “a very close one” when he feels that
“sincerity (ketulusan) is there, and honesty.” In this book’s title ‘Humanity’
comes between ‘Islam’ and ‘Indonesian Identity’. The central message is a
wonderfully heartfelt balanced merger of the three.
Leiden University has long been a center for the study of Indonesia,
of Islam in general, and Indonesian Islam in particular. This publication
aims to provide an international platform for the voice of Ahmad Syafiʾi
Maarif, an Indonesian Muslim scholar whose vision and humanity have
inspired many inside Indonesia. He may have referred to himself with
characteristic modesty as but a “small cog,” but his views and practices
have been vital to the political and spiritual welfare of today’s Indonesia,
and may well have a role to play in our troubled world.
Jan Michiel Otto
Professor emeritus of Law and Governance in Developing Countries
Leiden University
An Introduction to Ahmad Syafii Maarif:
The Man and This Book
by Herman L. Beck
Ahmad Syafii Maarif is a highly respected and influential Indonesian
intellectual and moral leader. At the beginning of the twenty-first century
he was one of three Indonesians given the honorary title guru bangsa,
“teacher of the nation,” by his Muslim compatriots.¹ The other two,
Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) and Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–2009),
have passed away, leaving Syafii Maarif as the surviving “teacher of the
nation.” One of the other honorific titles reserved for him is muazin
bangsa, “muezzin of the nation,” an allusion to the fact that Syafii Maarif
throughout his life admonished his fellow citizens to comply with the
ethical principles and moral rules of their religion just as the muezzin
calls believers to prayer five times a day. This honorific title was used as
the title of a book dedicated to him in 2015 by friends and colleagues
to celebrate his outstanding contributions to his country and religion.²
The Maarif Institute for Culture and Humanity was founded in 2003 to
safeguard and promote Syafii Maarif ’s ideas and ideals.³
Held in high esteem not only by fellow Muslims, Syafii Maarif is
also respected by followers of other religions in his country. Franz
Magnis-Suseno, a Jesuit priest and prominent Indonesian philosopher
of German origin, for example, considers him to be “one of the most
open-minded, inclusive, and on principle, nonviolent people within
Indonesian Islam.”⁴ Syafii Maarif has also won praise abroad from both
individuals and institutions. The well-known Dutch anthropologist
Martin van Bruinessen declares him “Indonesia’s last remaining public
wise old man and a unique paragon of moral leadership.”⁵ In 2008
he was presented with the Ramon Magsaysay Award for Peace and
International Understanding – sometimes called the Asian Nobel Peace
Prize. According to the jury, Syafii Maarif “promoted the country’s
pluralistic society and nonsectarian principles of Pancasila amidst the
call for Islamic fundamentalism.”⁶
The author of the book the reader is holding needs no introduction to
Indonesians, but non-Indonesian readers are probably not familiar with
his work. This book provides an excellent introduction to his ideas and
ideals – a legacy for future generations in Indonesia. It is a translation of
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the second and revised edition of Islam dalam Bingkai Keindonesiaan dan
Kemanusiaan: Sebuah Refleksi Sejarah (Islam, Humanity, and Indonesian
Identity: Reflections on History), published in 2009 in Bandung and
Jakarta. The main title of the book reveals the three pivotal themes
that throughout Syafii Maarif ’s life have played a central role in his
thinking, writing, and actions: beingMuslim, being Indonesian, and being
human, and their interconnection. The subtitle stresses the importance
of reflecting on history as an essential tool for understanding and
tackling contemporary social and moral evils such as poverty, injustice,
corruption. Syafii Maarif takes as a premise that the “real nature” of being
Muslim, being Indonesian, and being human can only be appreciated
through education. Therefore, he engages these topics – be it separately or
jointly – in most of his post-1985 speeches, lectures, articles, and books.⁷
Here, they are collected in one volume.
Ahmad Syafii Maarif started to write this book after his retirement
in 2005 as general chair of the Muhammadiyah, the highest position
within this organization and one he had held since 1998. As he was
turning seventy in 2005, he decided not to stand for reelection during
the 45th Muktamar, the Congress of the Muhammadiyah, held in the
city of Malang that year. He had also been working on an autobiography
during this time.⁸ Published in 2009, his autobiography often sheds
light on views held and positions taken by Syafii Maarif in this book,
the more so because he repeatedly stresses that everything should be
understood in its social and historical context. By reading this book and
the autobiography together, I was able to gain insight into both Syafii
Maarif ’s intellectual heritage and his life story. This introduction aims to
offer an understanding of the man and this book, without claiming to
be complete. The main themes as mentioned above will be singled out
and highlighted in order to show the importance of his contributions to
Islamic thinking in general and Indonesian Islamic thinking in particular.
Ahmad Syafii Maarif lived through turbulent times, from the Dutch
colonial period to the Japanese occupation, and the Indonesian war
of independence. He experienced the so-called Old Order of Sukarno,
the New Order of Soeharto, and finally the Reformation and post-
Reformation era in Indonesia. Syafii Maarif was born on May 31, 1935 in
Sumpur Kudus, a rural hamlet in the Minangkabau highlands of West
Sumatra. The Minangkabau people are overwhelmingly Muslim, with
traditional (adat) belief systems surviving as well. Polygamy was still
quite common in Syafii Maarif ’s youth, and his father had several wives.
At the same time, the region is famous for its strong matrilineal system.
Also typical of the Minangkabau is that many men live and work outside
the region for long periods. Minangkabau people are widely considered
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dynamic and egalitarian in nature, which is one of the reasons that they
are well represented in intellectual, government, and business circles all
over the Indonesian archipelago, and in Malaysia and Singapore as well.
Since his youth, education and specifically religious education played
an important role in Syafii Maarif ’s life. In his autobiography he describes
how he entered primary school in the morning and received religious
education at the surau, a small prayer house and communal building,
after school in the afternoon or early evening. His father, who belonged to
the local village elite, was also involved in the religious instruction Syafii
Maarif received in his early years. He especially stresses the influence of
the Muhammadiyah on his education from the moment this reformist
movement established itself in Sumpur Kudus in 1944, when he was
nine. This solid religious foundation helped to form his character and
would become the basis on which he could build and elaborate his
own structure of ideas and ideals. Islam and the Quran would be his
touchstone throughout his life.
In pursuit of further education Ahmad Syafii Maarif left Minangkabau
for Yogyakarta in central Java. Yogyakarta is the city where Ahmad
Dahlan (1868–1923) founded the Muhammadiyah movement in 1912. He
endorsed the “modernist” principles of Muhammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905)⁹
and intended to realize the ideas and ideals of this Egyptian reformer
in Yogyakarta. The so-called modernists such as Muhammad Abduh
and, in his footsteps, Ahmad Dahlan, sought to understand why the
Muslim world in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was so
far behind the West. In their eyes this backwardness had allowed Western
colonial powers to dominate large parts of the Muslim world. They
came to believe that only by overcoming this backwardness would the
Muslim world shake off the yoke of colonialism and Western hegemony.
Purifying Islam and educating Muslims were seen as the way to overcome
this backwardness. Ahmad Dahlan’s initiatives in educating Muslims
led to the founding of the Muhammadiyah movement; nowadays this
organization is one of the biggest non-governmental players in the field
of education in Indonesia and, perhaps, even worldwide. It should come
as no surprise that Ahmad Syafii Maarif continued his education at one
of Muhammadiyah’s schools in Yogyakarta.
In his early twenties Syafii Maarif became a member of the Muham-
madiyah movement. After graduating he entered the service of the
Muhammadiyah as a primary school teacher, working in different regions
of Indonesia, and meanwhile diligently devoting himself to intellectual
and spiritual growth. Throughout his life he would voice the belief of
the founder of the Muhammadiyah movement that ignorance leads to
poverty, backwardness, corruption, and injustice and that, therefore,
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ignorance should be overcome by education. Syafii Maarif ’s own pursuit
of lifelong education is the most convincing evidence that he acted upon
his constant appeal to his fellow citizens to seek out education. His
efforts were rewarded with scholarships to study in the United States. He
was a graduate student in the history of education at Northern Illinois
University in 1973, and completed his ma in history at Ohio University
in 1980. Just three years later he completed his PhD in Islamic Thought
at the University of Chicago. Syafii Maarif ’s study at the University of
Chicago is of particular importance, because the influence of his PhD
supervisor, Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988), brought about a fundamental
revolution in his own way of thinking.
In his autobiography Syafii Maarif recounts that before he became
acquainted with the ideas of Fazlur Rahman, he belonged to those
members of theMuhammadiyahmovementwho nowadays, in retrospect,
would be considered fundamentalist. Their interpretation of the goal of
the purification of Islam implied not only a return to pristine Islam but
also the establishment of an Islamic State of Indonesia. He sympathized
with Indonesian intellectuals, politicians, and activists who adhered to
the same kind of ideology, men like Mohammad Natsir (1908–1993), with
whom Syafii Maarif shared his Minangkabau descent, and he supported
organizations and political parties that tried to realize that ideal, like the
Masyumi in which Natsir played a prominent role.¹⁰ When the Masyumi
was banned by Sukarno and later whenMohammadNatsir was prevented
from taking a role in another political party by President Soeharto, he
founded the Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (ddii), the Indonesian
Council for Islamic Propagation, in 1967 to realize his ideal in a grassroots
movement. The ddii contributed substantially to the introduction and
spread of the Salafi and Wahhabi body of ideas in Indonesia.
As far as non-Indonesian Muslim thinkers are concerned, Syafii
Maarif admired people like Sayyid Abu ʾl-Aʾla Mawdudi (1903–1979)
and Maryam Jameelah (1934–2012) for the same reasons. Mawdudi
was an influential contemporary revivalist ideologue and politician; he
tirelessly labored for the establishment of the Islamic State of Pakistan.
He was convinced that in modern times the realization of din (the perfect
religious system), the formation of umat (the true community of the
faithful), and the full application of sharia (Islamic law) were only possible
in an Islamic State. Maryam Jameelah was a follower of Mawdudi for
a long time. Originally a non-practicing Jewish-American woman of
German descent, she converted to Islam in her early twenties, went
to Pakistan, and married a close companion of Mawdudi. She became
known as a passionate defender of pure Islam and a keen critic of the
corruption and materialism of the Western world.¹¹
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It was under the influence of Fazlur Rahman that Syafii Maarif ’s
thinking moved in a different direction. Rahman was born in what is
now Pakistan, under British rule. He held a PhD from Oxford and had
taught in the uk, Canada, and the United States before being appointed
in 1963 to head the Central Institute of Islamic Research in Karachi.
Five years later he felt forced to leave Pakistan because the liberal,
reformist Islam that he represented was being attacked by the orthodox
ulama (religious scholars). He returned to the United States, becoming
Professor of Islamic Thought at the University of Chicago in 1969. In
that capacity he earned quite some fame and attracted students from
all over the world who wanted to study with him, Ahmad Syafii Maarif
being one of them. Syafii Maarif must have felt drawn to many of the
ideas and insights Fazlur Rahman presented in his lectures and books.
To mention only a few examples:¹² Rahman’s urgent call for a correct
understanding of Quranic teachings and, in view of this, his emphasis
on the importance of education and studying the Quran; his stress on
morality and ethics based on a careful reading of the Quran and on the
ability to differentiate “between Quranic ethics and law”; his promotion
of the Quran’s defense of humanity and humanism as one of the central
messages of the Revelation; his conviction that democracy, human rights,
and women’s rights are Islamic; his plea to develop one’s capability to
make a distinction between “historical” Islam and “normative” Islam;
his opinion that the establishment of an Islamic State is not a Quranic
requirement. All these themes are found in Syafii Maarif ’s publications
after he returned to Indonesia.
Perhaps Syafii Maarif ’s graduate studies in the United States con-
tributed to his openness to Fazlur Rahman’s ideas. His ma thesis, written
under the supervision of Prof. William H. Frederick at Ohio University,
was devoted to the study of the relationship between Islam and politics
during the period of so-called Guided Democracy (1959–1965) under
President Sukarno in Indonesia. His PhD dissertation for the University
of Chicago was titled “Islam as the Basis of the State: A Study of the
Islamic Political Ideas as Reflected in the Constituent Assembly Debates
in Indonesia.”¹³ Both were translated and published in Indonesian. In
these early works, Syafii Maarif deals with the role of Islam during the
formative period of independent Indonesia. He is interested in the mean-
ing of Islam for and in national politics and governmental policy or, to
quote Bahtiar Effendy, “the political relationship between Islam and the
state.”¹⁴ Although he is still focused on the Islamization of Indonesia,
he no longer champions this idea from a top-down perspective by way
of the establishment of an Islamic State. Instead, he favors a bottom-up
process of Islamization, by way of education and democratization.
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After his return to Indonesia, the shift in Syafii Maarif ’s thinking
made it easier for him to understand Muhammadiyah’s acceptance in
1985 of the Soeharto government policy “that all organizations must
adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation.”¹⁵ Pancasila is the
official philosophy on which the Indonesian state is founded. It consists
of five principles: “1. Belief in the One Almighty God; 2. Just and civilized
humanity; 3. The unity of Indonesia; 4. Democracy guided by inner
wisdom in unanimity arising from deliberation amongst representatives;
and 5. Social justice for all of the people of Indonesia.”¹⁶ Pancasila was
accepted by the Muhammadiyah only after long and heated deliberations
because, according to the statutes of the organization, its first and only
ideological foundation is Islam.
Syafii Maarif has defended Pancasila ever since. He did not see
Pancasila as a rival of religion in general or of Islam in particular. Rather,
he considered it a gift to the Indonesian people by the country’s founders
in order to overcome all the threats the newborn state faced after its war
of independence. He also praised the wisdom of the founding fathers for
their choice of Bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian language based on the
Malay language, as the national language instead of favoring one of the
regional languages, like Javanese. In this way the equality of all the ethnic
groups and cultures in Indonesia was stressed, which in turn contributed
to the viability of Indonesia as a unified nation. In Syafii Maarif ’s
interpretation of Pancasila this philosophy also implied a guarantee
of humanism, humanitarianism, justice, and democracy. In the post-1985
writings and speeches of Syafii Maarif all these topics would play a salient
role. He dedicated himself to the task of convincing his audience that all
these topics are compatible with Islam and in fact are rooted in the Quran.
In the years after 1985 Syafii Maarif ’s star gradually rose within the
Muhammadiyah. He passed through all its echelons from the lowest to
the highest and held several offices before serving as general chair from
1998 to 2005. In 1998 hewas vice-chair under the leadership of AmienRais
(b. 1944), who was elected at the 43rd Muktamar held in Banda Aceh to
become its general chair from 1995 through 2000. However, Amien Rais
preferred a political career with the Partai Amanat Nasional (National
Mandate Party), which he had founded after the fall of President Soeharto
in 1998. According to Muhammadiyah statutes, those who hold high
office within the organization cannot pursue an active political career;
therefore, Amien Rais had to renounce his position as general chair.
However, Syafii Maarif was held in such high esteem by the members of
the Muhammadiyah that he was elected as its general chair for the period
from 2000 through 2005 during the 44th Muktamar of the organization
in Jakarta in 2000.
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Under the leadership of Syafii Maarif the Muhammadiyah pursued
quite progressive policies, although “liberal” and “progressive” in an
Indonesian context are more or less synonymous with “moderate” in
the West.¹⁷ As chair of an organization with an estimated 25 to 30
million members, Syafii Maarif was even better equipped to struggle
against what he considered the social and moral evils of contemporary
Indonesia: poverty, injustice, corruption, radicalism, and friction between
the different communities. These evils were the biggest threat to social
harmony and peaceful living together of all the peoples coexisting in a
unified Indonesian state. With the support of the Muhammadiyah, Syafii
Maarif intended to beat these evils by stimulating and defending “the
ideas of democracy, pluralism, and the spirit of interfaith dialogue” and
thus promoting peace.¹⁸
It is important to note that Syafii Maarif did not consider democracy
an exclusively Western idea. He points to the Quranic concept of shura
(mutual consultation) in surah 3:159 and surah 42:38 as proof that
democracy is inherent to Islam. He also mentions the fact that since
the death of Ahmad Dahlan, elections played a crucial role within
the Muhammadiyah. Finally, he refers to Mohammad Hatta (1902–
1980), Indonesia’s first vice president, who as a fellow Minangkabau
countryman has always been one of his role models. Hatta once stated:
“… democracy in Indonesia has three main sources: the Western idea of
socialism advocating the principles of humanism, the Islamic teachings
on God’s justice and the need to establish universal brotherhood, and the
knowledge that Indonesian society is based on collectivism.”¹⁹
During his period as general chair of the Muhammadiyah, Syafii
Maarif was also closely associated with theWorld Conference on Religion
for Peace (wcfp), a global organization of adherents of different religions
and religious groups aimed at furthering world peace. His commitment
to this organization shows his dedication to the issues of tolerance and
pluralism, a commitment that is not only theoretical and on a global level.
He also devoted himself to these ideals in day-to-day life by promoting
tolerance and trying to solve inter- and intra-religious tensions. A few
examples will suffice. First, Syafii Maarif has exerted himself to bridge
the differences between the “modernist” Muhammadiyah to which he
belonged and the “traditionalist” Nahdlatul Ulama (nu), with its 45
million members – by far the biggest Muslim social organization in the
world. When there were troubles for political or other reasons he often
managed to bring about reconciliation between the two organizations by
personally visiting one or more nu leaders. Secondly, Syafii Maarif has
been involved in many interreligious and interfaith initiatives, including
national and international dialoguemeetings and other activities.Thirdly,
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Syafii Maarif has defended the right to adhere to religion other than one
of Indonesia’s six “official” ones and even to be an atheist. Officially – at
least until recently – the policy of the Indonesian government with regard
to religion was that every Indonesian citizen should adhere to one of the
six “recognized” religions: Islam, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism,
Hinduism, Buddhism, or Confucianism. Fourthly, Syafii Maarif has
been one of the few prominent public figures who has spoken out for
Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a Christian of Chinese background, politician,
administrator, and the governor of Jakarta from 2014 through 2017. He is
better known as Ahok. He was accused of blasphemy by radical Muslim
groups, sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and, thus, lost his high
position.
Rightfully Syafii Maarif can be called an activist in many fields; even
when he does not see himself as an activist in a certain area – for example,
in the gender debate – the position he takes is often remarkable in the
Indonesian context. As always, his touchstone is the Quran. On the basis
of his reading of the Quran, Syafii Maarif rejects the inferiority of women
and the legitimacy of polygamy, and instead defends the equal rights of
men and women. According to him, there is no objection in the Quran
to a woman serving as the highest leader. Consequently, a woman could
become the president of Indonesia. As far as Syafii Maarif ’s rejection
of polygamy is concerned, his Minangkabau background has perhaps
influenced his view; in his autobiography he makes clear that his mother
suffered terribly as one of several wives. He considers polygamy a type of
injustice.
Whereas Syafii Maarif is still highly appreciated as an adviser and
éminence grise, his influence seemed to have diminished since his
retirement as general chair of the Muhammadiyah in 2005. The result of
the election of a new central board of theMuhammadiyah during the 45th
Muktamar in Malang has been interpreted by many Muhammadiyah
watchers as a “conservative turn,” a setback in comparison with the
central board under the leadership of Syafii Maarif. Maybe his ideas
were too progressive, and he moved too fast for many members of the
Muhammadiyah. However, ten years later, during the 47th Muktamar in
Makassar in 2015, this conservative turn seems to have been rectified by
the election of a new general chair, widely considered to be a moderate
progressive.
Time will tell whether Syafii Maarif ’s ideas and ideals have fallen
on fertile ground. For now, the reader should be grateful that, finally, a
book by one of Indonesia’s most prominent intellectuals has been made
available in an English edition to a wider Western public. This is quite
exceptional, for works by Indonesian intellectuals and philosophers
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are rarely translated into English. It is an even greater shame that the
legacy of most Indonesian Muslim thinkers is largely neglected by
their co-religionists in other parts of the Muslim world.²⁰ Indonesian
Muslim thinkers are strongly inclined to draw on ideas and ideals from
around the world, resulting in creative and courageous new perspectives.
Although this book presents Syafii Maarif ’s ideas and ideals with regard
to being Muslim, being Indonesian, and being human, with a focus on
the Indonesian context, his insights may offer inspiration to Muslims
and non-Muslims all over the world.

Preface to the Second Edition
As it turned out, it took some five years for this second edition (revised)
to arrive in the hands of readers. The public conveyed a variety of
responses to the book, and all of these, whether critical or appreciative,
have been equally important to the writer. The second edition contains
refinements and even additions, particularly in “The Status of Women
in Islam” at the suggestion of K.H. Husein Muhammad of the Fahmina
Institute Foundation in Cirebon. Corrections and improvements were
also provided by Rev. Dr. Jan S. Aritonang from the Jakarta Theological
Seminary. I would like to extend my sincere thanks and gratitude to all,
and especially to these two religious figures, who are also my friends.
Finally, my heartfelt thanks to Mizan Publishing and the Maarif Institute,
both of which supported the publication of this work from the beginning.
Syukuran jazîlan “Thank you very much.” I certainly hope the notes on
this revision will be welcomed by readers.
Ahmad Syafii Maarif
Yogyakarta, January 14, 2015

Preface
In May 2006 I first had the idea of writing about Islam within the
framework of Indonesian identity – “Indonesianness,” if you will – and
humanity. After a year of unavoidable delays, I began to organize my
thoughts on the evening of May 7, 2007, at my home on Jalan Halmahera
in Yogyakarta. The first draft was finished on February 9, 2009. To get
feedback, criticism, and suggestions from experts, I hosted a meeting on
March 3, 2009 at the Maarif Institute, moderated by M. Deddy Julianto,
with three of the experts who prior to this had acted as readers of the
draft of this book.
The three readers were Dr. Anhar Gonggong, a renowned historian;
Dr. Luthfi Assyaukanie, a specialist in Islamic studies, both classic and
modern; and Dr. Putut Wijanarko, a communications expert from Mizan
Publishing. Dr. ShofwanKarim, Rector of theMuhammadiyahUniversity
of West Sumatra, was also invited to this meeting. The Maarif Institute
contingent included Muhammad Abdullah Darraz and M. Supriadi. I
was assisted by Darraz in processing the input, critiques, and suggestions
of these experts. He is a young man who had long specialized in classic
Islamic studies. It was my hope that some of the weaknesses of the pre-
publication draft could be reduced by integrating the suggestions and
critiques of these experts. As the author, naturally I bore full responsibility
for this book on my shoulders.
Raja Juli Antoni, director of the Maarif Institute, and I wish to extend
our deep appreciation to all those named above and everyone who
directly or indirectly participated in bringing this work into the light of
day. To Mizan Publishing, I say in the Javanese language, Matur nuwun
ingkang sanget, “I am deeply grateful.”
May this work be of benefit to its readers.
Ahmad Syafii Maarif
Yogyakarta, March 4, 2009

Introduction
This book is my reflection on Islam, humanity, and Indonesian identity. I
am a devotee of history “with a mission,” to cite an attribute applied to
Toynbee.¹ This book draws on a variety of sources, including historical
ones, both Indonesian and foreign, primary and secondary. It is written
in tribute to Indonesia, to Islam – the religion of the majority of
Indonesians – and to humanism, which theoretically informs and protects
Indonesian nationalism.
My mission in writing this book is linked to the future of Indonesia,
at least as I see it as one of its citizens who is now in his seventies. I
feel a kind of profound disquiet about Indonesia’s still unsuccessful
realization of the promises of independence expressed by its leaders
so many decades ago. Those promises had been made long before the
Proclamation of Independence in 1945. It is this disquiet that pushed
me to write my reflections on history, for the future of the nation. In my
travels to the numerous islands throughout Nusantara (the Indonesian
archipelago), the unmatched beauty of the country left an indelible
impression on me. I asked myself why it was that Indonesian history
did not reflect its natural landscape. Instead, we have managed our
nation.
To create a framework for this book, I needed to consult a wide variety
of reading materials, texts that would lead me to the type of wisdom that
could be acknowledged on all sides, Muslim and non-Muslim. My aim
was simple enough: that Indonesia remain whole and survive far into the
future, that it not be destroyed at the hands of its own children who do
not know themselves, who are greedy, blind, and obtuse. This nation
must be defended honestly and responsibly. This is the concrete and true
meaning of our post-independence nationalism.
The following interconnected considerations are central to making
such a study:
. The responsibility of the majority umat (community) to the nation is
far from what it should be.
. This will be the first book that sets out to deal with the themes under
discussion in an integrated way.
. The influence of political ideology and of authority in general is fading,
which will encourage more transparent communication among our
fellow citizens.
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First of all, as the majority population in Nusantara, the Muslim umat
(community) should no longer question the close relationship of Islam,
humanity, and Indonesian identity. Those three must be expressed in the
same breath to ensure that the Islam developed in Indonesia is friendly,
open, inclusive, and able to provide solutions to the problems of the
nation, no matter how great. Let us call it an Islam that is dynamic and
amicably rubs shoulders with all our cultures, subcultures, and diverse
religions. An Islam that provides justice, pleasure, security, and protection
to all people who reside in our Nusantara, without discrimination,
regardless of the religion that they do or do not follow. An Islam that
solidly sides with the poor, even as its teachings seek the alleviation of
poverty, until poverty is successfully driven out of this nation of islands.
If aminority of people – egotistical and puffed upwith cheap rhetoric –
insist on showing Islam with a fierce face, like some monster, this will
naturally frighten and repel many clear-headed groups, whoever they are,
whatever their religion. A monster that claims to speak on behalf of God
has clearly cut loose from sharia law in a true sense.² The powerlessness
that is sometimes felt by a community when confronting the challenges of
the modern world, together with all the complex issues that accompany
it, must not be used to intimidate the members of that community
or encourage them to take extreme and wildly dangerous measures.
Suicide bombing in Indonesia, along with the murder of others, is an
extreme expression of despair and helplessness, whatever the political
or ideological cause. For all Indonesians, suicide bombing is clearly
intolerable and unjustifiable. The cause that these jihadis proclaim is
not relevant and is in fact misleading. In other words, such deeds are
political adventuring designed by the narrow-minded, those who “feel
right on the wrong road,” to borrow the phrase sent to me by D. Zawawi
Imron, an Indonesian literary figure from Madura.³
From this perspective Islam, humanity, and Indonesian identity should
be understood as a plaited unity that is complementary and mutually
enriching. People should not be so easily trapped seduced by the notion
that Islam cannot be “caged” in the vessel of the nation-state called
Indonesia. Islam, as this view would have it, knows not the boundaries of
nation, race, or state. This is clearly an impractical, utopian view. If there
were any truth to such notions, why does the Quran acknowledge the
differences between tribes and races so that they would get to know each
other in order to exchange ideas and culture?⁴ A fatal error can of course
occur if people then make idols of ethnicity, ancestry, and nationalism,
as we shall discuss later on.
Based on what we know, Islam was born and developed entirely in the
flesh and blood of history and not in a cultural vacuum, much less in a
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quiet place far from the bustling atmosphere of cities. Islam was born and
developed in the fierce commercial climate of the Quraysh tribe, not in
an isolated Bedouin village. After the Prophet Muhammad received his
first revelation at the Cave of Hira in the year 610ce, he never returned
there but went straight into the midst of a society that had long been
crushed by injustice and discrimination. The Prophet initially shared his
teachings within his own family circle and only gradually moved out into
the public. Historically, Islam has always interacted and grappled with
society, which is continually transforming in response to social changes,
with the goal of directing such changes to stay on the road of justice.
Even during the Medina period (622–632ce), Islam was growing and
developing within a commercial urban environment. Thus, whether in
Mecca or in Medina, Islam was always in close contact with a world
that was dynamic, competitive, and creative – the world of trade. So
great was the pull of trade that some of the Prophet’s companions forgot
about God and walked off even as he was delivering the Friday sermon.
The Quran describes this in the following verse: “But when they saw a
transaction or a diversion [O Muhammad], they rushed to it and left
you standing [and preaching]. Say, What is with Allah is better than
diversion and than a transaction, and Allah is the best of providers.”⁵
Here the Quran is very clear that even some of the companions of the
Prophet were not invulnerable to the temptations of the world. And that
happened during the time of the Prophet and in his very presence. His
companions were just ordinary people. Thus, it is not too surprising that
warfare later broke out among them upon the death of the Prophet. All
this must be seen from the perspective that they were ordinary people
who were not directly guided by divine revelation.
Can one, for example, separate the birth of Islam from the Arab
environment? Of course not. Only those blind to history theorize that
Islam emerged in a cultural vacuum. The Quran was written in the Arab
language, the mother language of the Prophet Muhammad as the bearer
of the final revelation. What was forbidden was the idolizing of one’s
homeland, ethnic group, clan, tribe, or nation-state, which would create
an ideology in conflict with Islam.
But in the case of Indonesia, if nationalism is understood as being
limited to an ideology of opposition to colonialism and oppression,
how can or why should it be rejected? In Sukarno’s historic speech
Indonesia Accuses, delivered at his trial in 1930, he quoted Sun Yat-sen,
who said that nationalism gives a country the power to advance and
gives an ethnic group the power to protect itself.⁶ Why then, he asks,
must it be opposed and condemned? We have to think within the specific
context of place and time, for otherwise we will certainly go astray. When
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introducing a revealed teaching that is transcendental in nature one must
use the greatest wisdom in considering the local atmosphere. The local
environment must be carefully studied for the successful implanting of a
teaching. A teaching is not something merely to be sung, but serves as a
guide for humanity because the power of the mind alone is insufficient
to solve the complex problems of facing us. Humankind, as a player on
the stage of history, may not act as its own referee.
Colonialism, oppression, and racism are the skeletons in the closet
of history that must be banished from the face of the earth. The first
paragraph of the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution states, “Whereas inde-
pendence is the inalienable right of all nations, therefore all colonialism
must be abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity
and justice.” From the beginning, our constitution has emphasized the
central position of humanity and justice. On the basis of such a for-
mulation, Indonesian nationalism has two inseparable goals: banishing
colonialism and struggling to establish humane and just values.
Naturally, we must start from Indonesia, a young state still searching
for a more appropriate, just, prosperous, and appealing future. Who
can deny that these two goals are indeed in line with and arise from the
same source as the teachings of Islam that are against oppression and for
justice? Of course, according to the theories of Rousseau and Hegel, a
citizen’s highest loyalty is to the nation-state, an understanding that must
be rejected by someone of faith. We cannot accept nationalism as those
European philosophers defined it. We take only its positive aspects in the
interests of the country, which are the interests of us all.
While I was studying at Northern Illinois University at DeKalb and at
the University of Ohio in Athens, Ohio, in the early 1970s, I heard such
utopian notions from an Indian Muslim, but I questioned whether they
were realistic. That Islam was universal in the essence of its teachings
and humanitarian mission – yes, that was true. But the social practice
of Islam in the cultural format of various ethnicities can never be free
from local, national, and even global influences. That is totally natural,
and there is no need to debate the particularities of historical Islam.
What must be tightly guarded are its main doctrines: the oneness of God,
belief, and good actions. None of these may be altered. They must stay
intact as the fundamentals of a Muslim’s system of faith.
Therefore, it is not an error of terminology to speak of Arab Islam,
Indian Islam, Nigerian Islam, American Islam, Iranian Islam, Turkish
Islam, Brunei Islam, Chinese Islam, Indonesian Islam with all its
variations, and so forth. And it’s not just this big picture, but people also
speak of Islam as it is understood by Muhammadiyah, the Nahdlatul
Ulama (nu), Persis, the hard-liners, and so many others.
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I want to comment on these issues for reasons that I hope are
religiously strong and scientifically valid. I admit at the outset that I bring
my own subjective views to my reading of the map of Islam, the map of
Indonesia, and the map of humanity. This is unavoidable. Over the course
of my life my thinking on these questions has evolved significantly. The
increasingly fluid sociopolitical conditions in Indonesia may no longer
be dealt with using static, narrow ideas that idolize an imagined history –
as long as an attitude of moral consistency runs through the analysis like
a red thread. Do I possess such intellectual integrity and honesty? Let
society judge me, and judge honestly. It is its right. The progressive life is
packed with the clash of ideas to find the best and the most true.
The second consideration that motivates this study is that, as far
as I know, no other comprehensive study speaks deeply, critically,
and creatively about the problems of Islam within the framework of
Indonesian identity and what it is to be human. We have the valuable
legacy of the Indonesian intellectual Nurcholish Madjid, who wrote on
similar themes, and which I have found helpful; however, he did not
publish a comprehensive study but rather papers and articles that were
later collected in book form.⁷
In Indonesia, the meaning of “humanism” extends to the qualities of
a “just and civilized” character, as contained in the second precept of
the Pancasila, the statement of five principles that is Indonesia’s elegant
national covenant. The earliest formulation of this concept came from
Sukarno, at the time the Indonesian Constitution was being drawn up.
This was Sukarno’s formulation of this second sila, or principle, in his
radio speech of June 1, 1945: “Internationalism, or humanism.”⁸ I shall
cite this statement at greater length later on.
The term “God, the One, the Only” also originated with Sukarno⁹ and
later became the first principle, in agreement with the Jakarta Charter
dated June 22, 1945. The clause that followed read, “with the obligation
to enforce Islamic sharia for its adherents.” On August 18, 1945, the day
after the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence, this was changed
again to simply “belief in God, the One, the Only,” a change that has
been most vigorously challenged by Muslim circles for years, by blaming
Mohammad Hatta for being the architect of the meeting conducted one
day after Indonesia’s bell of independence had sounded.
Over time, the paradigm of my thinking has undergone a change:
after much study, I found that Hatta’s political stance can be completely
understood and even justified. The wording Hatta put forth was one of
the ways he used to preserve the unity of the nation that he had struggled
ever since his twenties. I must also note that Hatta was an observant
Muslim, both in word and deed. He was a man of rare personal integrity.
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So it would be historically inaccurate to say, as some do, that Hatta
was a secularist simply because of that meeting on August 18, 1945. In
fact, Hatta was the “godfather” of all the top leaders of the Masyumi
Party, which had fought to make Islam the foundation of the state, in
opposition to the supporters of the Pancasila. To read Indonesian Islam
outside the context of history is to err like a man crawling in circles in
the darkness, thinking he is walking in daylight.
The third consideration is that, with the diminishing influence of
political ideology, cultural exchange among Indonesia’s diverse citizens
has become more fluid. As long as it is not contaminated by power
politics, this form of communication can be very effective in cementing
national integration, which sometimes still seems vulnerable and fragile.
Also, Indonesia’s ethnic subcultures are increasingly using the Indonesian
language and modern technologies to communicate with one another.
Even though there are small groups here and there that still question
Pancasila as the philosophical foundation of the state, the dominant
thinking that flourishes within Indonesian society has consciously and
willingly accepted Pancasila.
There have been instances when the acceptance of Pancasila as the
philosophical basis of political or social organization was forced on those
who were unwilling to receive it. Nevertheless, to this day there is no
other concept that is as “right” for strengthening the unity of the nation
as these five principles, read as an integrated whole. Studies by Muslim
writers like me that break new ground on this important issue are still
needed. To defend this nation, we cannot afford to be torn apart by
narrow interests – local nationalisms, ethnic identities, or the politics of
religion.
As for the moral atmosphere of the nation that remains vulnerable
and even fragile, the main reason does not stem from the Pancasila.
On the contrary, it is that the Pancasila has been betrayed by behavior
and actions, including those of leaders and elites. This is the irony we
witness in the history of modern Indonesia. In the past it was believed
that ideological antagonisms were the main causes of our failure to
attain the goals and promises of independence. However, now that those
antagonisms have faded, it is plain that Indonesia has still not yet regained
its moral consciousness. Justice is increasingly rudderless, the political
climate is more and more chaotic, and the Indonesian ethos now appears
to accept that the ends justify the means. The ideals of independence
seem more distant than ever. Rather, corruption has grown all the more
terrible after the disappearance of those ideological antagonisms from the
political arena. I have not even mentioned the networks of the narcotics
trade; not one subdistrict can guarantee that its territory is free from this
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deadly poison. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Indonesians
have become increasingly worried by the contagion of materialist culture
and the worship of money. Mosques, churches, temples, monasteries,
and pagodas are still widely visited, but the question remains, does this
correlate to any significant extent to the moral improvement of the
nation?
If this analysis is correct, and I feel it is, we have to say that our sickness
is cultural and mental in character. Cultural sickness comes from the
increasing brittle spiritual building in which this nation resides. What I
mean is that we are suffering from a chronic illness for which we have to
find a cure, once and for all, so that the future will be brighter, fairer, and
pleasant for all of us.
It has been a long time since the anthropologist Koentjaraningrat
said that one of the forms of that sickness is “a mentality that likes to
take shortcuts.”¹⁰ That is, wanting to get rich quick, without working
hard, or what is usually called “a fanciful and opportunistic mentality.”
This sickness infects a wide range of groups and does not exclude the
religious scholars and leaders. Its long-term outcome will make our
national personality and character increasingly unsteady, fragile, and
vulnerable.
If such behavior is not restrained, there is no guarantee that there is
anything we can do about Indonesia’s fate. It is futile to hope that others
will come to our aid if we are unable to heal ourselves. The future of our
people is entirely in our hands. Even a senior observer of Indonesia said:
“Indonesia is beyond help.”¹¹ I cannot bring myself to reach such a grim
conclusion as long as we realize how serious Indonesia’s problems are
and struggle to overcome them. We must not stay silent, but rather do
whatever is best for the public interest and for our collective future.
Saving the nation is a collective task and the obligation of all citizens
without exception. Of course, the government must be capable of
directing all the strengths of the people to this end. The people of
Indonesia, generally speaking, are still “followers” – if there is an example
of virtue at the top, they will follow. For Indonesia, it is axiomatic that
exemplary behavior by the leaders is required.
The Relationship of Islam, the Indonesian Soul, and Humanism
I have mentioned that Islam, the Indonesian soul, or “Indonesianness,”
and humanism must be spoken of in one breath. Seen from the per-
spective of its early history, Islam, as the final message from Heaven,
within a relatively brief space of time succeeded in gaining a portion of
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the earth that contained a great diversity of peoples and cultures. Some
one hundred years following the death of the Prophet, this religion had
spread throughout the world with great speed and had been embraced
by peoples and races of great diversity with their own distinct histories.
Islam always came into areas that were themselves rich in systems of
values and beliefs. For more than fourteen centuries, Islam has been
active and creative on the face of the earth; at the start of the twenty-first
century its adherents number about 1.3 billion, spread across various
nations and states.¹² Of the 187 countries in the world, it is virtually
assured that not one of these is without Muslim inhabitants. There is no
sign that Islam’s global expansion will wane; even in the United Kingdom,
Islam has become the second religion after Christianity, even though,
according to Karen Armstrong, the proportion of churchgoing citizens
has fallen to about 33 percent.¹³ But we are obliged to ask, of these 1.3
billion Muslim, what percentage still makes religion the compass of their
daily lives? Who knows – quite possibly the percentage is lower than
what we find among the Christian community in the United Kingdom.
Thus, we must humble ourselves and not pound our chests in
pride. We must realize that Islam is facing a serious corrosion of its
practice. And we have not even begun to speak of Islam in the realm of
politics, where the picture is even more dismal. Islam is now becoming
increasingly a doctrine justifying flawed and immoral political behavior.
In contemporary Indonesian history, examples of moral misconduct
and deviance are easy enough to find. Statements of support by several
Muslim groups for the corrupt and repressive authoritarian regime some
years back are one example. The situation is becoming ever more grave,
due to the religious arguments made in approving those statements.
Other bad examples have accumulated; we need not record them here.
One can find similar doings not only here in Nusantara, but in all Muslim
countries. Islam has been made into a commodity of power politics on a
global scale.
As it turns out, we are not always honest in our religious practices
because it is so easy for us to invoke the name of God to conceal short-
term political objectives. Barack Hussein Obama, when he was the junior
u.s. Senator from Illinois, mentioned the following observation by his
mother: “For my mother, organized religion all too often blankets closed-
mindedness with the cloak of piety, covers up cruelty and oppression
in the robe of the truth.”¹⁴ Throughout history, many different belief
systems everywhere in the world have abused religion for low-minded
goals. Religion thus becomes a bartered commodity. But religiosity used
to gain a self-seeking goal, we know well, is among the types of religious
behavior that are of no value in the eyes of Allah.
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That politics in Indonesia as it relates to religion, particularly Islam, at
times presents an opaque picture is nothing strange. It would be difficult
to differentiate, for example, between the behavior of someone who
claims to believe in revelation and someone who could not care less
about religion, even though we hear sharia slogans shouted everywhere.
It even not infrequently happens that calls to the night prayer have been
exploited and made to justify the political tendencies of the moment – to
defend the position of a leader, for example. I expressed these thoughts
at a forum once:
We commit too many deviations and even moral crimes, and do so
not infrequently in the name of God. This is no different from the
conduct of people who hijack God for their own base interests of
the moment with no feelings of guilt or regret. Such unlovely scenes
cannot be allowed to go on, for I am sure this will disgust people
who think clearly and deeply, whatever their religion or ethnicity ….
Indonesia is a nation that claims to be religious, but every day and
night the noble and lofty values of religion are trampled on and raped
under the shelter of all kinds of theological justifications and sacred
quotations.¹⁵
Long before this, people were encouraged to practice their religion in
a civilized way. Sukarno at least in theory emphasized the principle of
a civilized belief in God (Ketuhanan), or a cultivated belief in God, in
the sense of religious people having noble character and manners and
adopting an attitude of mutual respect.¹⁶ In other words, being religious
in a civilized way is the same as being religious in an honest, sincere, and
generous way. By “generous” I mean that the principle of pluralism is
important; it shows in our willingness to recognize the rights of others to
hold that the greatest truth resides in their respective religions, even if
we do not agree with them. At the same time, other people must respect
the position of Muslims who say that Islam is the truest religion. The
expression “the truest” heremust be understood in the light of the distinct
beliefs of each adherent. It is uncivilized and it disturbs the peace to say,
“Our religion is the truest and your religion is packed with myths and
confused beliefs.”
The Quran enjoins all believers: “So race to [all that is] good. To Allah
shall you return all together, and He will [then] inform you concerning
that over which you used to differ [about religion].”¹⁷ It appears that
differences in religious understanding will never be resolved here on
earth until the last day. The highest judge to decide in the end, according
to this verse, will be the authority of God. The task of the adherents of all
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religions is to vie with each other in establishing and spreading all that is
good for everyone, not just for themselves or their own group.
But claims about which is “the truest” may not be allowed to wreck our
Indonesian homeland, a nation-state owned by all of us, or make us veer
off the narrow path of “a just and civilized humanity.” Sukarno was right
in citing Mahatma Gandhi’s saying “My nationalism is my humanity.”¹⁸
Thus, “Indonesianness” in the sense of Indonesian nationalism should
never slide toward expansionist nationalism, which is no different from
modern imperialism according to the theory of the Iranian scholar
Mostafa Rejai.¹⁹ He said, “Both in theory and in practice, nationalism is
connected to messianism, expansionism, imperialism, and war.”²⁰ From
this perspective, the contentious question arises as to whether or not
Indonesian nationalism at the time of the takeover of East Timor was
expansionist in character. I tend to say that Indonesia at that time was
pursuing imperialist politics, since this territory had not previously been
a part of the Dutch East Indies, whose territorial unity itself was the main
justification for an independent Indonesian homeland.
In this connection, it was noteworthy that the writer and Catholic
activist priest Y.B. Mangunwijaya said that the takeover of East Timor
by Indonesia was illegal in international law, which only recognized
Indonesia as being the former Dutch East Indies. East Timor was the
former colony of Portugal, not Holland. According to Mangunwijaya, no
fewer than 120,000 East Timorese were killed or went missing during
the takeover, and tens of thousands of Indonesian soldiers perished in
carrying out that expansionist policy.²¹ As for the concern that East Timor
under the Fretilin (Revolutionary Front of Independent Timor Leste
[East Timor]) would go communist, and therefore had to be preemptively
taken over, this is another matter that is not directly related to theories of
nationalism.
In the discourse about nationality, the circle of major figures of the
early days of the national struggle also clashed in their opinions. This
of course was perfectly natural. Take the example of the polemic over
nationalism between Agus Salim and Sukarno, two fathers of the nation
who came from different subcultures, the Minangkabau of West Sumatra
and Java-Bali, respectively. Their exchange was carried in the publication
Fajar Asia in 1928. Both Sukarno and Agus Salim shared a love for
Indonesia, but in Salim’s mind Sukarno’s love was excessive. Sukarno
had said, “It is no more than your obligation that you enslave and bind
yourself up in servitude to your mother Indonesia and become a son
who has devoted himself to her.”²² Salim was against the idolization
of the motherland (the impression one has of the above excerpt, even
though this may not have been Sukarno’s intention). Yet apart from
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their differences, Salim also wrote about his similarities to Sukarno:
they had the same orientation, “love of nation and motherland,” and the
same objective, “ennoblement of the nation and independence for the
motherland.”
The same starting point: In the arena of colonial politics, this was the
struggle between the holders of power and the mass of the people who
demanded their rights under natural law, that is, inalienable sovereignty
over their own people and motherland, and independence from any
foreign nation.²³
At this level, there were no basic differences between Salim and
Sukarno. “But,” wrote Salim, who distinguished between differing in
principle and differing in intention, “our principle is religion, that is to
say, Islam. Our intention is Lillahi Taʿala [for Allah].”²⁴ This was written
decades ago, before Pancasila entered the stage of national history. But,
as it turned out, this polemic from 1928 continued right up to the eve of
Indonesia’s Proclamation of Independence and after it as well, meaning
that it touched on the philosophical basis of independent Indonesia
(which I will discuss at greater length). Fifty-seven years separated 1928
from the enactment of Pancasila as the basis of mass organizations and
parties. How bitterly and for how many years was this problem of the
philosophical basis of public life debated, until a forced consensus was
imposed by Indonesia’s authoritarian New Order government in 1985.
Chapter Highlights
I will now give a brief chapter-by-chapter preview of the book before we
enter into the broader discussion. Chapter 1 introduces the cultural and
religious struggle that has been going on in Nusantara and Indonesia
for centuries. Long before the arrival of Islam and even Hinduism and
Buddhism, the lands of Nusantara were populated by the adherents
of various religions and animist and dynamist beliefs. Hinduism and
Buddhism, or perhaps a mixture of the two, were present in a number of
islands from the fifth century ce. The first activities of Hindu believers are
visible in Kutai (in East Kalimantan) and inWest Java with the appearance
of the Kingdom of Tarumanegara at the beginning and middle of the
fifth century, respectively. The coming of Islam, therefore, was preceded
by other, older religions.
It is one of the wonders of later history that this newcomer, Islam,
“conquered” Nusantara so that over time it became the religion that is
still embraced by the majority of the inhabitants of the archipelago. But
Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucianist minority groups
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have lived in peace side by side with their Muslim brothers and sisters.
The main cause of the occasional conflicts in the modern era has not
been religious differences but rather economic and political interests
exploited by irresponsible and parochial provocateurs.
Up to the sixteenth century, Java and Sumatra in particular were still
centers of Hinduism and Buddhism. The influence of Islam had not
yet become widespread, although there is a theory that Islam arrived
in Nusantara in the first century Hijra (seventh–eighth centuries ce)
straight fromArabia.²⁵ If this theory is correct, Islamwould have endured
a period of struggle for about five centuries before the appearance of the
first Muslim kingdom in Pasai (today’s Aceh Special Territory) at the
end of the thirteenth century. Buddhism and Hinduism have marked
differences. Hinduism is elitist and is based on a caste system, while
Buddhism is rather like Islam in social structure, having more egalitarian
features. The most profound and enduring impact of these two Indian
religions was in central Java, where two monumental temples – the
Buddhist temple Borobudur and the Hindu temple Prambanan, both
dating back to the ninth century – are maintained by the Indonesian
government, even though the Hindus and Buddhists themselves are
minorities in Indonesia, with the exception of the Hindu majority in
Bali.
Although Islam emerged as the “victor” in its contest with these
predecessor religions, its cultural achievement was more formal and
quantitative. Qualitatively speaking, the old cultural remnants were
maintained and fostered by some people in Nusantara. Furthermore,
Islam as a religion came to Nusantara for the most part not through the
power of the sword, but rather following the pattern of its Hindu and
Buddhist predecessors, that is, via peaceful penetration, so that the older
systems of belief disappeared from the surface only. That it traveled this
peaceful path was one of the conclusions of the Medan Seminar,²⁶ but it
is not impossible that as Islam expanded its power the path of violence
was also traveled. We cannot close our eyes to violence, if it really did
occur. We must look at our past as it was.
Beneath the surface, the multilayered syncretist forms survived,
especially animism and dynamism, the original beliefs that had taken
root long before the arrival of Indian influences.²⁷ The firmly implanted
layers of old values explain why the puritanical Islamic movement that
began in the nineteenth century in West Sumatra encountered so many
cultural difficulties. The struggle continues to the present day, but it has
almost never given rise to significant social upheaval. The aggressive
puritanism seen in the Padri movement in the Minangkabau lands of
West Sumatra has gradually yielded to more enlightening and persuasive
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cultural approaches.TheMuhammadiyahmovement was founded in 1912
in Yogyakarta, the center of Javanese culture, and then rapidly flourished
in the Minangkabau lands from the early 1920s. In addition to bearing the
banner of a moderate puritanism, its activities in the fields of education
and health have strengthened it as the most renowned “deed-oriented”
Islamic movement in the world. In terms of numbers, almost no other
Islamic movement can match it.
The traditionalist Islamic movement in the Nahdlatul Ulama (nu) –
literally, Revival of the Scholars – that arose in 1926 at first wanted to
check puritanical influences: it tolerated the old traditions and values. It
has more recently come closer to Muhammadiyah in the sense that it has
opened itself widely to new Islamic thinking. We might even say that the
nu youth are more “advanced” than the Muhammadiyah in absorbing the
results of the new thinking that has appeared in the Muslim world since
the end of the twentieth century. I see such developments not as cause
for concern but rather as part of the “race” to spread good values and
enlightenment – which must be addressed positively, regardless of who
is doing it. Recently, too, Muhammadiyah and the nu, representing the
mainstream of Islam in Indonesia, have marched shoulder to shoulder
under the banner of an Islam that is open, modern, andmoderate, a social
model that is highly strategic for Indonesia’s continuance as a pluralistic
nation. It has become axiomatic that so long as Muhammadiyah and
the nu cooperate, Indonesia will remain safe from the threat of extreme
radicalism. For it is also true that, in addition to these two major streams
that have drawn much closer to each other now, Muslim movements
with more radical characteristics and their own political agendas have
also sprung up over the past twenty-five years. This is at the same time a
refutation of the view that Islam is monolithic. We see this phenomenon
not just in Indonesia, but across the world, wherever Muslims have
established communities.
This chapter also discusses the process of Islamization in Nusantara
that replaced the Indianization process, the coming of colonialization,
the emergence of a national movement, the birth of the nation and state
of Indonesia, political and ideological combat, and the establishment of
Pancasila as the foundation of the state philosophy.
Chapter 2 focuses on Islam’s views of democracy, tolerance, and reli-
gious and cultural diversity; the countless expressions and interpretations
of the religion; and the message of anti-violence. Diversity of religion and
culture characterized the inhabitants of Nusantara long before the birth
of Indonesia as a nation, less than a century ago. An ahistorical notion
would have it that the Indonesian people are centuries old, beginning
in the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, and so forth, and continuing through
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the coming of religions from India, Arabia, and Europe. But what is
old is not the Indonesian nation of peoples as we know it today, but the
forerunners of this Indonesian nation, the multitude of ethnic groups,
each with its own rich cultural mosaic, customary laws, and languages.
The Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic kingdoms were also the forerunners
of the Indonesian state that was brought into existence on August 17,
1945.
At the time of the European invasion of Nusantara in the early
sixteenth century, the kingdoms the invaders encountered had Islamic
features, but each was independent. They were not infrequently at war
with each other.TheDutch neededmore than three centuries to subjugate
these kingdoms. They began by setting up the East India Company
(Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, voc) in 1602. Aceh was the
final Muslim kingdom to be defeated, and only in the second decade of
the twentieth century. To weaken Aceh, Professor Snouck Hurgronje,
religious adviser to the Dutch East Indies government, provided the key
to “taming” political Islam.
The colonial system in Nusantara was painful and humiliating. One by
one, the Muslim kingdoms were overpowered. The natural riches of the
archipelago were shipped to Europe, while the people of Nusantara were
kept uneducated, impoverished, and oppressed. Nonetheless, without
colonialism, could the nation and people of Indonesia have ever been
imagined? In other words, you might well condemn the colonial system –
whether it be the Portuguese, the English, the Dutch, or the Japanese –
and it really was worthy of condemnation, but the fact remains that it was
due to the influence of colonialism that we began to imagine Indonesia,
first as a nation, and then as a state. Its main constituent parts were the
kingdoms “that succeeded in being united,” being forced to do so by the
Dutch in a colonial administrative system. In the early twentieth century,
the figures of the national movement, educated in the West, created a
nation in the 1920s to which they gave the name Indonesia.
Also, in Chapter 2, we critically discuss the problems related to the
differences in vision of the newer and older generations of Muslims, the
reasons for the appearance of radical groups, and the global dimensions
of Indonesian Islam. Chapter 2 ends with an account of the efforts
of mainstream Indonesian Islam to find a meeting point in religious
thinking. Thanks to the modern education that increasingly spreads
throughout that mainstream, this sought-for meeting point has become
a very real possibility. The young, educated generation, which is prepared
to cast off the arrogance of dogmatic certainties, will sooner or later
discover the best solution to the problem of the relationship between
Islam and Indonesianness. Muslim and Indonesian identities must be
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woven into one broad carpet that accommodates all citizens. The Islam
being offered, of course, is an Islam that is tolerant, inclusive, and friendly
to everyone who shows a good will toward the building of Indonesia
as a homeland for all its inhabitants, citizen or non-citizen. Islam must
become the big tent of the nation, and religious leaders must always show
wisdom of a high quality.
In this regard, we cannot close our eyes to the weaknesses of the
Muslim umat in Nusantara. One of these weaknesses is the fact that
the majority do not possess the qualities they should display. Chapter 3
focuses on this problem. In this chapter, education receives special
attention, since speaking of the quality of the Muslim umat has no
meaning at all if the problem of education is not solved. Education that
is oriented toward formalism but neglects substance, and so is incapable
of creating good human beings who are intelligent, independent, and
sincere, will only produce unemployed graduates, regardless of how
many academic titles they hold. This chapter also looks critically at
the achievements of Muhammadiyah and the nu in education and
enlightenment. Systems bearing the label of Islam have been proliferating
of late; the question is, to what degree are those systems able to offer an
alternative to the current systems that are considered no longer effective?
This chapter also discusses Islamic activities, and particularly the Muslim
parties that are in a state of deterioration. The final part of the chapter
discusses Islam and the future of Indonesia.
Chapter 4 concentrates on Islam as an open religion, on the issues
of sincerity and symbolism, and on the global map of the umat. It
tightens the links between Islam and being Indonesian and human on the
universal level. This chapter takes a daring approach, philosophically and
theologically. It includes Iqbal’s thinking on ijtihad (“interpretation and
conviction arrived at through reasoning and judgment of the Quranic
code”) and the dialogue between God and humankind.
Chapter 5 attempts to summarize the entire essence of the flow of
thought from the Introduction through Chapter 4. This chapter as
well tries to imagine the perspective ahead for Indonesia based on the
arguments raised in this work. At the end of this chapter, I summarize
my thoughts on Islam, humanity, and Indonesian identity.
Before proceeding to Chapter 1, there is something I need to reem-
phasize. This work is the effort of a Muslim in his advanced years to see
Indonesia strong, sovereign, just, prosperous, intact, and respected by
other nations. Respected, not because of the size of its population as
the fourth largest in the world, but because of the moral and intellec-
tual qualities of its people with their rich and complementary cultures.
Respected, not because Indonesians are good at theorizing, but because
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we are skilled at translating theories into policies that defend the weak
and the destitute. Respected, because Indonesians truly care about justice
for all.
To move in the direction of this big idea, history must be made into
a torch. History is not simply for amusement or entertainment,²⁸ as
Bertrand Russell has said. History is a mirror. History is the past that can
give inspiration to anyone who wants it. History is also the laboratory
of wisdom for anyone who wants to find a pearl within it. History is a
critique of our behavior when we slide off the rails we have collectively
laid. Above all else, “history,” writes Allan Nevins, “is truly a bridge that
joins the past with the present, and at the same time shows the way to
the future.”²⁹
This work is my response to the conditions of modern Indonesia as
well as to the map of the global Islamic umat, or community, which
seems powerless to overcome the challenges that arise, one after another.
A strong sense of cultural stagnation is still felt in all Muslim countries,
as if great achievements no longer belong to them. But no matter what
the situation, the flag of optimism must always be flown, even in the
midst of the sea of pessimism that has engulfed part of the Indonesian
people and the global Islamic umat. Russell well describes the difference
between stagnation and progress: “Periods of stagnation are periods
during which people feel powerless. Periods of progress occur when
people feel that great deeds are possible and thus want to own a share in
them.”³⁰ Under these unhappy conditions, some Muslim writers have
come forward in an effort to find the answer to these questions: Why has
the Islamic world too long been at the tail end of civilization? Why does
it find it so difficult to rise up?
Indonesia, with the benefit of its critical optimism, must truly rise
again by giving birth to great works of high quality in the sphere of
justice, and in well-being that is felt by all. Islam, if understood correctly
and intelligently, will give an awesome impetus to the strengthening of
Indonesian identity under the aegis of “belief in God, the One and the
Only” and “a humanity that is just and civilized,” as one manifestation of
our faith and our common existence as a nation. Islam, Indonesianness,
and humanism must be woven together so elegantly and beautifully that
the widespread subcultures that constitute Indonesia as a nation and a
state feel the safety and tranquility they need to survive in this “continent
of islands” for all time.
Our weakness since Independence has been that we do not seriously
manage and organize our Indonesianness, with the result that in certain
periods, social explosions with political, economic, ethnic, and cultural
backgrounds have continued to occur. They always result in victims.
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I hope that in weaving together the conceptual framework of Islam,
Indonesianness, and humanity, this nation would be prepared to organize
and reread its past in the interests of the present and of the future in an
honest, responsible, and profoundly loving way. The Islamic umat as the
majority has a very great historic responsibility to defend Indonesia so
that it stays intact and united, and never wavers.
Let our rich cultural mosaic flourish in the Indonesian garden that
shelters all who dwell in this fertile region without fear, without a sense
of alienation. The populations spread over the little islands of Nusantara
must truly feel their Indonesian identity as a pleasing certainty, an
awareness, and not the result of compulsion. That goal can only be
realized when the majority umat sets the example in defending the
integrity and unity of the nation, a prospect that still feels very far off.
Thus we must strive for this purpose tirelessly and without succumbing
to apathy. Indonesia is the home we all share, the home whose roof can
never be allowed to leak as a result of particularism and indifference.
My experience over the past eleven years with leading cross-religious,
cross-cultural, and cross-ethnic figures has brought me to conclude that
Indonesia can still be repaired. There is still a sufficient stock of honest
and sincere people who genuinely love Indonesia and who are ready, if
asked, to speak openly about its future design. If Indonesia’s leaders, in
the not too distant future, could succeed in displaying a finely calibrated
statesmanship at all levels, I feel that many of the nation’s ills could be
cured. The people deeply need the exemplary ideals that have almost
disappeared from our contemporary culture with its pragmatism, love of
simplistic solutions, and lack of long-term vision. Most of the politicians
who have appeared over the past eleven years are indeed lacking in vision
and sensitivity.
Indonesia should have been a more stable society, since culturally the
nation was formed before politically the state came into existence on
August 17, 1945. But too few true leaders appeared on the scene. What
did appear were politicians and bureaucrats without a long-term vision,
who found it easy to barter away principles that they should have held
fast to. In other words, the nation turned out to be morally loose. The
principal question then arises, Why is a nation that claims to be religious
so lacking when judged in terms of morals and ethics? The answer to
this question must be found. The root of the problem must be studied
honestly and with academic rigor for the purpose of improving the lives
of Indonesia’s people. That Indonesia’s culture is sick is something spoken
of widely. We need to find the remedy to cure this sickness.
From the point of view of constitutional politics, there are some who
propose changing the structure of the state from unitary to federal.³¹
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My comment after reading Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin’s booklet is: “The
thoughts incorporated in this little book need to be evaluated critically
and with suspicion. In fact, in 1945, Mohammad Hatta came out with
this same idea.” Since the question of federalism is still quite sensitive, I
think we should let time, which matures all of us, show us which system
is the best for the future of the nation. Once emotions can be controlled
by the power of reason, there will be no problem “too dangerous” to
discuss deeply, openly, and seriously. The federal idea actually is still held
in some intellectual circles in Indonesia; several months before he passed
away on February 10, 1999, Y.B. Mangunwijaya tenaciously defended
the idea.³² If the emotional situation in Indonesia permits, I myself tend
toward the choice of federalism. Forget for the moment a state as big as
Indonesia – Malaysia, whose population is only about one-tenth that of
Indonesia, is a federal state. We must, of course, be particularly cautious
in discussing such a sensitive issue.
Chapter 1 Islam and Nusantara
Thenatural world of Nusantara, the Indonesian archipelago, is stunningly
beautiful. Gaze at the verdant mountain ranges, valleys, and gorges (even
though much has now been ruined). Catch sight of the lakes that spread
over the islands – Danau Singkarak in the Minangkabau lands, or Danau
Matano in Sorowako, South Sulawesi – with their clear, pure waters.
Centuries ago many peoples came to this beautiful archipelago bringing
religions and civilizations that flourished here. One of these religions
was Islam, the youngest of the three that originated with the Prophet
Abraham, after the Jewish and Christian religions.
The march of Islam in Nusantara lasted many long years until a
quantitative victory was successfully consolidated. But what has not yet
been realized is a qualitative victory. The quest for such a victory calls for
a serious struggle in the future.
Nusantara: Where Faiths and Cultures Interact
In the ancient world, there were ongoing trade relations between the
regions of Southwest Asia and Nusantara long before Islam appeared. In
fact, the arrival of Islam stimulated these trading activities even more,
because trade is a permissible calling in Islam. Over the course of time –
in the third decade of the twentieth century – in this region a nation
appeared on the map of the world, composed of a group of diverse and
pluralistic ethnicities and subcultures, the largest of which were Muslim.
Islam became one of the important components of the nationalism of
Indonesians, alongwith language and historical experience.The historical
roots of this new nation penetrated deeply into the past in the form
of kingdoms, various religions and diverse cultures, and hundreds of
languages.
In addition to Islam, the religion embraced by the majority of the
inhabitants, other religions were tolerated and flourished as well. In
population, Indonesia is the largest Muslim nation on earth. There is still
no final answer as to why Islam “won” the theological and commercial
contests centuries ago in a region so culturally complex. This victory
can only be equated with the victory of the Indonesian language –
Bahasa Indonesia – which grew out of the Malay culture of the Riau
Archipelago, which itself has ancient roots in the early Buddhist Sriwijaya
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period. In Islamic hands, Bahasa Melayu (the Malay language) developed
all the more dynamically in line with the egalitarian nature of this
religion.
Perhaps, too, it may be compared with the victory of Islam and the
spread of the Arabic language throughout the former Roman Empire
in the Middle East and North Africa – the home of Saint Augustine
(354–430) and later, the historian Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) – in the
seventh century, not long after the passing of the Prophet Muhammad in
632ce (that is, in the twenty-third year of prophethood). The caliphs
(“successors”) and rulers who came after the Prophet as the leaders of
the umat of believers were responsible for this large-scale process of
Islamization and the spread of Arabic. The vitality of this new religion
and culture propelled Islam and the Arabic language to all corners of the
earth and sustained generations of Muslims in those early centuries.
But we must also record that this process was not always smooth
and peaceful, and that military might and wars were not infrequently
involved.Thewarfare was not, however, waged to force people to embrace
Islam, but rather the result of conflicts that arose in the context of political
expansion by Arab Muslims. In actuality, the Muslim religion has not
always been able to guard against the abuse of power by Muslims in
authority. We cannot assume that past events proceeded flawlessly, simply
because the past shelters under the label of Islam. Honesty toward the
past depends upon our critical attitude in viewing it, whoever were the
historical actors. The Muslim umat should not feel so pure that it closes
its eyes to deviant behavior, particularly that of rulers with theological
approval or fiqh – legal pronouncements – by the scholars, who claim to
be the heirs of the prophets.
Naturally, no historical writings can possibly present a flawless map
of the past. Good history demands honesty by its writer, and that is not
easy to achieve: humans are partial to the interests they carry about
like baggage. But history must present the facts, no matter how much
the facts may damage the writer or some admired group of humanity.
Writing history always demands first and foremost the personal integrity
of the historian.
I need to comment on the problemof honesty. SomeMuslim historians
and writers are reluctant to mention problematic facts due to various
considerations, as though the expansion of Islamic power had always
been achieved by peaceful means. Because of that, Al-Faruqi uses the
term al-futuhat ( fatah in the singular form), which means “opening,”
that is, “opening the heart and the mind [of humankind] to the truth
of Islam.”¹ For subjugation at the time of the Prophet and the Rightly
Guided Caliphs (610–661ce), the concept of “opening” may be used,
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especially in the era of the Prophet, where worldly power and riches in
no way were a part of his mission. As for the siege of the Jewish tribe
Bani Qurayza following its treachery after the Battle of the Trench, Ibn
Al-Athir revealed this information, “The Messenger of Allah ordered the
adult men of Bani Qurayza to be killed and their women and children to
be spared.”² In the atmosphere of war, killing was permitted so long as it
did not go beyond the boundaries of accepted custom. But in the eras
that followed, the expansion of power did not always bow to religion
and morals. Thus, we must be highly cautious in evaluating the use (or
indeed the misuse) of religion in the interests of power. The stakes were
very high; that is to say, people could act very cruelly, treacherously, and
immorally, all in the name of God. As historian I will lay out in this work
such excesses as they existed, even if they are neither agreeable to hear
nor pleasant to acknowledge.
For me, the agreeable and the pleasant belong to the world of poetry.
In history, bitterness must be given voice and unpacked bravely and
responsibly, even though I may strip myself naked by doing so. There is
something slovenly about the history written by people who try to conceal
bitterness within a package of sweetness and light, writing history as
entertainment. History is also a guideline for acting within the limitations
of space and time. Within that space and time, history works itself out in
accordance with the non-linear “laws” of society. The actors are humans
with all manner of subjective tendencies and worldly interests often
concealed, and not infrequently in packages of sacred verse.
Speakers of the variants of the Malay language may be greater
in number or at least equal to the speakers of Arabic. Malay was
formally consolidated in Indonesia as Bahasa Indonesia (“the Indonesian
Language”) in the Youth Oath of October 28, 1928, in which Muhammad
Yamin, a figure in the Jong Sumatranen Bond (“the Young Sumatran
Union”), played a major role. In Malaysia, one says “Bahasa Malaysia,”
but the roots of the two are the same: the Malay language that originated
in the Riau Archipelago. Language was among the greatest contributions
of Riau to the culture of Nusantara. Not only did the population that
had been colonized by the Dutch in Nusantara speak Indonesian as
their formal speech, the common people of East Timor were fluent in
it, too.
The Indonesian language was key to the efforts to consolidate the
national identity and overcome obstacles in interethnic communication.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Dutch East Indies government
chose Malay as “the administrative language of power to optimize
the efficiency of its colonial exploitation.”³ The official use of the
Malay language in this way spread far and wide, reaching out and
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grasping tribes and ethnicities hidden on even the smallest islands.
As a medium of communication, the Indonesian language was indeed
situated strategically.
Muhammad Yamin’s role in strengthening the Indonesian language’s
acceptance as the language of unity was so important that a Dutch
official, P.M. Hooykaas, commented that “that young man from Sumatra
will be a pioneer in the efforts to use the Malay language [the official
Dutch term for Indonesian] as a medium of communication and social
interaction in Indonesia andDutch will be hard-pressed because of him.”⁴
Yamin therefore deserves to be remembered as an expert and thinker
in the fields of language and culture more than as a controversy-laden
politician. (The most serious of these controversies revolved around who
had been the first to propose the concept of Pancasila in the session of
the 1945 Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian
Independence [bpupk], Sukarno or Yamin. I will review this crucial issue
at the end of this chapter.)
In fact, long before Yamin and his comrades pioneered Bahasa
Indonesia as the official language, KiHadjar Dewantara, a central figure in
Javanese culture, had suggested that Bahasa Melayu, the Malay language,
become the official language throughout Nusantara. In his writings he
criticized his friend Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, who had said that the
Javanese language was the language of slaves and had to be replaced by
Dutch. Writing with considerable heat, Ki Hadjar commented:
Language and nation are one thing. It makes no sense to kill off one
language in a contrived way to make space for a new, foreign language.
And since the Javanese language is used by 20 million Javanese people,
it is too reckless and hasty to speak of the death of such a beautiful
language. If we want one language for all the people of the Indies, you
should not force us to accept a foreign language, since we have the
Malay language which is not only easy to learn, but by now has become
the lingua franca of Nusantara.⁵
Tjipto was more of a radical than Ki Hadjar, who always appeared calm,
patient, and reflective. Tjipto even wanted to kill the Javanese language,
the mother tongue defended so reasonably by Ki Hadjar. Tjipto was
disgusted with what was termed feudal tradition, but he was unrealistic
in taking this attitude so far as to want to replace Javanese with Dutch.
Therefore, the expression of Ki Hadjar that “language and nation are one
thing” became very important in this respect.Wouldn’t replacing Javanese
with Dutch have resulted in the cultural and spiritual extermination of
the Javanese people?
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The solution provided by Ki Hadjar was a very wise one: let Javanese
survive for the Javanese people or other groups that wanted to learn and
use it, but take advantage of the potential of BahasaMelayu as the language
of unity. It was much easier to learn, and certainly more democratic,
than the status-laden Javanese language. Javanese is an old language with
an extraordinarily rich vocabulary, much richer than Malay. Naturally, in
the democratization process, Javanese would encounter many obstacles,
because its non-democratic structure was developed in tandem with a
centuries-old and multileveled feudalism that organized society between
sturdy status partitions.
On another occasion, Ki Hadjar was even more forceful in his defense
of Bahasa Indonesia: “For the sake of the unity of the Indonesian nation,
only Bahasa Indonesia has the right to be the language of unity.”⁶
Although Ki Hadjar was a central figure in Javanese culture, defending
the position of Bahasa Indonesia has to be recorded as one of his many
contributions to the development of an inclusive Indonesian culture.
He was very conscious of Indonesian identity in relation to Bahasa
Indonesia as the language of unity, an egalitarian language that was
an important pillar in the establishment of the country’s democratic
system.
Scientific analyses of the relationship of Bahasa Indonesia and
democracy in Indonesia are few. If a Yamin or Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana
defended the choice of Bahasa Indonesia, it should not be surprising,
since they both were born into the Minangkabau culture of Sumatra,
which shares linguistic similarities with Malay. But we must salute the
Javanese Ki Hadjar who was no less outspoken in Bahasa Indonesia’s
defense. Thus, it is not surprising that later on many of the language
experts and poets in the Indonesian language were Javanese, Sundanese,
and other ethnicities that have so enriched this nation, as Ki Hadjar had
predicted.
During what has been called the cultural polemic of 1935 between
Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana on the one hand and Dr. Soetomo, Ki Hadjar,
and Sanusi Pane on the other, we note with interest Tjipto’s proposal
to bury the Javanese language. For, in imagining Indonesia’s future, the
Javanese Tjipto had preceded Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana in adopting a
European orientation when he proposed to replace Javanese with Dutch.
Exchanging one language for another means changing the way one thinks
and feels as a part of the culture of a nation; this is enormously difficult,
no matter how feudal one believes the culture to be. In his later years,
Sutan Takdir Alisjabana was not as rigid as when he first published his
polemic at twenty-seven years of age. Just four years later, he reassessed
the Eastern values that he had earlier judged to be out of date and an
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obstacle to progress. This he did in the third cultural polemic in 1939.
The writer Subagio Sastrowardoyo had this to say about Alisjabana’s
conversion:
In the cultural polemic of 1939, a change in the style of Sutan Takdir
Alisjabana’s argument became apparent. This temper now no longer
flares up, indicative of a cultural view that is softer and calmer by
comparison. Gone is his tendency to put forward his heavily biased
views and estimations without seeing the possibility of compromise
and synthesis. Rather, Takdir tends to see everything in totality, with all
elements linked and fused together. And he even implicitly admits to
the limitations of idealized rationalism and positivism by accepting
irrational elements, for example, in political life, and that there are still
many questions that cannot be answered by positivism and which at
the end of the day have to be submitted to speculative philosophical
thinking.⁷
Even at the beginning of the 1960s, Takdir gave a “high [assessment]
of Indonesia’s traditional arts.”⁸ All this shows that in his intellectual
and spiritual peregrinations Sutan Takdir Alisyahbana had experienced
a number of significant turning points. No longer is the West viewed
as the sole source of progress, let alone wisdom. In contrast to Tjipto,
who wanted to replace the Javanese language with Dutch, Takdir wanted
Bahasa Indonesia to become the language of science. He worked hard to
achieve this goal. In addition to Yamin, Takdir can be categorized as one
of the fathers of the modern Indonesian language.
The choice of Melayu (“Malay” – subsequently officially named
“Bahasa Indonesia” by nationalist youth) as the national language
promoted the fluent cultural conversation between the archipelago’s rich
subcultures, while at the same time contributing new vocabulary to this
language of unity. Bahasa Indonesia is an egalitarian language. If the
Indonesian nation succeeds in finding leadership that truly appreciates
and understands this cultural wealth and fluently speaks proper Bahasa
Indonesia, there is hope that Indonesia will long endure as a nation
and a state. Ethnic frictions could be resolved with guidance from local
wisdom, under the umbrella of national wisdom.
Over the course of the history of Nusantara, whether in the era of
Sriwijaya, old Mataram, Majapahit, or the modern period, such local
wisdom has been greatly underappreciated, particularly when power
politics has developed with a centralizing appetite. Regions far from
the center are generally treated as stepchildren, and their obligation
is to bow to and pay tribute to the center of power. This is one of the
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sources of the fears and disquiet that reached their climax in the regional
rebellions of the modern era. The blending of the heterogeneous ethnic
groups has still not been successfully concluded. Almost all provinces
that have developed in Indonesia since colonial times, and continuing
into the independence era, were at first based on ethnic territories and
their subcultures. Interethnic marriage and migrations have, of course,
occurred, but these have not become a tidal wave. For that reason, efforts
to keep strengthening and accelerating national integration cannot be
viewed lightly. The nation is still in the creative process of becoming an
Indonesia that is intact and coherent. The Java–Outer Islands dichotomy
has still not yet disappeared in the independence era, a historical legacy
of ages past.
Let us take a fleeting glance at the etymology of the word Nusantara.
It derives from two words: nusa and antara. Nusa (Sanskrit/Kawi) means
“island, native country.”Antara means “distance, gap, interval, space
between two objects.” Nusantara are the islands located between the
Asian continent and Australia,⁹ positioned between two oceans, the
Indian and the Pacific. (In the common Javanese speech level called
ngoko, antara can mean “distance, space between two objects.”¹⁰) Because
of the large number of the islands of Nusantara, more than 17,000, an
expert was not wrong in calling this a Maritime Continent,¹¹ or perhaps
it could be said to be an Archipelagic Continent.
This Maritime Continent’s distance from east to west is 5,110 kilo-
meters, and it stretches 1,888 kilometers from north to south; it is spread
out on both sides of the equator from 94°15´ to 141°05´ longitude east,
and from 6°08´ latitude north to 110°15´ latitude south.¹² The total area
of Nusantara’s land mass is 1,919,443 square kilometers,¹³ its seas total
5,800,000 square kilometers, and its coastlines run for 95,181 kilome-
ters.¹⁴
If Indonesia is able to survive intact and fully sovereign as a nation-
state, its people must rid themselves of subculture egotism, parochialism,
regional conceit, ephemeral interests, and worthless political pragmatism.
We must always remember that this nation is too important and was
achieved at too high a cost to be sacrificed for mean-spirited and
transitory aims. In drawing near to those ideals, the principle of “justice
for all the Indonesian people” must not again be frustrated, as has
happened so many times in the past. There is an old Malay saying:
“The raja is just, the raja is honored. The raja is tyrannical, the raja is
opposed.” “Raja” here in the democratic context is a system of power that
has been in operation for more than sixty years since our Proclamation
of Independence.
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Justice of course has never yet been realized.This is a very serious issue
that will determine the future fate of the nation. As I have seen it, since
the 1945 Proclamation, there has never been a pattern of development
that is truly guided by the principles of Pancasila, particularly the fifth
of these principles, which has been left neglected for so many decades.
To be sure, it has been honored in rhetoric, but it has been betrayed in
practice. That means we have not yet been honest as a nation and as a
state. If we as a nation continue to face problems, we must look for their
roots in harsh reality: “The word is still no friend of the deed.”
The term Nusantara was first used by Ki Hadjar Dewantara, a freedom
fighter and the founder of Taman Siswa.¹⁵ Yet although this name directs
our attention to the sea, the promising potential of the maritime regions
has still yet to be exploited in a good way. More than that, the attention
we pay to these regions is very weak. In fact, the sustainability of the
life of our nation will very much depend on the generosity of that salty
water with its store of enormous natural wealth. But we must never
forget either that, like the wind, water is not always our friend. When
the seas run amuck with tsunamis, the land can be struck with terrible
force. The location and geography of Nusantara renders many of its
regions vulnerable to earthquakes and tsunamis. The largest tsunami
of the twenty-first century struck Aceh on December 26, 2004, and
left thousands of victims in its wake and many devastated buildings,
On May 27, 2006, tectonic movements in the Central Java area around
Yogyakarta caused physical destruction and numerous casualties. At the
end of 2007, earthquakes shook Bengkulu, West Sumatra, and parts of
Java and Sulawesi, causing much damage. There were not many deaths,
because the public was growing more aware of how to deal with natural
disasters.
The name Indonesia has been in use since 1884, when it was popular-
ized by the German scientist Adolf Bastian from the University of Berlin
when referring to the cluster of islands of the “Malay Archipelago.”¹⁶
But “Indonesia,” and “Indonesian” as the name of a new nation, only
appeared in the 1920s within the circle of the Indonesian Association (pi)
in the Netherlands. At first, not everyone in the nationalist movement felt
comfortable with the name, but themajority vote in pi established it as the
name of the newborn nation, even as the name Nusantara was still being
used with the same meaning and continues to be used to the present day.
To speak of Nusantara is the same as to speak of Indonesia. One might
even consider renaming the country “the Republic of Nusantara,” a name
that contains a sense of the seas and islands. But one benefit of using the
name Indonesia is that the period of colonialization was so long, while
Indonesia as a nation only emerged in the 1920s. On this basis, we can
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say that Indonesia was not colonized for more than twenty-five years,
including the three and a half years of the Japanese occupation.¹⁷
To be sure, the name Nusantara sounds more poetic and musical to
the ear, and it matches the flavor of our language. It also seems more
“native.” Of course, it implies many things. Therefore, we must first think
carefully and deeply if we really want to adopt this name. The term Nusa
in official use is held by two provinces: ntb (Nusa Tenggara Barat – West
Nusa Tenggara) and ntt (Nusa Tenggara Timur – East Nusa Tenggara).
The majority of the people of ntb are Muslim, while the majority are
Christian in ntt.
And now, what of the term “Muslim Indonesia,” which has become
popular in recent times? We usually link such a descriptive label to places
where the adherents of a particular religion predominate. That’s why we
refer to Christian Europe, Buddhist Tibet, and Muslim Saudi Arabia.
Because the inhabitants of Nusantara, which then became Indonesia,
are for the most part Muslim, it would not be wrong to say “Muslim
Indonesia.” The meaning is quite simple: the majority of the people are
devout Muslims – santri – or are in the process of becoming santri.
Referring to people as santri indicates that they regularly observe the
religious commandments associated with the Five Pillars of Islam. Santri
come from all walks of life; they range from those who are highly educated
to those who have only an elementary school education – that is, the
majority of Muslims in Indonesia.
The term “Muslim Indonesia” absolutely does not mean to suggest
that other religions and beliefs cannot grow and flourish, even though
these are in the minority. Supposing that at some point in the future
Islam were to be embraced by the majority of the population of Great
Britain; then we would find the name “Muslim Great Britain” in use.
It would be the same if the number of Muslims fell in Nusantara and
those who espoused Hinduism and Buddhism became the majority;
then Indonesia would again become Hindu-Buddhist. Spain, once ruled
by Muslim Arabs, is another example. Even though the majority of the
population always remained non-Muslim, still we use the term “Muslim
Spain.” It refers to Spain’s having been ruled by Muslim power for about
seven centuries, from the eighth to the end of the fifteenth century, a
very long stretch of time. In other words, these terms do not have to be
debated because they are already well understood and accepted.
Now let us focus on the religions that flourished in Nusantara before
the arrival of Islam. It is a hard fact of geography that Nusantara is
hemmed in by two continents, Asia and Australia, and two oceans, the
Pacific and the Indian, providing space and fertile land for the spread
of religions coming from outside. Because of its strategic geopolitical
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location and its rich earth abundantly supporting human life, Nusantara
was a target for other nations, in pursuit of various interests: religious,
economic and commercial, cultural, and later, colonization. Among the
most important and influential religions for centuries were Hinduism and
Buddhism, as already mentioned. Both of these religions have completely
Asian, specifically Indian, features. In Nusantara, these two religions
on occasion struggled and even warred over influence, as when the
Hindu Majapahit defeated the Buddhist Sriwijaya around the fourteenth
century. Because a large part of the lands of Nusantara were inhabited,
and indeed ruled, by Hindus and Buddhists almost during the same
centuries, the progress of the new religion of Islam was necessarily
connected with these two old religions, before it came into contact with
European arrivals.
In this way, Islam, as the newcomer that then “defeated” its predecessor
religions, came as a shock and a sensation of historic proportions. There
is no certain historical response to the question of how this victory came
about. Because of the substantial Muslim majority, at a later date some in
the Muslim umat wanted to make Indonesia formally an Islamic state, or
a state based on Islam.This wish was in fact based on political calculations
in a democratic system that relies on a majority vote. More recently, small
antidemocratic groups have emerged, with all their political rhetoric,
to create an uproar in the name of sharia. They use the democracy in
pursuit of means that are not democratic; for example, they refuse to
take part in general elections. They emphasize sharia textualism over the
substance of sharia, which aims at establishing justice for all.
In The Religion of Java, the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz
actually wondered if the majority of Javanese were Muslim at all because
of the syncretist practices so apparent in their populations¹⁸ ButHodgson,
whose knowledge of Islam and its umat far outweighed that of Geertz,
even if he was not particularly knowledgeable about Indonesia, saw the
anthropologist’s work as misleading. A footnote in Hodgson’s The Venture
of Islam explains Hodgson’s assessment, which has been praised as an
important finding about Islam in Nusantara:
Unfortunately, its [Geertz’s work’s] generally high excellence is marred
by a major systematic error: influenced by the polemics of a certain
school of modern shariʾah-minded Muslims, Geertz identifies “Islam”
only with what that school of modernists happens to approve and
ascribes everything else to an aboriginal or a Hindu-Buddhist back-
ground, gratuitously labeling much of the Muslim religious life in Java
as Hindu. He identifies a long series of phenomena, virtually universal
to Islam and sometimes found even in the Quran itself, as un-Islamic;
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and hence his interpretation of the Islamic past as well as some recent
anti-Islamic reactions is highly misleading …. For one who knows
Islam, his comprehensive data – despite his intention – show how very
little has survived from the Hindu past even in inner Java and raise the
question why the triumph of Islam was so complete.¹⁹
Its triumph was “complete” in the sense that an awesome change
had occurred, with the displacement of religions in a tremendous
demographic wave, whether at the elite level or among ordinary people.
The modernist school of Muslims mentioned by Hodgson would
certainly have been Muhammadiyah, Persis, and Al-Irsyad, who at
first were very active in opposing the syncretist tendencies evident
in the religious practices of a part of Nusantara society, and not just
in Java. However, as it developed further, the modernist movement,
especially Muhammadiyah, increasingly considered cultural dimensions
in its proselytizing outreach. This has given it greater flexibility without
compromising its main principles and mission. Persis and Al-Irsyad have
survived, but have not grown like Muhammadiyah, which continues to
expand. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Muhammadiyah
was threatened to a minor degree by political movements associated with
“jubah proselytizing” (named after the traditional Saudi cassock-like
robe); these attacked several Muhammadiyah charity centers with a high
level of intensity. Muhammadiyah was already beset with heavy burdens,
and many of its branches were no longer functioning (in one region only
28 percent were reported to be still active). Naturally, this represented
a challenge for the survival of Muhammadiyah. If the branches were
destroyed, Muhammadiyah would lose its standing at the grassroots
level.
To return to the Islamization process. Naturally, Islam’s victory in
Nusantara was phenomenal. Two giant religions whose ancient footprints
had been implanted in Nusantara for centuries were thrust aside, with the
exception of Hinduism’s persistence in Bali. Here and there Buddhism
also lives on in certain parts of society, especially in Java. The 2000 census
shows the numbers of religious adherents and their percentage among the
entire Indonesian population of 201,241,999. Hindus numbered 3, 651,939
(1.81 percent); Buddhists numbered 1,694,682 (0.84 percent); Muslims
numbered 177,528,772 (88.22 percent); and the combined Protestant and
Catholic communities numbered 17,954,977 (8.92 percent).²⁰ In 1900, the
population of the Dutch East Indies (as Nusantara was known) was only
about 30 million.²¹ A century later the population had increased seven-
fold, with no change in the percentage of Muslims. Although there is no
conclusive answer as to why Islam achieved an overwhelming majority
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of religious followers in Nusantara, there certainly are historical studies
that have attempted an explanation. I will be speaking of this further.
I have mentioned that the Hindu and Buddhist religions had been
very influential in Nusantara for centuries, particularly among the elites,
while most of the population did not move very far from their traditional
animist beliefs. There was a “general consensus,” writes Van Leur, “about
the fact that Hindu culture only touched the top level of Indonesian
society, and even then, only in certain aspects of life.”²² With the coming
of Islam, the socio-religious map of Nusantara went through a drastic
change, at least demographically, as we have seen. We therefore need
to find the answer to the difficult question: Why did Islam become the
religion embraced by the majority in Nusantara after so many centuries
of Indianization, albeit elitist in nature?
Once Islam became the religion of the majority, the friction that later
occurred with Christianity did not greatly affect the religious balance.
Christianity and Islam are both known as missionary religions and have
competed with each other since the seventh century in Southwest Asia,
Africa, and Europe. Both sides were involved in the long and bloody
Crusades (1095–1291) that the Christians initiated. This historical wound
is still etched in the memories of both communities in various parts of
the world. There is no comparable wound in Islam’s relationship with
Hinduism and Buddhism, even though India, the birthplace of these two
religions, was for centuries under Muslim rule. However, Muslims do not
generally call that rule a form of colonialism. Why, for example, would
Muslims feel uncomfortable about saying that Hindu India was under
Muslim colonial rule? The same goes for Catholic Spain (Andalusia) –
why don’t they say it was an Arab Muslim colony for centuries? That
this particular Muslim colonial system was in fact not harsh, did not
force the population to convert to Islam, and did not drive the people
out, is another matter. In the hundred years after the passing of the
Prophet Muhammad, Islam expanded at high speed. If that expansion
had not been checked by Charles Martel at Poitiers in southern France
in 732, all of Europe might have been under Muslim rule – but to such
hypothesizing, there is no end.
The Rise of Islam in Nusantara
The kingdoms of Nusantara with their Hindu and Buddhist features
gradually but inexorably were replaced by a system of rule with Islamic
features. We can take the example of the Kingdom of Majapahit, which
contained a mixture of Hinduism and Buddhism. According to Coedès,
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there are several reasons why Majapahit, the last of the Indianized
kingdoms in Nusantara, collapsed. The main reason for the fall of
Majapahit was the emergence of Malacca as a commercial center ruled
by Muslims. Islam had set down footprints along the coast and, from the
beginning of the fifteenth century, had gradually spread inland. Second,
Majapahit was afflicted by internecine struggles for power.
The king of Majapahit, Rajasanegara, died in 1389 and was succeeded
by his son-in-law and nephew, Wikramawardhana. After several years on
the throne, in 1401 Wikramawardhana was opposed by Wirabhumi, the
son of Rajasanagara by a concubine. The ensuing civil war lasted until
the death of Wirabhumi in 1406. Although Wikramawardhana retained
power, Majapahit’s fragility could no longer be sustained. It survived the
civil war for just over a century.
The third reason for Majapahit’s collapse, according to Coedès, was
the interference of the Yongle emperor of Ming-period China, who tried
to uproot Javanese power over all of Nusantara and the Malay Peninsula.
The Muslim Chinese admiral Zheng He was tasked with implementing
this mission. In response, several emissaries were sent to China from
Java, formerly subjugated byMajapahit, bearing tribute.²³ This meant that
Majapahit had lost its moral and political authority.²⁴ There is no definite
year to mark the fall of Majapahit, but its final collapse is estimated to
have taken place between 1513 and 1528. There is no evidence that this
collapse happened suddenly from the blows of the newcomer: Islamic
power.²⁵ The disappearance of Majapahit from the stage formally marked
the end of Indianization in the system of statecraft in Nusantara, where
it had played a role since the beginning of the fifth century ce. The
Indianization process lasted for over a millennium and bequeathed rich
cultural and political legacies to the people of Nusantara.
Islam now took the place of Hinduism and Buddhism. If the process
of Islamization really began in the seventh to eighth centuries ce, as the
Medan Seminar concluded,²⁶ Islam’s ascendancy as a political power to
replace the established order must have been a long and difficult struggle.
Historical evidence concerning this crucial issue is far from conclusive.
What is even more astonishing is that when the Islamization process for
which we have evidence began at the end of the thirteenth century, inter-
island communications were very primitive and time-consuming. Still
this wave kept rolling on, irresistible to any power, including eventually
the gunpowder and firearms of Europe. The temperament of the sailor-
merchants of Nusantara may have made a significant contribution to
this Islamization process. Trading and proselytizing were an important
part of the panorama of Nusantara at that time. There must have been an
extraordinary passion to expand the radius of Islam.
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I have said above that Islamoffered an egalitarian position for everyone
in the eyes of God and the eyes of history, a doctrine not offered by
Hinduism. This may be one explanation for the emergence of Islam
as the timeless victor, up to the present day. The Dutch sociologist
W.F. Wertheim, the thesis adviser of the renowned historian Sartono
Kartodirdjo, did in fact observe a sharp contrast between Islam and
Hinduism in the status of people in their collective lives. But we must
also be honest and admit that in certain social segments, some of
the Islamic umat did not always obey the teaching of its religion to
hold fast to the principle of egalitarianism. I shall give an example of
this further on. Let us first follow Wertheim’s argument concerning
how thoroughly Islam humanized so many Asian anti-egalitarian
practices:
Islam has made contributions on a large scale to the humanization of
very many Asian customs and practices. The concept of the equality
of humans did not lead to the eradication of slavery, but, as with
Christianity, directed a better treatment of slaves and adopted children
… which contained an acknowledgment of the principle of basic
equality between free men and slaves.²⁷
It has been said that Islam restored the self-worth of society’s “little
people.” The following excerpt makes this difference all the more clear:
The attraction of Islam for traders who lived under the rule of Hindu
nobles must rather be found in the world of ideas: Islam gave underclass
people a consciousness of their individual worth as members of the
umat of Islam. In Hindu ideology, such a person was only a creature
who was lower than members of the higher castes. In Islam, he or she
could, so it was said, feel equal to those others, or even, albeit lower in
the social structure, in his or her quality of being a Muslim, superior
to them, since they themselves were not Muslims. In this sense, Islam
could be seen as the trigger of the revolutions that occurred in the
twentieth century.
To put it another way, in Islam people felt that their self-worth was
not bound by the walls of caste that served to denigrate their human
dignity for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. Very similar phenomena
occurred when the Crescent Moon confronted the Cross in the struggle
for influence in Nusantara, which I shall discuss.
However, as mentioned earlier, over the course of history there
have also been groups of Muslims who feel they are better than their
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coreligionists, albeit not as sharply as in Hindu society, either because
of bloodlines or from other artificial attributes. Among people of Arab
descent, for example, the Sayyid group, which claims descent from the
Prophet, feels grander than the non-Sayyids. In aristocratic circles, there
is a certain haughtiness toward ordinary folk, whereas it is quite possible
that the aristocrats themselves are the descendants of pirates or brigands.
Or, for the rajas of Java, it is not impossible that the blood of Ken Arok, a
former brigand of Tumpel who robbed Ken Dedes of Tunggal Ametung,
flows through the veins of these nobles. We should not be so proud of
bloodlines and descent. All will be wiped out if it is not accompanied
by good personal qualities. Pride based on bloodlines and origin, but
without real achievement, never lasts long, except through compulsion.
And compulsion sooner or later will trigger discontent, which in turn
leads to popular rebellion against the ruling elite. The more intelligent
the common people, the harder it is to manipulate and trick them subtly,
let alone coarsely. The Indonesian revolution of 1945–1949 was not just
against foreigners who wanted to reestablish colonialism, it was also
against the feudal system.
We might ask the Quran, Who is the greatest and highest in degree in
the sight of Allah? Are such factors as blood or descent important, as
seen in feudalism? Are ethnicity, skin color, or language the determining
factors? Or, in modern times, is it the person holding academic, military,
or bureaucratic titles? The firm and complete answer is: “Indeed, the
most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you.”²⁸
For me, this verse is a forthright declaration of the teaching of equality.
To gain this most honored position, in Islam the door is wide open for
all people who work hard and sincerely. Bloodlines, origin, position, and
background all fall down when confronted with the spear-point of this
verse. Before the Quran, all humankind is given the same position and
the same ranking, like the teeth of a comb. For that reason, Islam ideally
desires the formation of an egalitarian, moral, and meritocratic society,
that is, a social order that gives a respected position to a person based only
on personal integrity and quality, as well as his or her commitment to the
noble, just, and civilized values of humanism. Islam strongly emphasizes
the fostering of a strong and whole human character, and never more
than in a leader. A person of weak character occupying an honored and
strategic position will bring about disaster.
Over the course of the history of Islam, we frequently run into leaders
or rulers who are weak of character, entailing all possible bad results for
their countries and people. There is a saying that expresses how valuable
good character is: “When wealth is lost, nothing is lost / When health is
lost, something is lost / When character is lost, everything is lost.”²⁹
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In the history of prophethood, long before being elevated as Prophet
and Messenger, Muhammad was known by the public at large as
possessing a lofty character, having been granted the honorific title
of al-amin (the trusted one). His character is immortalized in the Quran
in the verse, “And indeed, you are of a great moral character.”³⁰ So great
was the character of the Prophet in that age that the Quran calls upon all
those of faith to accept Muhammad as Messenger and good example.³¹
The objective and honest witness of history will surely reinforce this
affirmation by the Quran. One of the hadiths says that Muhammad has
the best temperament and behavior of all of humankind.³²
More than five centuries after the passing of the Prophet, a military
figure appeared who was legendary in the eyes of both friends and
foes. This was Salahuddin Al-Ayyubi (1137–1193), known as Saladin. He
succeeded in taking back Jerusalem in 1187 after that city had been in
the hands of the Crusaders for almost a century. He did not have one
drop of Arab blood in him, but it was he who succeeded in uniting the
Arab world – Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia – thanks to the quality
and character of his leadership. Saladin was born an Armenian Kurd.
He was a noble general of war and a lover of the sciences, and he
treated his enemies humanely. He paid homage to the Arab Abbasid
dynasty, which had been ruling since 750, although by now its authority
was much diminished. No Arab general was the peer of Saladin in
strength of character, thanks to the Islamic education that formed his
personality.
The figure of Saladin is historical proof that the character of a person
can outdo bloodlines and origins. To this very day, the Muslim world
feels the highest respect toward this leader from the era of the Crusades.
Unfortunately, Saladin had no idea how to do away with the system of
dynastic politics, because, at that time, Quraysh blood – the blood of
the Prophet’s clan – was still believed to confer the right of leadership.
This theory of succession has still not been entirely corrected. It is even
growing in influence in some countries, with its relationship to the
monopoly of power and economic resources. Under these circumstances,
Islam has become the prisoner of power politics. Yet sooner or later, the
corruption will be revealed.
TheKhawarij faction (a puritanical splinter group) from the beginning
held the view that whoever managed to become the leader, his origins
would notmatter, even if hewereAfrican.What, after all, was themeaning
of skin color compared to the quality of devotion and piety that formed
a person’s character? But the radical methods and the path of violence
that this group took to achieve its aims and its egalitarian theory did not
reverberate strongly, and they ultimately fell by the wayside. Khawarij
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extremism reached such a level that its followers even condemned as
heretical Uthman and Ali, whom they judged to have committed great
sins, a position that was rejected by themajority of the umat.³³ As a result,
the Khawarij faction attracted widening antipathy in those early days;
now its followers have become a small, even moderate, minority. The
Khawarij emerged after the peace between Ali and Muawiyah following
the Siffin War in 658ce. Some 12,000 followers of Ali deserted in protest
against that peace treaty, and these were the ancestors of the Khawarij
faction, who for the most part originated in the rural areas in the east of
the Arabian Peninsula.³⁴ Even though this faction has fallen in numbers,
its sectarian spirit persists within theMuslim umat everywhere, including
Nusantara, going by various names and claiming various justifications,
each faction under its own leaders. “Khawarij blood” still flows in the
river of history of the Muslim umat.
Let us return to our original analysis. In Nusantara, when compared to
the Hindu kingdoms, the system of Muslim rule was clearly looser, even
if it followed the dynastic pattern, a deviation from the example set by
the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (632–661ce). With the elevation
of Yazid as ruler by his father Muawiyah in 680, the egalitarian political
system in the world of Islam disappeared for over a thousand years. The
remnants of this Islamic dynastic political system still survive into the
twenty-first century in several Arab countries, in Brunei Darussalam,
and, to some extent, in Malaysia as well, although the rulers there
have more of a symbolic and ceremonial function, as in Great Britain,
its former colonizer. In Brunei, the sultan is the functioning head of
state.
In all the dynastic political systems, the egalitarian principle has never
been given proper respect. The position of individual citizens is based on
descent, a principle that is demolished by the Quran, as shown in the
above excerpts. In modern times, this doctrine of egalitarianism still has
to be pondered over and over in the interest of clarifying for the Muslim
umat that for centuries their fundamental rights have been plundered by
the dynastic system. As for those Muslim writers who defend the dynastic
system, my suggestion to them is to consult the Quran and the evidence
from the early history of Islam. They should not look at the period of
history when Islam was contaminated by the political culture of Persia
and Byzantium, beginning in the time of the Umayyads (661–749/750).
The rulers were Arab, but their system of rule was imported from those
two empires. Hadn’t Muawiyah, before becoming the sole ruler, served
as governor in Syria for twenty years? Syria itself had formerly been part
of the Byzantine Empire.
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As a political system, the Abbasid Empire (750–1258), centered in
Baghdad, simply carried on the Umayyad pattern, but was more open to
other ethnic groups, especially Persians, who originally had been in the
position of mawali (vassals or second-class citizens).³⁵ Significantly, the
Abbasid army from the lands of Khorasan (Persia) smashed the Umayyad
force, causing huge numbers of casualties among fellow Muslims.
In one aspect, there is a slight similarity between the Hindu political
system and that implemented by the Muslim kingdoms in Nusantara, and
that is they both had dynastic features, absent the caste system of Hindu
society. Muslim kingdoms such as Pasai, Siak, Jambi, Tuban, Gresik,
Demak, Cirebon, Banten, Ternate-Tidore, Banjar, Bugis, Minangkabau,
Aceh, and later, Mataram, all had a dynastic character, with the head of
the state being a raja, sultan, or other title, complete with “sensational”
honorifics. Some of these (rendered literally) are: Glorious Sultan King of
the Great Universe; Spike of the World; He, the Great Ruler; Sultan Who
Holds the World in His Lap; His Majesty, Spike of the Universe. These
dynastic systems were an extension of those that took hold in the Arab
world with the death of Muawiyah. The Byzantine and Persian patterns
were taken over by Muslim rulers for a long period of time because, of
course, it pleased and benefited them. The principle of egalitarianism in
the fullest sense was never realized in any of the Muslim kingdoms of
Nusantara. In the succession of power, the factor of blood became a sort
of axiom that had to be held on to, even though in the eyes of the Quran,
it is a very fragile factor, as fragile as a spider’s web: “The example of
those who take allies other than Allah is like that of the spider who takes
a home. And indeed, the weakest of homes is the home of the spider, if
they only knew.”³⁶ As a result of this deviation, political theory never
developed in the Islamic world for hundreds of years, to say nothing
of the principle of shura (consultation) as the Quran teaches us. If I
criticize the dynastic-aristocratic political system I am not automatically
defending the democratic system, except under several conditions, which
I shall be cite, as relevant, in Chapter 2.
When and for what reasons did this large-scale process of Islamization
happen in Nusantara? It took only a short time, from about the fifteenth
to the sixteenth century, continuingmore intensively into the seventeenth
century. It is little understood how closely the development of Islam
in Nusantara was linked to the world of trading. This was a world that
was dynamic and egalitarian. The north coast of Java, with its harbor
cities, had built up a trading network – which long had Islamic features –
with Malacca, Pasai (in present-day Aceh), Bengal, Gujarat, and even
Iran. Generally speaking, the traders were creative people, sensitive
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to the winds of change, including changes in the system of values.
Social systems that involved caste greatly hindered the dynamism of this
constant movement, to say nothing of the low regard that Hindus and
Buddhists held for trading activities. From its earliest times, however,
Islam was propelled by a Prophet who earlier in his life had been a trader.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that Islam provided a strong impetus
to traders to expand the scope of their activities with commercial
centers ruled by Muslims. If the Muslim umat later lost out in the
world of trade, that came about from a loss of entrepreneurial ethos and
acuity.
The historian Sartono Karodirdjo (1921–2007) saw several factors that
facilitated the Islamization process, notably in Java. They include the
following:
. The completely open urban atmosphere impelled structural tenden-
cies for greater mobility, including changing religions.
. The old society that was disintegrating and losing its orientation
needed a new identity and new values.
. With the decline of the centers of Hindu-Buddhist power, changes
in social structures brought changes in power structures.
Islam provided a new identity and new values, which in turn buttressed
that process of change.³⁷ Majapahit had weakened politically and
economically, and thus the weakening of its social structure was only a
matter of time. As well as through trade, Islamization proceeded through
the path of mysticism, as pioneered by Abdurrauf from Singkel (also in
northern Sumatra) and Syamsuddin from Pasai in the sixteenth century,
which had a significant impact on coastal Sumatra and Java.³⁸ Benda
also sees these mystics and sufis as accelerating the influence of Islam in
Nusantara: “Most probably these sudden changes were brought about by
the spread of sufistic teachings which played a role as an impetus of this
belief across the Asian continent and even to China. Furthermore, this
Islamic mysticism was spread to Indonesia, not by Arabs, but by Muslim
Indians.”³⁹
Once again, an Indianization process occurred, but this time it was
an Indianization with Islamic features. If Islamization was as lengthy
a process as stated by the Medan Seminar, which dates Islam’s arrival
in Nusantara to the seventh or eighth century ce, then many links
must be connected to explain that process. Therefore, several writers
use historical accounts, tales and romances, family chronicles, annals,
and other literary forms to connect these broken links, in spite of the
difficulties in addressing the quality of these sources based on standards
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of critical history.⁴⁰ People will always ask about the tracks leading up to
an event, and if the sources are lacking they turn to tales and the like –
with all their weaknesses and deficiencies. Such sources must be used
with extreme care.
Still in regard to Islam’s progress in Nusantara, the historian Anthony
Reid notes two more aspects in which Islam was superior to the Hindu-
Buddhist cultures whose rulers had exhausted their energies in clashing
with the newcomers. First, Islam had a superiority in weaponry as the
logical extension of “the general prosperity and international contacts
available to the Muslims.” He mentions, for example, that the Ottoman
Turks had sent artillery to assist Aceh in “winning many battles in the
sixteenth century.” Not only that, “Muslim Chinese were often found to
be among the sharpshooters and armorers in the cities of Southeast Asia,
especially the Javanese ones of Giri, Gresik, and Banten.” Not many of us
have such an appreciation of the role of those Chinese Muslims in the
process of Islamizing Nusantara. Second, Reid cites the quality of faith of
the Muslim umat, which felt that God was always on their side, even
though they were the minority. Their sense of solidarity and belief in
themselves came from the quality of that faith.⁴¹
In this chapter we have discussed Hodgson’s “quarrel” with Geertz
on the penetration of Islam among the Javanese. Here I would like to
bring in the views of Karkono Kamajaya Partokusumo, who during his
lifetime was known as an expert on Javanese culture. (His understanding
of Islam was close to that of Muhammadiyah.) For Karkono, Javanese
syncretism should not be so quickly judged or denigrated. The following
passage explains his view:
Even though their Islam is syncretic, they would never accept being
called non-Muslim. As Javanese, they still follow tradition, ceremonies,
and symbols, but their faith and monotheism follow the teaching of the
true Islam. Many of the Javanese traditions that contain symbols do
not have to be seen as polytheistic. Those symbols and traditions are
distinctive characteristics of the Javanese, just like the singular traits
that are still associated with other ethnic groups.
Whenever Islamic practice in Java or the Islam of the Javanese people
is as I have described it, don’t let this become a basis for dispute and
reprehensible actions.
From the time when the first Javanese Muslim raja R. Fatah was
crowned Sri Sultan Syah Alam Akbar in Demak in 1480 up to the
present, when our country has become independent and is a republic,
Javanese culture has always existed side by side with Islam, intertwined
and complementary. There has never been compulsion or conflict
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that has forced Javanese to abandon their traditions. In my opinion,
traditions will surely shift or change in line with societal trends and the
strength of religious practice.⁴²
Naturally, in the cultural domain, there has never been compulsion to
become a puritanical Muslim, although matters may be different in the
realm of power politics. It is often the case that religion is unable to guard
against the ambitions of power politics. This occurs in all civilizations.
In view of this, we should be cautious in differentiating between the
expansion of power politics and religious development. Both Spain and
India were under Muslim rule for centuries, with the majority of their
people remaining non-Muslim. In India, the relatively unsuccessful
Islamization process, compared to that in Spain, may have been due to
the oppressive caste system. Islam was viewed as a solution, even though
the majority of ordinary Indians remained Hindu. A portion of those
who were Muslim left to form Pakistan and then Bangladesh. However,
in modern India there are about 140 million Muslims, more or less 14
percent of the entire population, which now numbers 1.324 billion (2016),
second in the world after China’s 1.379 billion (2016).
Thus, the widely held theory about the pénétration pacifique in the
advance of Islam in the face of this expansion of power politics needs to
be corrected.⁴³ That theory is correct to the extent that it concerns the
spread of Islam as a religion and a cultural force not occurring through
compulsion, as this would conflict with the principles of theQuran, which
was generally the reference used by the proselytizers of this religion.⁴⁴
But, if it relates to the spread of power, warfare is usually unavoidable.
In this respect, we must read the conclusion reached by Ricklefs,
which says: “Islam was spread in Indonesia not simply by persuasion
and commercial pressures, but also by the sword.”⁴⁵ Ricklefs should
also differentiate between Islam as a cultural force and expansionist
behavior by Muslim rulers to achieve their political agendas, which
were occasionally no less deplorable than those of their non-Muslim
counterparts. In fact, the stench of such behavior was more terrible in
the struggles for power among Muslims themselves, as may be seen in
various periods of the history of the Muslim umat.
Let us look at one such example. Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607–1636),
highly admired by the people of Aceh, acted cruelly in building his power
by murdering all the orang kaya (the independent nobility who were
influential in the maritime political system) when he accused them of
undermining the throne and stealing state property. Not only that, but
Sultan Iskandar Muda also had all his sons condemned to death to avoid
power struggles. The result of this was that for three generations after
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Iskandar, the Aceh sultanate was ruled by sultanahs (female rajas), who
were easily influenced by the orang kaya of succeeding generations, who
quickly reappeared after the demise of Iskandar.⁴⁶ And so, let us not
exaggerate the greatness of a leader to the point that his despicable deeds
are simply covered up. History wants to force open the past just as it was,
but this difficult to do. Apart from the requisite source material that is
never complete or unbiased, it is not uncommon for the political interests
du jour to present obstacles to our search. But an uncompromising
historian will never give in to the limitations of source material and
political obstacles. He or she seeks to expose the reality of the past, even
if rulers stand in the way.
We cannot close our eyes to the dark events of history. Religion is not
infrequently used to justify or legitimize a system that betrays themessage
of that same religion. Fatwas issued by religious scholars throughout
history often have a partisan cast in their efforts to defend the existing
power. In the past, religious arguments were often aimed at winning
over the common people so they would not be inclined to revolt against
Muslim tyrants, even if this has not always been successful. I believe that
fatwas such as this are nothing more than betrayals, backed by religious
arguments, of the holy aims of the religion itself. Such fatwas clearly are
made-to-order for rulers intent on holding onto their thrones, or they are
issued to curry favor. True religious scholars are those who issue fatwas
based on religious teachings; they are understood to be honest and brave
in the face of all threats and inducements. Those who courageously issue
proper fatwas are the religious scholars who are strong of character. But
how rare such individuals have been!
In the progress of Islamization, something paradoxical occurred that is
worthy of note. It was the arrival of the Westerners in Nusantara and their
Christian missionary activities that accelerated Islamization. There is an
interesting perspective here. Islamization commenced at the time when
Indianization had reached a dead end both politically and culturally.
An acute crisis hit the Indianization process, which had reached its
saturation point. The Islamic experience pointed to another reality.
With the arrival of the West and the wave of Christian proselytization,
Islamization progressed all the more quickly and firmly. In contrast to its
previous interaction with Hindus, who had come from Asia, now Islam
had to confront Christianity, which even though it had originated with
the Prophet Abraham, was now Westernized. Long before the sixteenth
century, Christianity and Islam had been engaged in a fierce armed
struggle during the blood-soaked Crusades. These had started with
Pope Urban ii’s speech at the Council of Clermont in 1095 and ended in
1291 with the fall of Acre and the control of all Palestine by the Muslim
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Mamluks. Echoes of those Crusades were felt in the contest between
Islam and Christianity in Nusantara, beginning in the sixteenth century
and continuing to the present day.
It is an incontrovertible fact, not only in Nusantara but in various parts
of the world, that once Islam has set down its cultural footprint, however
imperfectly, its adherents only very rarely change their faith, and this only
in certain cases. Take the example of Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587–1629),
who twice served as the Dutch governor-general in Batavia (1619–1629).
Coen was not only known as having been singularly instrumental in
strengthening the position of the Dutch East India Company by violent
means – destroying anything in his way⁴⁷ – he was the first person to
introduce the rice-for-faith system. That means that each child who
studied in a Christian school was given a pound of unhusked rice. Hence
the term “rice Christians,” people embracing religion for material gain, as
Wertheim has written.⁴⁸ As history unfolded, Coen’s tactics were never
effective, because generally faith that can be bought with material things
is a low-quality faith.
With all its weakness in all the different aspects of life, the percentage
of the Muslim umat of the entire population of Nusantara is very high,
about 88.22 percent.⁴⁹ This is the strongest indicator that converting out
of Islam for any Muslim is virtually unimaginable, to say nothing of a
well-educated one. The cases that deviate from this general pattern are of
little concern, although they still need to be stemmed. The worrisome
problem is when the quality of the Muslim umat overall is unacceptably
low. Ignorance is the main reason for the poverty and backwardness
suffered for centuries by the Muslim community throughout the country.
So the greatest enemy is the disease of ignorance, which produces
poverty and backwardness. The most important jihad should be to drive
this sickness out of the body and spirit of the Muslim umat. If this
problem of ignorance can be overcome, then the solution for so many
other problems can be found. But this requires changes in the paradigm of
thinking. From the quantitative – the numbers chase – to the qualitative,
it calls for pursuing quality in every domain: science, technology, the
economy, social and moral spheres, and Islamic thinking. Because of
that, speeding up the process of sharpening and enlightening the mind
is the only choice open for the Muslim umat to regain the posistion of
khaira umma, “the best community,” as the Quran expresses it.⁵⁰ Each
Muslim nation may compete pursuing this ideal. Unless it radically
changes its paradigm of thinking, I worry that God will look askance
at this umat, for it is still steeped in and lulled by a false pride in the
name of religion; it is sunk in the greatness of the past, but it fails to
deal with the present, as may be seen in the Arab world. Islam demands
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the birth of an open community that firmly grasps the universal values
of prophethood, but also fosters local values that can be compatibly
integrated to enrich the practice of this religion in collective life. A purely
legalistic approach will only end in the formation of an Islamic culture
that is dessicated and lacking vitality and that surely will not last long.
Humans are creatures that do not want to remain forever deprived in
a culture of aridity. There is a spiritual demand for something that goes
beyond the material.
Let us return to the Islamization process. Why was the advance of
Islamization accelerated by Western expansion? We have already spoken
of the paradox⁵¹ of history in Nusantara. Supposing Western colonialism
had not come to Nusantara, it is no sure thing that the majority would
be Muslim. Thus, the echo of the Crusades proved useful in Nusantara,
in that it broadened the belief that Christianity was the religion of the
colonizer, and as such must be resisted. So it is not surprising that the
doctrine that forms the backdrop of resistance against invasion by the
West was born in the womb of Islam.The nobility who culturally were still
drenched in Hinduism saw Islam as a liberating force. With their entry
into the ranks of Islam, as pioneered by the religious adepts, scholars, and
teachers, the proselytizers of reform, this class of nobles felt that their
position was safe, at least for the present, until they and their religious
leaders were defeated by the gunpowder and artillery of the West.
We do not know for sure what percentage of people in Nusantara
were Muslim when the Europeans arrived in the sixteenth century. But
they were not the majority, even if several Muslim kingdoms had held
a foothold in their territories since the end of the thirteenth century.
“It was especially the arrival of the Portuguese,” writes Wertheim, “that
caused a great number of the nobility to embrace Islam as a political
move to confront Christian penetration.”⁵² From that moment on, the
belief arose that the invasion by the West could be stemmed by Islam,
even if the Muslim rajas did not form a united front. In fact, they quite
often confronted one another. The late, famed journalist Mochtar Lubis,
known to be neutral in discussing matters of religion, never hesitated to
say publicly that Christianity was the religion of colonizers. “Christianity
was equated with the colonial government in the same way as it was as
the religion of the Dutch colonials. Both the Catholic and Protestant
churches in Indonesia always enjoyed financial assistance from their
mother organizations abroad.”⁵³
To lengthen the radius of their influence in the face of the quickly
expanding Islam, the two Christian religions became active in the areas
of education and social and health services, especially in their most basic
forms. Lubis comments further:
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They built schools and hospitals, and the colonial government helped,
protected and encouraged them. While Islam continued its presence
by pribumi [native, indigenous] efforts, the overseas churches kept
pumping in fresh blood and funds for the sake of the mission and
church work in Indonesia. Thus, Christianity even today is marked
by foreign elements, such as pastors and nuns from Germany, the
Netherlands and Italy, and priests from the us or the Netherlands as
well as from other countries.⁵⁴
We need to expand this observation by Lubis. After Indonesia gained
independence, the Muslim side no longer needed to dwell on this because
“indigenization” (pribumisasi) of Catholicism and Protestantism was
proceeding rapidly. There were still foreign pastors and priests, of course,
but their Indonesianness was pronounced in a number of ways. My friend
Franz Magnis-Suseno was born in Germany; in defending Indonesia as
his home, he can outdo the loyalty of native-bornMuslims.My friendship
with Magnis goes back a long way, and we are often seen together in
seminars, forums, and similar discussion groups. On June 13, 2007,
Magnis sent a letter asking me to make a brief recommendation in
the interest of his trip to Europe to raise funds for the construction
of Building s2 and s3 stf (“Philosophy High School”) Driyarkara, in
Jakarta, because the old building was no longer adequate. I was happy to
make that recommendation. It went more or less like this: “Seen from the
aspect of enlightenment, the Driyarkara School of Philosophy has thus
far made many contributions in enriching and sharpening the vision
and views of the Indonesian intelligentsia, whether Christian, Muslim,
or others.”⁵⁵ Magnis-Suseno is among those Catholic thinkers who are
less concerned about the number of religious adherents than about the
quality of the adherents to a religion.
I have found an identical attitude in the Venerable Monk Pannyavaro
of Candi Mendut. In a conversation we had in his monastery one day
when my wife and I paid him a visit, Pannyavaro said that having a
large number of followers is not important, but the quality of their
commitment to virtue is crucial. This monk has been my good friend for
years. We appreciate each other in our differences, but we meet in a moral
riverboat (biduk) for the betterment of all creatures. For me, a sincere
friendship across faiths is very affecting. Humankind is indeed one. But
let power politics intrude into those friendships, and the atmosphere
will shatter, as it frequently does, even between adherents of the same
religion. Examples of this are almost too numerous to mention, whether
in the past or as they continue to accumulate in the present. This is the
effect of pragmatic politics without a clear moral vision.
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Let us return to our discussion. I have been outlining a picture of the past
when Nusantara was still under a colonial system that was very dark and
oppressive for the pribumi population. The churches at that time were
all most unanimous in their support for this system; several academics
have admitted this. The past cannot be changed, but it can be forgiven
for the future of us all. Didn’t the mosques in Andalusia under Arab-
Muslim rule or in India under Mughal-Muslim rule also side with those
in power?
“As long as they developed themselves in Indonesia,” writes Lubis,
“whether Catholic or Protestant, the churches found a pleasant place
in the Dutch colonial structure. There are no records of the Christian
churches criticizing or condemning the cruel and inhuman practices done
to the Indonesian people by the voc or the colonial government, the war
against Banda, the hongitochten in the Maluku, the expansionist war in
Aceh and other regions, the administration of heerendiensten (voluntary
labor for Dutch interests) and kultuurstelsel (forced cultivation).”⁵⁶
Such attitudes are not surprising, because the church leadership of
that era was in the hands of the foreigners. It was not easily differentiated
from the colonial structure. But in the revolution for our independence
(1945–1949), Muslim and Christian worked shoulder to shoulder to drive
out the Dutch, who were trying to reinstate colonialism with the help of
the British. This strongly contrasted with the attitudes of the churches
before the twentieth century.
The Influence of Colonialism, Islam, and the National Movement
I mentioned in the Introduction that it would be difficult for us to imagine
an Indonesia, either as a nation or as a state, had it not been preceded
by a colonial system, and specifically Dutch colonialism, which lasted
longer than Portuguese and British colonialism. It was the former Dutch
colony that became Indonesia. During the Japanese Occupation (1942–
1945), short as it was but no less harsh, Indonesia stood up as a nation
that had been conceived in the 1920s. Nationalism and the independence
movement were the direct result of the Dutch educational system, which
had opened the hearts and eyes of the people of Nusantara. Western edu-
cation had raised a tiger cub. Nationalist leaders gradually headed in the
direction of independence using modern organization, inspired by their
Western education. In this way, colonialism indirectly served Nusantara.
The Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Com-
pagnie, or voc) showed another face of colonialism. Long before the
budding of national consciousness, at the start of the seventeenth century
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the voc had emerged as the trade monopoly power over various agricul-
tural products of Nusantara. In the late eighteenth century the voc fell
into corruption and debt, and in 1799, the Dutch government revoked
the company’s charter and took control. By 1910, the Netherlands had
expanded its control over almost all of Nusantara.⁵⁷ In his self-defense at
the state court in Bandung in 1930, Sukarno exposed the brutality of the
voc:
We know how during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the
East India Company, impelled by fierce competition with the English,
Portuguese, and Spanish, established amonopoly system.We know how
harshly and brutally they implanted and strengthened that monopoly.
We knowhow in theMalukuArchipelago thousands of lives were ended,
rajadoms were destroyed, millions of clove and nutmeg plants were
eradicated every year. We know how, in order to guard their monopoly
in the Maluku Archipelago, the rajadom of Makassar was conquered
and its trade extinguished, so that hundreds, thousands of Makassarese
lost their livelihoods and were forced to become pirates. We know
how in Java, following a “divide and conquer” policy, as Professor
Veth or Clive Day or Raffles might say, one by one the kingdoms fell
under the control of the voc, and the people’s economy was constricted
(by contingenten and leverantien) – yes, was absolutely pressured and
extinguished.⁵⁸
Sukarno was not inventing these accusations; these were the hard facts of
history, and they describe what really happened. Holland, a small country,
had given birth to cruel murderers so it could grab extraordinary profits.
With this bitter fact before us, we blush to speak about civilization and
humanity. We condemn the pirates Sukarno speaks of, but we also must
understand their motives. The colonial system is the skeleton in the closet
of civilization. Human conscience must oppose this system, whatever the
people, whatever the religion. We need to reread and frequently reflect on
a sentence in the first paragraph of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution
in this connection. Let me quote it here: “Whereas independence is
the inalienable right of all nations, therefore, all colonialism must be
abolished in this world as it is not in conformity with humanity and
justice ….” This brief but dense paragraph did not emerge out of nowhere,
but was extracted from the cry of the souls of all those who struggled for
independence through the long years of the colonial system.
Forcing Nusantara under one colonial administrative umbrella would
facilitate the management by the Dutch of this colony, including draining
the wealth of its soil. This was the forerunner of the Dutch East Indies
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colony, which became the main “capital stock” of Indonesia in later days.
The political process of this union constituted another form of indirect
“service,” although built on countless victims. Formore than two hundred
years, the Dutch exerted themselves in so many ways, including war and
diplomacy, to conquer Nusantara. After Aceh was subdued in 1912, up to
World War ii and the arrival of the Japanese in 1942 there was no more
meaningful resistance from the people of Nusantara against the colonial
system.
Thus, the Dutch only had thirty years in which to feel cushioned from
the opposition and disturbances of the Muslim umat. In early times it
had been a sporadic opposition, driven by the spirit of jihad, without
modern weapons. Defeat was a constant risk. But it was precisely this
defeat that gave birth to the multitude of heroes who lie beneath the soil
of Nusantara. Perhaps the correct title for them is Heroes of Nusantara,
not National Heroes, because there was not even the slightest notion of
Indonesia as a nation before the twentieth century.
The factor that triggered the modern national movement was not
the traditional Islamic educational system in the form of the pesantren
(Islamic boarding schools), but the educational system of the West that
opened pribumi eyes and hearts. As well, during the 1930s a number
of Indonesian students from Egypt became especially energetic in the
movement against colonialism. The pesantren system served as a latent
force in this opposition; however, at the outset this concept of a national
movement was not within the frame of the Indonesian identity, so to
speak. Fighting against the Dutch throughout the nineteenth century
was led entirely by the Islamic scholars, the more traditionalist reli-
gious scholars (kiyai), and other Muslim figures. But, to reiterate, it
was not within the context of an Indonesia. Their resistance was to
maintain their own sovereignty and sense of self-esteem. Let us take,
for example, the wars in Maluku, Makassar, Banjar, the Minangkabau
lands, Java, and Aceh, which broke out throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury. All of these were led by local Muslim figures, whether Islamic
scholars or aristocrats. Even though this nineteenth-century resis-
tance was not waged to create a nation called Indonesia, the heroic
struggle became important political capital for the national move-
ment of the twentieth century. Without such capital, how difficult it
would have been to create a nation in an archipelago of thousands of
islands!
When did the national movement under the banner of Indonesia
actually begin? The date is often set as May 20, 1908, when the Budi
Utomo (High Endeavor – bu) society was established. That date is
commemorated annually as the Day of National Awakening (Hari
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Kebangkitan Nasional – Harkitnas). But, historically speaking, is there
a firm basis for choosing this date? To answer this question, I will
excerpt part of my column in the magazine Gatra,⁵⁹ which included
testimony fromAli Sastromidjojo’s autobiography. I believe this testimony
is the property of all the leading figures of the Indonesian Association
(Perhimpunan Indonesia – pi). My argument is based solely on history,
nothing else. I am quoting Ali’s testimony as he gave it in 1923 in ameeting
of the pi:
My national consciousness had only barely reached the level of an
ethnic Javanese identity. For that reason, I then experienced moments
of radical transition in the development of the Indische Vereeniging
(“Indies Association”) to the Indonesische Vereniging (“Indonesian
Association”), which occurred in The Hague, causing a radical mental
change in my soul. Immediately, my feelings of being a Javanese began
to lose substance. Only then did new feelings and a new consciousness
immediately grow. I began to be aware that I was not simply a Javanese,
but was part of a great nation, the Indonesian nation! As an Indonesian,
I was no longer an inlander [“native”], inheemse [“aborigine”] or
bumiputra [“indigene”], but an Indonesian who possessed a motherland
with a new name: Indonesia! … All our thoughts and deeds while
studying in various universities in the Netherlands were aimed at
achieving the realization of those feelings and consciousness of being
Indonesian.⁶⁰
Similar emotions were experienced by other pi figures. For these educated
children of the colony a sense of “Indonesianness” now became a credo
of struggle whose vibrations were growing stronger and louder all the
while.
Next, in that column, I further clarified my argument:
Ali was being quite honest in his admission and his testimony. Aware-
ness of Indonesianness only appeared in the 1920s, replacing regional
identities, whether Sulawesian, Ambonese, or Javanese. But what about
Budi Utomo? We greatly appreciate the energy put out by bu as a
cultural-intellectual movement, but not as the creator of a nation which
henceforth would be known as Indonesia.
Thanks the struggles of the pi, which was then reinforced by the
1928 Youth Oath, the scars of Dutch colonialism appeared as a new
nation on the equator as an archipelagic cluster of lovely islands, as
Ali Sastroamidjojo had described it in his feelings. bu simply had not
conceived of an Indonesia. Between the years 1908–1931, bu closed
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itself off from non-Javanese ethnicities. It was, as the historian Ahmad
Mansur Suryanegara wrote, “an exclusive organization.”⁶¹
Because of that, so that we are honest and fair to our past, I propose
the designation of the origin of National Awakening Day be the
formation of the Indische Vereeniging (“Indies Association”), a name
later made more forceful in Indonesian as Perhimpunan Indonesia
(“Indonesian Association”). Ali said it was 1923 when that change
occurred, while Hatta in his Memoir, wrote that it was in 1922 ….⁶²
But if people feel less than comfortable with this, then just make
Youth Oath Day, October 28, 1928, as the beginning of National
Awakening. The sby-Kalla government should not hesitate to take
the radical resolution in this magazine, because the old resolution is
ahistorical and flawed and thus must be corrected. The building of
our national history must be erected on a firm and proper foundation.
Foundations that are frail will always be shaky, or, to quote the words of
a poet, “A web on a shaky branch won’t last long.” We want Indonesia
to last until this world crumbles!⁶³
In the history of modern Indonesia, there are still many issues that are
not clear, such as who actually took the initiative to launch the attack on
March 1949 in Yogyakarta. Was it Sultan Hamengkubuwono ix? General
Soedirman? Soeharto? There is unanimity that the one on the ground
who carried it out was Lt. Col. Soeharto. And what about Supersemar
(the order of March 11, 1966), which gave authority to Soeharto, who
then, among other things, dissolved the Indonesian Communist Party
(pki) on the following day? Even today there is no certainty about this.
In connection with Islam and the National Movement, I have clarified
that the idea for a National Movement emerged for the first time among
the students in Dutch schools, either in the Netherlands or in the
motherland. The majority of this educated group was Muslim, even
if non-Muslims held important roles, too, such as J.B. Sitanala, Arnold
Mononutu, and A.A. Maramis. I must provide a special note about the
firmness of Mononutu’s commitment to the idea of being Indonesian, as
Hatta recorded it:
In 1925, a lot happened that was connected with the Indonesian
Association. The colonial government [in Batavia] was threatening
the parents of many of the members. Those who were civil servants
were ordered to choose between their children remaining as members
of the Association or their [i.e., their parents] losing their positions.
Among those being threatened was the father of Arnold Mononutu.
This man had become a senior clerk in the Manado Resident’s office.
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Arnold was ordered to choose. Either leave the Association or, if he
remained a member, commencing the following month he would not
receive any allowance from home. This amounted to fl200 per month.
Arnold replied to his father’s letter, saying that he became a member of
the Indonesian Association because of his certainty and he could no
longer withdraw. And because of that, he forgave his father for cutting
off his remittance.⁶⁴
Who wouldn’t be touched by Mononutu’s sense of patriotism, when in
fact he was a Christian, the religion of the Dutch? He made the political
choice to belong to the pi with the fullest certainty, even if it made him
suffer. Arnold Mononutu was indeed a man of character.
And then, during the Revolution (1945–1949), who wouldn’t have
known of T.B. Simatupang, the Christian general who fought side by side
with his fellow Muslim generals to drive out colonialism?
As a result of the brutal politics of the colonial government, the pi
moved quickly, gathering funds every month to assist Mononutu, who
had been cast adrift. But, writes Hatta, these brutal colonial methods
“only strengthened the solidarity among the members of the Indonesian
Association.”⁶⁵ From the aspect of religion, the Mononutu case is quite
interesting. This “son of Manado” put the interests of the nation ahead of
his religious relationship with the colonials. He forgave his father because
he had been forced to cut off his remittances at a time when he, Arnold,
really needed them to continue paying his tuition costs in Europe. So we
see that not only since the era of the Revolution have Christian friends
stood fully for the idea of Indonesia as a nation. Ever since the National
Movement era, these friends of different religions worked closely with
their Muslim comrades for the independence of the motherland. Dr.
J.B. Sitanala, a Catholic, became one of the administrators of pi, then
the target of strong suspicion by the colonial power. Such historical
facts need to be repeated so that the force of national integration grows
ever stronger in the midst of religious pluralism and our variegated
subcultures.
Before we go on to discuss this topic, we ought to step back a pace or two,
and take a look at the sociological map of Nusantara under the colonial
system. Although the influence of the Dutch educational system became
the main driving force of the national movement, the access of pribumi
children to these centers of learning was very limited. Until the 1945
Proclamation of Independence, in terms of power relations in Nusantara,
there were three important social groups whose interactions affected the
colony. First, Dutch people in the home country were represented by the
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Dutch Government in The Hague. Second, there was the community of
the Dutch throughout Nusantara, who were increasingly represented by
the Dutch East Indies Government in Batavia. Third, there was anyone
else, other than the common people who themselves were governed by
the first two groups and whose influence on the government was almost
non-existent.⁶⁶ The colonized people for the most part were illiterate, and
their fates had been at the mercy of others for decades, even centuries.
By the era of the Ethical Policy at the beginning of the twentieth century,
the government had no desire to improve pribumi minds. This was
quite logical for the colonizers, since an intelligent people would clearly
be dangerous for the continuation of the colonial system. The Dutch
were very aware of this problem because they intended to rule rich and
beautiful Nusantara forever in the interests of their little country in
Europe.
At the end of the nineteenth century, there were in all of Nusantara
over 80,000 lower school students, most of whom were in missionary
schools. Of that number, in 1900, only 2,000 native children entered
missionary schools, because the government naturally hindered them
from attending. Thousands of others were in village schools whose
standards were far below those of the missionary schools. Compared
to the total population of 30 million⁶⁷ in Nusantara at that time, only a
small percentage of its children went to schools of good quality. About
90 percent of the illiterate children were Muslim. If we look at the
fact that in 1882, of 40,000 pribumi students, only 44 were girls, we
immediately see that the majority of illiterates were female. To be sure,
the Western educational system was gradually being introduced, but the
Dutch opposed pribumi efforts to educate themselves. The Dutch wanted
to prevent them from getting to know the Western world, for once their
eyes were opened the colonized peoples would resist the West, which in
Nusantara was represented by the Dutch.⁶⁸
However, over the course of a history that began in the early twentieth
century, the eyes of the people of Nusantara did finally open. The
opposition awaited the proper time to explode into the open, even
though it brought much hardship and suffering. How difficult it was for
the pribumi elite to conduct an enlightenment movement in the midst of
such mass ignorance and poverty. The Islam that this mass embraced
was more for spiritual use, while the technology used to win the worldly
competition was ruled by a religion not their own. A religion with a
historical claim so breathtaking would become stranded midway on the
journey if its community were ignorant and poor.
Palmier gives a picture of the extreme difference in income between
the Europeans and the Javanese. On the eve of the 1930 world depression,
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in 1929, 69 percent of the Europeans who lived in Java earned more
than 5,000 florins annually. In contrast to that amount, more than 80
percent of Javanese pribumi, and 69 percent outside of Java, earned less
than 300 florins annually.⁶⁹ Such conditions of poverty and ignorance
in the end gradually drove a people’s movement to change the people’s
fate with their own hands. Thus, we have the birth of Gerakan Al-Iman
(Movement of Faith) through a Malay-language magazine published in
Singapore in 1906, but exported to Nusantara; the establishment of the
Adabiya (Polite Manners) School in Padang in 1909; and the publication
of Al-Munir (Enlightenment) magazine, also in Padang, in 1911. These
were among the responses of modernist Muslim groups to the totally
destitute and illiterate situation of the people of Nusantara. There was no
other way to improve their destiny save through the process of honing
and enlightening their minds.
The following chronology gives a clear indication of the means by
which the pribumi elite confronted wide-eyed the closed, discriminatory,
and conservative colonial system: Al-Jamiʾat Al-Khairiyah (Association
of the Beneficent) in 1905; Budi Utomo (bu) in 1908; Sarekat Dagang
Islam (Islamic Trade Union – sdi) in 1911, which became Sarekat Islam
(Islamic Union – si) in 1912; the Indische Partij (Indies Party – ip) in
1911; Muhammadiyah in 1912; Al-Irsyad (Guidance) in 1913.⁷⁰ We see
that the first two decades of the twentieth century witnessed a flare-up
of popular movements aimed at independence, thanks to the infusion
of the Western system of education their members had received. This
was an unintended and unexpected contribution by the colonials to the
formation of an Indonesian nation several years later.
Something that is rarely mentioned is the radicalism of the Indies
Party, which early on had demanded the independence of the Indies,⁷¹
anticipating the statement of the Islamic Union, which began its agitation
in this cause only in 1917. In that year, si not only demanded self-
government, but also called for independence to be achieved by any
means.⁷²Thismeant that both ip and si had takenmilitant positions, even
though physical preparations and weaponry were completely lacking.
The only thing available was their energy and spirit to break loose from
colonialism. In the colonial climate, these two parties were truly brave and
risked serious danger by taking this political position. Budi Utomo, as an
intellectual-cultural movement, did not follow the si and ip, even though
it was senior to them by several years. So, once again, the designation
of bu as the dawn of the national awakening is in no way supported by
historical fact. Everyone acknowledges bu’s good services in pioneering
the process of enlightenment in priyayi (Javanese gentry) circles. That,
among bu’s contributions, was an important ingredient in the awareness
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of themembers of this ethnic group. In an announcement by the bu board
signed by its secretary Soewarno, which was carried in the Semarang
daily Locomotief on July 24, 1908, we read: “Our organization, Budi
Utomo, was founded on May 20 with an initial membership of some
650 persons. The objective of the organization has been reported most
succinctly by Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad [Batavia News]: to lighten the
burden of the daily struggle of the Javanese bangsa [people, nation]
through a harmonious and spiritual development.”⁷³
The use of the term bangsa for an ethnic group at that time was
actually quite widespread. There was not just a Javanese bangsa, but
an Acehnese bangsa, Minangkabau bangsa, Batak bangsa, Ambonese
bangsa, Sundanese bangsa, Banjar bangsa, and so on, because naturally
the Indonesian bangsa was yet to be imagined in the first and second
decades of the twentieth century.
In the meantime, the proposal to designate si the pioneer of the
national movement is also not correct, as it ignores the pluralism that
could be clearly seen in the pi and Youth Oath circles. The si, known
earlier as sdi (Sarekat Dagang Islam – Islamic Trade Union), had initially
been a movement to empower the economy and trading business of the
Muslim umat that felt threatened by non-Muslim commercial activities
in Surakarta. However, in 1912, a radical transformation that changed
sdi into si took place under the charismatic leadership of Oemar Said
Tjokroaminoto. It was not just the name that changed. The movement
changed its orientation from economic to political. As a result, the
economic empowerment of the Muslim umat was neglected, with the
energies of the Muslim elite now focused on its political interests in
confronting the colonial system. si’s H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, a graduate
of the Dutch Administrators’ School, was the first Muslim leader in
the modern era to emphasize Islam as a “binding factor and a national
symbol.”⁷⁴ Despite his Dutch-style education, Tjokroaminoto did not
want to work in the colonial government. Under Tjokro, si grew quickly
and came to be viewed as a threat to the colonial system. Thus, the Dutch
administration sought a way to weaken the si’s political position by
hitting its centralized power.
Tjokro was also the “godfather” of a number of communist and
nationalist figures who appeared later on, such as Alimin, Muso, Sukarno,
and many others. He was the real father of Indonesian nationalism,
even though this ideological term only became popular in the 1920s.
It is probably not too much to call Tjokro, as Anton Timur Jaylani
did, “the ‘definer’ or architect to build the Muslim nation.”⁷⁵ Aspiring
leaders of the Indonesian nation studied under Tjokro at his home in
Surabaya. Not long after his death in 1934, as has happened repeatedly in
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modern Indonesian history, the psii (Indonesian Islamic Union Party)
split into the Abikusno Tjokrosudjono and Agus Salim factions. Political
egotism was one reason for such factionalizing. Not just the psii with
its Islamic ideology, but parties with Marxist or nationalist ideologies
were also vulnerable to this disease. Generally, factionalism was not
caused by philosophical views that could not be reconciled, but rather
was triggered by the considerations of practical politics. Political parties
led by Indonesia’s intellectual class were never immune from the friction
of interests that brought with them factionalism.
The Birth of Indonesia as a Nation
The movement aimed at the formation of a nation in an effective and
directed way, after a national consolidation process, only came into
being in the 1920s. This development took place both in the Netherlands,
through pi, and in Nusantara, through youth and student organizations
from various regions who had gathered in Jakarta. According to Ali
Sastroamidjojo, there were only about sixty Indonesian students in the
Netherlands at that time. They maintained their fervor in struggling for
the ideals of an independent Indonesia, even though their colleagues
at home were experiencing a spiritual crisis following the failure of the
communist rebellion in 1926–1927. The pi even published a magazine,
Indonesia Merdeka (Independent Indonesia),⁷⁶ a name that was a symbol
of extraordinary intellectual courage if measured by the reality of the
times and where the magazine was published. The era of the 1920s was
a laboratory for the budding and flowering of Indonesian nationalism
and the weakening of regional sentiment. Bahasa Indonesia increasingly
played a central role in fostering the sense of what it meant to be
Indonesian (keindonesiaan), a concept still in its infancy.
Also in the 1920s, youth organizations like Jong Java (Young Java),
Jong Sumatranen Bond (Young Sumatran Union), Jong Minahasa (Young
Minahasa), Jong Islamieten Bond (Young Islamic Union), Jong Batak-
bond (Young Batak Union), Jong Celebes (Young Celebes), Sekar Rukun
(Harmonious Flowers), and the Vereeniging voor Ambonsche Studeren-
den (Association of Ambonese Students) held meetings in Jakarta in an
effort to harmonize their language as they united themselves, leaving
behind local nationalisms and reaching for Indonesian nationalism.⁷⁷
Once again, I need to stress that national consciousness emerged in the
circles of Nusantara youth who had been Western-educated. This is not
surprising, because the curriculum they absorbed in their schools broad-
ened their humanistic perspectives, including the concepts of democracy
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and nationalism, which increasingly commanded their attention. By
opening these centers of education, the Dutch, who had initially only
wanted to mold low-level civil servants, found that they had been nur-
turing ravenous tigers. This process of national awareness advanced very
quickly and reached its climax on October 28, 1928, thereafter being
known as the Youth Pledge. The term pledge seems to have come later,
for its name prior to that was the Congress of Indonesian Youth. Its three
important decisions were:
First: We, the sons and daughters of Indonesia, acknowledge one
motherland, Indonesia.
Second: We, the sons and daughters of Indonesia, acknowledge one
nation, the nation of Indonesia.
Third: We, the sons and daughters of Indonesia, revere the language
of unity, the Indonesian language.⁷⁸
Although the wording of the covenant mentioned “sons and daugh-
ters of Indonesia,” I cannot find the name of any “daughter” among
the committee members. But including the word daughters meant that
the “sons” were well aware of the importance of women in the national
struggle. And, through the Youth Pledge, in the words of the late historian
Sagimun M.D., “the Malay language was crowned as Bahasa Indone-
sia.”⁷⁹ How great was Malay’s contribution to forming an Indonesian
identity!
If we read the names involved in the pi activities in Europe and
the Youth Congress in Indonesia, it becomes clear that the nation was
created by young people in their twenties who had a Western education,
whether in Indonesia or in Europe. They used the weapons of the West
to form a nation, the Indonesian nation. Once again, I emphasize that
this nation was formed and established in general by young people
and students, and a small percentage of the older generation, such as
H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, Surjaningrat (Ki Hadjar Dewantara), Tjipto
Mangunkusumo, E.F.DouwesDekkeer, Agus Salim, TanMalaka, Semaun,
Soekiman Wijosendjojo, and Darsono. But the ones who were directly
involved in the movement to consolidate nationalism in the 1920s were
educated young people.
A poetic interpretation of the wording of the Youth Pledge was given
by the poet scb (Sutardji Calzoum Bachri); it is an interpretation I had
never read in any source. In the speech he gave on culture after receiving
the Jakarta Academy Award on December 10, 2007, scb provided this
commentary on the Youth Pledge: “The Youth Pledge has really never
been known as poetry. But if we look at what is contained in its wording
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there is imagination that is demonstrated by words that are dense but
succinct and full of meaning, so it meets the conditions of being poetry.”⁸⁰
If we look at the committee members of the Youth Pledge, we see they
include Muhammad Yamin and Amir Sjarifuddin, who were talented
poets, especially Yamin. It is not impossible that the text of the Youth
Pledge was drawn up by Yamin. If Sutardji esteems it as poetry, it
makes sense to do so. Yamin initially worshipped the region of his
birth, West Sumatra, and then worshipped Indonesia, later becoming an
ultranationalist.
Let us go back to the problem of the formation of the nation. It is clear
that the emergence of Indonesia as a nation and then as an independent
state are the fruits of the work and struggles of figures in the national
movement, whether they used a political approach or a sociocultural-
religious one. Earlier I mentioned briefly that during the first two
decades of the twentieth century, the Indies Party and the Sarekat Islam
(Islamic Association – si) were born with a political orientation that
grew more radical over time. In contrast, bu, Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad
and others were conceived of having sociocultural-religious orientations.
The combination of these two approaches of the two groups increasingly
awakened the people of Nusantara to the importance and need for the
independence of the motherland, and worried the colonialists. And
the worries of the Dutch were not without basis, because of their bitter
experience in confronting local rebellions that sustained the opposition
to the colonial system, even if only sporadically. The Aceh War (1873–
1912) against Dutch colonialism was the longest and took the most lives,
including several senior officers of the Dutch army. On the Acehnese
side, those who perished numbered in the thousands.⁸¹ Even though
all the popular uprisings ultimately failed in the face of the military
technology and the trickery of the colonialists, the echoes of resistance
were never extinguished from the collective memory of the children of
Nusantara.
In the third decade of the 1920s, the waves of the popular movement
grew all the more powerful, but its political and socio-cultural patterns
remained unchanged. Among the more notable popular movements
born at this time were Taman Siswa (Garden of Students) in 1922, Par-
tai Komunis Hindia (Communist Party of the Indies – pkh) in 1923,
Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union) in 1923, Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of
the Ulama) in 1926, Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist
Party) in 1927, and Perti (Partai Tarbiyah Islamiyah – Islamic Education
and Upbringing Party) in 1930, along with several other local organi-
zations.
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si weakened during the 1920s as a result of the factionalism of its
radical and moderate forces, or, as they were known, the “Red si” and
the “White si.” The Red si fused with the Communist Party, which was
founded by H.J.F. Sneevliet, a DutchMarxist who came to Nusantara with
one purpose: to spread the understanding of communism. The Semarang
branch of the si was successfully “reddened.” After this fracture, the si
never again achieved the greatness of its first four years. But it would be
difficult to find the equal of its services as a pioneer of the movements to
erect the pillars of nationhood through the political approach.
The communist leaders lacked patience. With preparations that were
all wrong, the pkh planned armed rebellions inWest and Central Java and
West Sumatra in 1926–1927. As expected from the start by Tan Malaka,
one important figure who did not support the premature revolution,
the colonial government managed to crush the rebellions in a series of
lightning strikes. Very soon the leaders of these rebellions, the majority
of whom were Muslim, were exiled to Boven Digul in New Guinea, while
the top figures fled. Some reached Russia, the center of the international
communist movement at that time. Lenin’s victory in Russia in the
October Revolution in 1917 and the anticolonial slogans held special
allure for some of the groups in the movement and helped persuade
them to merge with the pkh, including some religious scholars.
The destruction of communist power in Nusantara inspired Sukarno
and his friends to establish the Indonesian Nationalist Party (pni) on
July 4, 1927. The young Sukarno was obsessed with unity. The year before,
in 1926, he had written a long article in the daily Suluh Indonesia Mudah
(The Torch of Young Indonesia) titled “Nasionalisme, Islamisme, dan
Marxisme” (“Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism”). According to Sukarno,
these three political ideologies had to work together in order to achieve
the great goal of the independence of the nation. This is part of what he
wrote: “We are certain that all the leaders of Indonesia are aware that
it is unity that is bringing us to greatness and to independence.”⁸² So
obsessed was Sukarno with the concept of national unity that he seemed
to have forgotten the si’s bitter experience of having been stabbed in
the back by the communists, thanks to the tactics of Sneevliet. For in
1914, Sneevliet had established the isdv (Indische Sociaal Democratische
Vereeniging – Indies Social Democratic Association), which on May 23,
1920, changed into the Partai Komunis Hindia (pkh), the forerunner of
the Partai Komunis Indonesia (pki), with Semaun as its first chair.⁸³ The
isdv was established in Surabaya, and at first all its members were Dutch
citizens.
Even though Sukarno put nationalism at the forefront of his article,
in reality Islam and Marxism as formal political ideologies had emerged
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earlier, through si and the pkh. The party that openly bore the flag of
nationalism was the pni, which had been established only in 1927. And
even if the si did not proclaim its nationalism in the same way, the
character of its nationalism cannot be any more in doubt. In contrast,
the position of the pkh was problematic, because besides struggling
for the independence of the motherland, this party was also loyal to
international communism, with its base in Moscow. The dual loyalties are
obvious from this vantage point: to Indonesia and to a foreign country –
even though Tan Malaka, a pkh figure, often strayed from the general
line of the Comintern (Communist International). Tan Malaka was
never anti-si or opposed to Pan-Islamism, a movement that had been
slandered by the Comintern at a congress in Moscow. Tan Malaka was
a genuine patriot and nationalist who took the weapon of Marxism to
fight colonialism. Marxism, after all, was having its moment of triumph
at that time, particularly after Lenin had succeeded in making the 1917
October Revolution in Russia.
Tan Malaka, born in Nagari Pandan Gadang Suliki, Lima Puluh Kota
Regency, West Sumatra, around 1897, needs to be viewed against the
larger context of the growth of Indonesian nationalism. Unlike other
figures on the left who became increasingly anti-Islam, Tan Malaka
hewed his own unique and independent path. As a true nationalist, Tan
Malaka never kowtowed to Stalin, who had replaced Lenin as the top
leader in the Soviet Union after 1924. Tan Malaka was a free man, a
characteristic that had stuck in his soul ever since his childhood in Suliki,
where it was an integral part of the egalitarian Minangkabau culture.
The proud Tan Malaka, a slave to no one and to no thing foreign,
be it Stalin or the Comintern, was a phenomenon within Indonesian
communist circles. The tuberculosis that was eating away at his lungs
did not diminish his energy or spirit in opposing colonialism. As for his
attitude toward Stalin, let us consider what Mohammad Hatta recorded:
But he [Tan Malaka] would not stay in Moscow. He would not rest, but
was always on the move and struggling for an independent Indonesia.
He would continue his journey to the “Far East” and from there link up
with the independence movements throughout Asia. He would never
be able to live in Moscow where Stalin was dictator. He did not have a
spine that bowed easily. He bowed to principles that were agreed to in
joint consultations, but he could not, and rarely did, bend to any one
individual. In the communism that he had studied, from the start there
was “every one at the same level and feeling as one” – democracy in
the fullest sense. But communism under Stalin planted the seeds of
slavishness within its ranks.⁸⁴
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If he had not been an independent man, how would he have been
courageous enough to set himself against Stalin, the dictator, at the risk of
serious consequences? Tan Malaka was a man without a home in search
of something great: the independence of a people. Sickness and pain
were no concern to him. He was hunted by the colonial system wherever
he went, but he was never deterred. He kept on moving without being
intimidated, for nationalism was in the very marrow of his bones. The
élan of freedom that carried him from the village republic culture of
Nagari Pandan Gadang found increasingly wider and more exhilarating
space beyond his Minangkabau homeland, although it was filled with
traps. The following excerpt from Chairil Anwar’s poem 1943 poem “I”
(“Aku”) describes the passion behind such dangerous adventuring.
I am an untamed beast
Driven from its herd
Even if bullets pierce my flesh
I will attack in rage
I will take the pain and poison
Away in flight⁸⁵
It is unfortunate that Tan Malaka did not live a long life. In 1949, at the
age of fifty-two, he was assassinated by a fellow Indonesian, a vile act
committed by a narrow-minded man. This man did not understand what
Tan Malaka meant for a colonized people, even though the Soviet Union’s
socialist system so praised by Tan Malaka represented hope more than
reality. Communism, so generous with its promise to eradicate poverty
from the face of the earth, in the end was brought to the grave of history
by poverty itself. Of course, Tan Malaka never imagined that one day
communism would collapse as a result of all the promises never realized.
Even though Tan Malaka did not like Stalin, he continued to praise
the socialist Soviet Union, while attacking capitalism led by America and
Britain. In one of his works addressed and dated “Lawu, June 10, 1946”
and published in Bukit Tinggi in 1947, Tan Malaka was certain that the
socialist system was bound to succeed. Sadly, Tan Malaka had no chance
to witness the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the twentieth
century. Such an event – the failure of the Soviet Union’s socialist system
to create a society without oppression and exploitation – would have
been unimaginable to Tan Malaka. As he wrote in the little work just
mentioned:
With the disappearance of the latifundia (estate lands of the aristocracy),
often hundreds of square miles in area, and the aristocratic caste in
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Russia, the oppression and exploitation of the peasants also disappeared,
as did finally the peasantry in the old sense of the word. With the
advances of collectivism (working together) and mechanization (the
use of machines), workers of the land have emerged alongside workers
in the factory and mines.
The position of the worker in relation to the boss (the peasant in
relation to the landlord) has changed into the position of worker to
worker: equality.⁸⁶
We read other praise of the Soviet Union in connection with the problems
of labor and cultural diversity:
In the Soviet Union, the differences in the shape of the body, its size,
skin color, language, and culture of one group of mankind with those
of another no longer gives rise to contention, hatred, and hostility. The
Soviet Union is able and willing to concentrate all similarities of one
group to another, for example, in the necessities of life (political and
economic). It is also willing and able to be flexible about the differences,
for example, as regards language and custom. By using the Russian
language as the medium for all of Soviet Russia and letting Caucasians,
Turks, Mongols use and develop their own languages within one great
“federation” of the socialist system, the contradictions of nationality
have vanished.⁸⁷
Thus, Tan Malaka appears to have been very certain at that time that the
socialism/communism of the Soviet Union would succeed in creating a
just and prosperous society, as dreamed of by communists elsewhere. We
appreciate Tan Malaka the Marxist, even though all his dreams collapsed
forty years after his passing. Therefore, Tan Malaka’s thoughts about
socialism/communism are no longer relevant. But before the Soviet
Union disintegrated and before the Berlin Wall fell, belief in Marxism,
in the West as well, was quite strong. If Tan Malaka had witnessed this
entire historical drama, I am sure that his thinking would have changed
dramatically as well, but his spirit of anti-capitalism might have even
grown harsher. Capitalism as a system of exploiters has notmuch changed
to this day.
Nonetheless, I have to record that Tan Malaka was a phenomenal
figure in the struggle for the nation’s independence, one of the great
leaders who was tireless in fighting for the interests of his people. Chairil
Anwar’s poem, quoted above, captures the energy and pace of his struggle.
The testimony of Rosihan Anwar is worth recording in its connection
to the role played by Tan Malaka: “When I read his life’s history, his
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struggle for Indonesia, his ability to assert his intellectual weight in a
forum like the Comintern – before he was even thirty years old – I see
Tan Malaka as a great son of Indonesia. It is most regrettable that he has
been forgotten.”⁸⁸
Or, in the mournful words of Zulhasril Nasir: “Tan Malaka was a
fighter who died so tragically – someone who tirelessly thought about
and struggled for his nation for over thirty years died at the hands of his
own people.”⁸⁹ His death in Kediri on February 19, 1949, was tragic. I
still cannot accept the cliché of the revolution eating its own children.
Naturally, one’s political choices not infrequently bring a person to a
painful and dark corner of a historical drama. Tan Malaka was a victim
of that drama.
Revolutionaries could not have been responsible for this sadistic
murder. Its design could not have been known by Commanding General
Soedirman, as both he and Tan Malaka shared the same vision of the
struggle. Neither agreed with using diplomacy to confront the Dutch,
and thus both supported continuing guerrilla tactics after the capture of
Sukarno and Hatta in Yogyakarta on December 19, 1948. Alfian expresses
his regret for this murder by asking this question: “Was there ever the
death of a fighter more tragic than this? The general atmosphere of this
tragic death was too complicated to be discussed, let alone be cleared
up.”⁹⁰ With the passage of time, such complexities will become simpler
and the mystery of Tan Malaka’s death will be uncovered. His hostility
toward Sjahrir was certainly not the reason for his murder, because in
1949 Sjahrir was no longer in power. And the humanist Sjahrir was
not the type to finish off his political opponents in so barbarous a
manner.
We do not know how the political elite reacted to Tan Malaka’s
murder – at least, I have not been able to discover the answer to this
question. If the relevant sources could be traced, the reconstruction of
the events would be clearer. In the end, as Franz Magnis-Suseno sees
it, Tan Malaka was a national sage: “Tan Malaka was really a teacher, a
national guru and sage, and the Madilog [his great synthesis of Marxist
materialist dialectics and Hegelian logic] was his teaching.”⁹¹
I have already mentioned the immensely important and strategic role
played by the Indonesian Association (pi) in consolidating the word
Indonesia as the name of a nation. It is noteworthy that the figures behind
this move were young people between the ages of twenty and thirty, who
were still university students in Europe. They devised the term Indonesia
to replace the name “Dutch East Indies” for the colonized nation. In this
connection, Hatta’s speech before the Congress of Democracy in August
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1926 in Bierville, France, to introduce the name of Indonesia before a
world forum deserves to be recorded once again:
To those who criticize our presence at the Congress in Bierville, we
would like to state that our presence showed to democratic people in
the West that there is an unbreakable relationship between the basis of
humanism and the revolutionary struggle for a nation’s independence.
The first step in introducing our motherland Indonesia abroad has been
successful. The name “Indonesia” does not need to be advanced by a
resolution. I was there, and after listening to my speech at the opening
of the Congress, everyone used “Indonesia.” The Dutch people, who in
the opening address were still using “the Dutch East Indies,” did not
repeat that either in debate or in other speech. In their writings to the
outside, to friends and as general information, they said “Indonesia.”
[This they did] especially after exchanging ideas with me. In the agenda
of the Congress leadership, the name “Indonesia” was recorded, and
cannot be changed back to “Dutch East Indies.”
On the basis achieved at Bierville, the Indonesian Association has
been able to convey its propaganda outside the country.⁹²
With confidence in their own intellectual capacity, these Indonesian
youth in their twenties had succeeded in their mission to introduce
the name of a new nation: Indonesia. After Hatta’s speech, the Dutch
delegation naturally felt awkward about repeating the name “Dutch East
Indies,” even though Indonesia was still in the grip of colonialism. It
appears that the experience of colonization had quickly matured our
youthful fighters in thought and deed, as well as giving them access
to world literature. This is rarely found among the members of later
generations, including the present writer.
To be honest, we feel jealous of the pi delegates’ intellectual ability
to argue their views before all comers in international forums. One
such congress was organized by the League Against Imperialism and
held in February 1927 in Brussels. A delegation attended consisting of
Mohammad Hatta, Nazir Sutan Pamuntjak, Gatot Tarunamihardja, and
Achmad Subarjo. Hatta chaired the delegation. In this congress, the
pi delegates succeeded in landing one resolution that called upon the
Congress to:
. Be sympathetic to Indonesian independence movement and always
support it in any way possible.
. Demand the Dutch government to allow full freedom of movement,
abolish exile and the death penalty, and provide a general amnesty.⁹³
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The ambassadors of this colonized nation fought resolutely abroad
against colonialism at the risk of arrest and imprisonment, with all its
sufferings. Living under foreign oppression forged them into intellectual
adulthood before their time. In Brussels, Hatta was chosen to be an
executive member of an international organization that the Congress had
organized: the League Against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression and
for National Independence. Albert Einstein was chosen to be honorary
chair.⁹⁴ That same year, there were wide-scale arrests in the Dutch East
Indies of those accused of involvement in the communist rebellions in
Java and West Sumatra. Planning for these rebellions was held in secret
meetings at the Prambanan Temple in Yogyakarta.
Ali Sastroamidjojo, another member of the pi, recorded that Hatta’s
speech at the Bierville Congress had aroused the fierce anger of the
colonialists. This excerpt explains:
In his speech, Bung Hatta, who at that time was only around twenty-
four years old, spoke out clearly about the struggle of our people
to achieve their independence. The name “Indonesia” was brought
out into the open for the first time in this congress. The Dutch
government, which was always surveilling Indonesian student activities,
had to have known what had happened at Bierville and was highly
incensed. And all the more so, because the name of the colony, the
Dutch East Indies, was presented to the Congress as “Indonesia”
along with information about the objective of our national movement,
i.e., independent Indonesia. In fact, for years the Dutch government
had propagandized that the people they ruled in the colony lived
prosperously, happily, and in peace and quiet, so that people in countries
outside of the Netherlands believed that the Dutch colonial government
was the best [colonial administration] in the world. So, one may well
understand how great the Dutch anger was against Bung Hatta’s speech
at Bierville.⁹⁵
If propaganda for independence outside Nusantara was pioneered by
the pi, inside Nusantara it was accomplished by political parties and
sociocultural and religious organizations. Regardless of frequent internal
conflicts, they all shared one goal: to break free from colonialism.
Anticolonial movements with modern methods were for the most part
centered in Java. West Sumatra was the most prominent anticolonial
region outside of Java. Interestingly, leftist forces throughout the 1920s
and into the 1930s were quite vocal in these Minangkabau lands, and this
movement was generally led by religious scholars educated by Sheikh
H. Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, such as H. Datuk Batuah, who tried
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“to blend Islam with communism.”⁹⁶ Another man who appeared on
the political stage in West Sumatra, the orator Rasuna Said (1910–1965),
was no representative of the left but no less fierce in his opposition to
colonialism. At the age of twenty-three he was arrested and imprisoned
in Semarang. The authorities tried to persuade him to leave politics, but
Rasuna remained unmoved. He was freed in 1939, just as World War ii
broke out. Rasuna was a prominent member of the Permi (Persatuan
Muslimin Indonesia; Indonesian Muslim Unity) party led by Moechtar
Loetfi. Moechtar himself was exiled to Boven Digul shortly after Rasuna’s
arrest.⁹⁷ In the era of Guided Democracy (1959–1965), and even before
that, Rasuna was known to be very close to Sukarno, so that there was
friction between him and other Muslim figures from the Masyumi
political culture who would have been diametrically opposed to this
modernizing group.⁹⁸
In the early 1930s, Permi was not the only object of suspicion. Muham-
madiyah, which was known to bemoderate, was under heavy surveillance
by the authorities. The governor of West Sumatra, G.F.E. Gonggrijp, in
his letter of April 16, 1930, to Governor-General De Graeff, charged that
Muhammadiyahwas “not loyal and had an anti-West attitude.”He advised
that Muhammadiyah in this region no longer be treated like a branch of
the Muhammadiyah in Java. This was a heavy blow to Muhammadiyah,
coming on top of the ban of one of its main figures, A.R. Soetan Mansoer,
from carrying out proselytizing activities.⁹⁹ Strangely, Gonggrijp’s request
was turned down by the Office of Native Affairs (Kantor Urusan Pribumi)
and the Dutch East Indies Attorney General, R.J.M. Verheijen. Gonggrijp
was even urged to “pay more attention to improving relations between
Muhammadiyah and the adat [customary law] authorities.”¹⁰⁰ It appears
that the letter of the executive board of Muhammadiyah to Attorney
General Verheijen sufficiently influenced this official to avoid making
an enemy of the West Sumatra Muhammadiyah. Governor Gonggrijp
himself was then reassigned one year later.
With the weakening of Muhammadiyah’s political influence in this
region, Permi then took over that role, butMuhammadiyah’s proselytizing
continued to permeate Minangkabau society.¹⁰¹ Because of the specific
conditions in Minangkabau at that time, the local Muhammadiyah had
changed its cultural character to a very political one. But after being
reprimanded by its executive board in Yogyakarta, Muhammadiyah
West Sumatra returned to its original function as a proselytizing
movement. In other words, in the interest of proselytizing, the non-
political Muhammadiyah in Java succeeded in tempering the political
position of Minangkabau Muhammadiyah with the good intention of
maintaining cohesiveness and solidarity, albeit at the sacrifice of the
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latter’s short-lived radicalism. There were political benefits as well, as
Governor Gonggrijp was reassigned. The Dutch authorities in Batavia
obviously did not want to see the usually peaceful Muhammadiyah
become radicalized over the Gonggrijp affair.
We now turn to another topic to do a bit of speculating. IfWorldWar ii
had not erupted, would Indonesia have become independent in 1945?
Ultimately, of course, Indonesia did become independent, and there was
enough cause for that: anticolonialist feelings were at a high boil, even
if the leading figures were frequently at odds. The colonial authorities
appeared intractable and had no desire to grant independence to a colony
that they had exploited for so long. The feelings of moral obligation
reflected in the Ethical Policy at the beginning of the twentieth century
had not been aimed at freeing Nusantara, but rather at perpetuating
the colonial system in a more “civilized” manner. Let us look back at
September 1901, when Queen Wilhelmina delivered her address to the
States General, the Netherlands legislature. Here is some of what she
said: “As a Christian power, Holland has an obligation to arrange a better
legal position for the Christian people in the Netherlands Indies, to give
stronger support to the spread of Christianity and provide clarification
to all officials that Holland has a moral obligation that must be fulfilled
toward the people of that territory.”¹⁰²
Note closely the wording of that speech. Wilhelmina still links the
moral obligation she speaks of to strong support for the spread of Chris-
tianity. Meanwhile, the Muslim majority population, poor and ignorant,
is not the main target for empowerment, let alone for independence –
far from it. Therefore, the persistent efforts and tribulations of the
national movement might not have led to independence had World
War ii not occurred. The outbreak of that war gave the leaders of the
independence movement a strategic opportunity to free their oppressed
nation.
Governor-General B.C. de Jonge’s interview with the Deli Courant in
1936 shows he was still arrogantly dreaming. He said, “Weʾve ruled here
with the lash and the whip for 300 years and we will do the same for the
next 300.”¹⁰³ Sjahrir commented cynically: “It’s true that he’s only certain
of this based on his prosecutors, soldiers and – Digul.”¹⁰⁴ It is obvious
from de Jonge’s statement that the Dutch benefited unduly from their
colonial system while the Muslim peoples fared miserably. Poor and
ignorant, they were targeted with the lash and the whip. And having been
lashed and beaten, it was not at all certain they would want to unite. This
is another aspect of the weakness of the Muslim community, which has
experienced the sledgehammer of history time and time again without
learning from its sufferings.
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Here is Hatta’s defense speech of March 9, 1928, before the court in
The Hague: “That Dutch power will come to an end, that is, for me, a
certainty. The question is not whether or not, but whether sooner or later.
Let not the Netherlands deceive itself that its colonial power will remain
strong to the end of time.”¹⁰⁵ In fact, the Indonesian Association wanted
to achieve independence peacefully, but because of Dutch obstinacy
Hatta arrived at “the certainty that Indonesian independence could only
be gained by violence.”¹⁰⁶
Hatta’s prediction was borne out when the 1945–1949 revolution
to preserve the nation’s independence saw so many heroes perish in
the cause. The Dutch, supported by the British, were unwilling to let
go of Indonesia after the Japanese occupation. They felt no shame in
carrying on with their brutal colonial policies. From this perspective, the
Dutch and other colonial powers do not deserve to be called civilized
nations. Quite the opposite, they were barbarians who treated other
people coarsely and rapaciously. But ironically, after independence was
won, that same coarseness and rapacity were imitated by the authorities
of the independent nation. The result is that the people, especially the
peasants, laborers, and fishermen, have yet to truly feel the meaning of
independence. This has been the tragedy of history suffered by many
newly independent nations after World War ii.
At the beginning of his defense speech, Hatta asked why in Indonesia
high-school students were already engaged in politics, unlike in the West
where high-school students only prepared themselves for politics. Hatta
mentioned the names of youth organizations such as Young Java, the
Young Sumatra Union, Young Minahasa, Young Ambon, the Young
Islamic Union, Young Indonesia, and others. Then Hatta answered his
own question, explaining how hideous the colonial system was, and that
it must be ended:
To be able to comprehend the reality, you have to remember that young
people do not teach themselves but are taught within conditions and
situations where they grow and flourish, and in the society where they
exist. In colonial society, a young person quickly experiences harsh and
bitter reality. He sees with his own eyes the suffering of the oppressed
masses. He sees those masses begin to accept their sad fates, how for
decades this youth just submits to the torments of a system that one
day will surely sink out of sight. This youth feels and understands the
suffering and torment of the people. That is the reason why almost
all youth organizations in Indonesia contain in their programs the
following objective: improvement of the social welfare of the people ….
Such youths truly feel the shame of being colonized …. That is why
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the youth of an unfree people, from their earliest years, have grappled
with thoughts that are not experienced by Western youths of the same
age.¹⁰⁷
As one of those colonized youths, at twenty-four years of age Hatta very
clearly described the bitterness and suffering of the colonized. De Jonge
was right; they had been colonized by the lash and the whip.
No less poignantly, two years later, before the colonial court in
Bandung in August 1930, Sukarno answered the charge of using radical
language in the Indonesian Nationalist Party (pni) courses:
Honorable judges, to be sure, my language is radical. My language is
not that of old grannies who faint dead away if they hear the word
“independence.” My speeches are not the sermons of priests in church
or those of the one who does the preaching in the mosque. I am a
revolutionary nationalist, a radical nationalist, a nationalist with the
head of a buffalo! My language is language that comes from the heart and
throbswith a national spirit, throbswith frustration and disappointment
over the calamities and suffering of the people.¹⁰⁸
At the end of his defense speech, Sukarno declared himself to be the
representative of the suffering people:
I am really standing before the court of you honorable judges not as
Sukarno, not asGatotMangkoepradja, not asMaskoen or Soepriadinata.
I stand here as a part of the Indonesian common people who moan
and grieve, as one of the sons of Mother Indonesia who is loyal and
devoted to Her. The voice that issues forth from my throat in this
court now does not exist only within walls or partitions, my voice is
listened to by the people whom I serve, echoing this way and that,
crossing the plains and mountains and oceans, to Kota Raja [and] to
Fak-Fak, to Ulu Siau near Manado all the way to Timor. The common
people who listen to my voice feel that they are listening to their own
voices.¹⁰⁹
The language Sukarno used was truly the language of war, even if
he rebutted all the charges brought against him. The fighter against
colonialism naturally has to be skilled at arguing against such charges,
even though, in its emotional power, language constitutes the overflow
of opposition that smashes the existing system. Hatta and Sukarno
performed their historical tasks most courageously before the courts
of the colonial power. If these two great minds could only have worked
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together longer in the post-Proclamation period, Indonesia would be far
better off than it is at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Why the
partnership of these two leaders broke apart will be discussed in another
part of this work.
During the 1930s, the national movement faced very difficult times.
The main players, such as Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, and many others
were arrested and exiled. Some went to the island of Ende, others to
Boven Digul and Bengkulu, while others disappeared overseas, like Tan
Malaka and several other leftist leaders. Why Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir,
and others stood so strongly against colonialism was not least because
they themselves had directly felt how rotten and brutal that system
was. It was a system that did not value other people as fully human.
Sukarno and Hatta were absolutely certain that colonialism had to end
soon. And that is what happened. With the outbreak of World War ii,
Indonesia was given a golden opportunity to seize the independence
it had so longed for, although it was disrupted by the brutal Japanese
occupation.
Devising a strategy to cope with the Japanese occupation polarized the
leaders of the national movement. Sukarno and Hatta worked together
with the Japanese military, while Sjahrir and his colleagues operated
underground against the occupiers. But it was never in doubt that all these
leaders were against colonial powers, whoever they might be. Therefore,
Sjahrir’s claim that those who collaborated were no different from
“Japanese dogs” cannot be supported.¹¹⁰ Accusing Sukarno and Hatta of
weakening the national movement during the Japanese occupation is a
very unworthy charge. Their years of suffering in exile were proof that
they were leaders who could not be bought.
In March 1942 when the Japanese first arrived, they were greeted with
enthusiasm. Japan had promised to rid them of the Dutch. The Dutch
East Indies government surrendered to the Japanese without resistance
and unconditionally on March 8, 1942, at Kalijati, West Java. Governor-
General de Jonge in 1936 was so certain that the Dutch would be in
Indonesia centuries to come, but Dutch rule crumbled in the face of the
Japanese army. Thus, it was not surprising that the cry Banzai! Banzai!
(“May the emperor live ten thousand years!”) was shouted everywhere
as a sign that Indonesia was on the threshold of independence. Several
months before the Japanese landing, Radio Tokyo had broadcast the
Indonesian nationalists’ song “Indonesia Raya” (“Great Indonesia”).
Even after the humiliating capitulation of the Dutch, “Indonesia Raya”
continued to resound. This was one of the tactics used by the Japanese to
trick the Indonesian people – and indeed, many were tricked – because
not many days later “Indonesia Raya” was forbidden, replaced by the
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Japanese national anthem, “Kimigayo.” Also, the new Indonesian flag,
the Red and White, was taken down and replaced by the Japanese Rising
Sun.¹¹¹
What this all meant was that the Japanese, themselves Asians, were
the new colonizers, replacing the Dutch, who had previously acted so
arrogantly. The cruelty and brutality of Japanese colonial rule left deep
wounds in Indonesia. But it is well worth noting that the Dutch army
did not make a single move to confront the Japanese invasion, showing
how weak the Dutch colonial defense was. Although Sukarno and Hatta
warned that the Pacific War would erupt at any time, the Dutch never
trained the Indonesian people to cope with the danger. The Dutch must
have worried that if they trained Indonesians for war, ultimately the
barrels would be pointed at them.
At the end of Dutch colonial rule, a number of Indonesians were
appointed to the knil (Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger; Royal
Netherlands Indies Army), such as T.B. Simatupang, A.H. Nasution, Alex
Karilarang, Kartakusumah, Oerip Soemohardjo, Soeharto, and several
more. These names converged in peta (Pembela Tanah Air; Defenders of
the Motherland), the defense force organized by the Japanese. After
the Proclamation of Independence, ex-knil and ex-peta members
became the core of abri (Combat Force of the Republic of Indonesia),
the forerunner of the tni (Indonesian National Army). Soedirman, who
later became Commanding General, came from peta. And it is true that
during the Revolution, the former knil soldiers aimed their rifles at the
Dutch army that wanted to reestablish its power.
An interesting point of debate in the relationship between knil and
peta is the idea in some quarters that they conducted a struggle for
command of the army. According to A.H. Nasution (ex-knil), such a
struggle never happened, even though he first wantedOerip Soemohardjo
(a retired knil major) to take the position of Commanding General, not
Soedirman from peta. The following explains what Nasution said:
I had just then selected Pak Oerip, because as a retired major, he was
prepared to be an adviser to the youth groups. That was something
we really appreciated. We were the ones who made this choice. The
role of knil and peta was not too visible then. In my view, none of
those present contested this, and of course we only proposed Pak Oerip
because he had earlier been the Army General Chief of Staff at that
time. Pak [Soe] Dirman came after that. But Pak Dirman was the one
who was chosen, because he had the additional support from South
Sumatra.¹¹²
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Nasution strongly disputed the idea of a rift between elements of
knil and peta at that time. If such an impression was created, it was
because “the psi [the Indonesian Socialist Party] was always concerned
about the problem of a knil-peta rift. For me, that never happened,” he
explained.¹¹³
When asked about the difference between knil and peta, Nasution
replied, “The former knil was clearly just an instrument. But the former
peta in the body of Indonesia had its own spirit, and that spirit came
from Japan, from, among other things, the Bushido spirit.”¹¹⁴ Maybe
it was simply because of the Indonesian taste for sports that the image
was projected of ex-knils fighting it out with ex-petas over positions
in the army, itself as young as the Japanese occupation had been short.
Nasution, in his old age, gave a wise answer. knil and peta had both been
trained by colonialists: the Dutch and the Japanese. They had derived
great benefit from that training in the interests of defending Indonesian
independence. With the Sapta Marga (the “Seven Roads,” or the Seven-
Point Military Code of Honor), the tni (Indonesian National Army)
ideology was firmly in place. Educational background, whether knil
or peta, no longer mattered, especially after 1950, even if there was a
“tendency to Japanize all formalities,” as Nasution said.¹¹⁵
October 5 is celebrated as Republic of Indonesia Combat Forces Day,
originating with President Sukarno’s proclamation on the formation of
the People’s Security Forces (tkr) on October 5, 1945. Because of his
experience in knil, Oerip was appointed to implement the organization
of that newborn army.¹¹⁶ But it was Soedirman who was selected to be
the Commanding General based in Yogyakarta. This shows that in the
military at that early time, a selection systemwas practiced.Up to a certain
point, the military also recognized democracy, in its own way, before
it was put to the test. With the war to protect national independence,
the Indonesian army gradually matured and became experienced in
handling various forms of warfare.
World War ii, the Constitution, and the Proclamation of
Independence
Before going on, we need to look at how World War ii, specifically in the
Pacific, was linked to Indonesian independence. For although fatigue
had enveloped the national movement in the 1930s, the spirit and fire
for independence had never faded or dimmed. Hatta’s and Sukarno’s
predictions about a Pacific War had come true. This war changed the
world map dramatically.
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The Pacific War ended in August 1945. Japan’s stamina for continuing
the war had already weakened. Even if the United States had not dropped
the atom bomb on Hiroshima on August 6 and on Nagasaki three days
later, the defeat of Japan was imminent. There is a very serious moral
question here that needs to be addressed. Many military observers view
the dropping of the bomb as unnecessary, including General Dwight
D. Eisenhower (1890–1969); he indirectly criticizedHarry S. Truman, who
appointed him to lead nato and preceded him as president. (Eisenhower
served as thirty-fourth president of the United States from 1953 to 1961.)
Eisenhower was present when Henry L. Stimson, secretary of war in
Truman’s cabinet, spoke about the potential use of the atom bomb against
Japan. Eisenhower later wrote the following in Mandate for Change:
1953–1956 (1963):
During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of
a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings,
first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that
dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because
I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by
the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer
mandatory as a measure to save American lives.¹¹⁷
But Truman and his supporters were determined to strike Japan with
this terrible weapon. Eisenhower’s voice was not heard.
The scientists bear their own share of responsibility for the use of the
atom bomb against their wartime enemy. This may be seen in Albert
Einstein’s letter of August, 2, 1939, to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
At the very end of the letter, he hinted that Hitler’s Germany was
preparing to make an atom bomb.¹¹⁸ This letter clearly pushed Roosevelt
to develop an American bomb. It is in this context that we must read
the origins of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki drama at the end of World
War ii.
WorldWar ii was born from thewombofmodernWestern civilization,
triggered by the ambitions of the German dictator, Adolf Hitler, the
would-be conqueror of all of Europe. Germany, humiliated by the 1919
Treaty of Versailles following the end of World War i, was waiting to
take revenge. Even a nation like Germany, which had produced so many
scientists and philosophers, could fall into the hands of the bloodthirsty
and territory-hungry Adolf Hitler in conditions of instability and while
bearing a burden of shame.What is hard to understand is the philosopher
Martin Heidegger in the 1930s praising Hitler with these words: “The
Führer himself, and he alone, is the German reality, present and future,
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and its Law.”¹¹⁹ Shortly after thewar, whenHitlerwas nomore, “Heidegger
characterized Hitlerism as an historical explosion of a structural malady
that afflicts all mankind and he stated his concern that it would take a
long time to be free of that poison.”¹²⁰ When Hitler was ashes, Heidegger
found the courage to speak critically of the leader he had praised. (Hitler
and Eva Braun, who were married on the night of April 28–29, 1945,
killed themselves on the following day after ordering that their corpses be
burned.) Of course, it is not easy for someone to live in a totalitarianism
that muzzled every possible freedom of the self. But why didn’t Heidegger
flee from Germany, as Albert Einstein had done, for example, rather than
engaging in philosophical prostitution? Every person exercises his or her
own judgment with all its risks.
In the East, Japan’s Emperor Hirohito was not strong enough to oppose
the plans of his army, which was out to conquer Asia. Thus, it was not
surprising that Japan and Germany forged an alliance. Both wanted to
emerge as the lords of Asia and Europe, respectively, an ambition that
ended in the suicide of civilization. Although the numbers of the dead are
unknown, estimates of the victims of World War ii run between 50 and
60 million, including both military and civilians. The greatest number
of victims were the people of the Soviet Union, who were mobilized to
block Hitler’s invasion. Nothing in history matches the numbers of these
casualties. In the end, Hitler even called upon twelve-year-old children
to take part in the defense of Germany.¹²¹ This dictator created total war
beyond all human reasoning.
The Pacific War led directly to Indonesian independence. After
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, causing great damage and many
Americans casualties, President Roosevelt requested the approval of
Congress for the United States to enter the war. Here is the second
paragraph of Roosevelt’s speech:
The United States was at peace with that nation and, at the solicitation
of Japan, was still in conversation with its government and its emperor
looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Indeed, one
hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in the
American island of Oahu, the Japanese ambassador to the United States
and his colleague delivered to our Secretary of State a formal reply to a
recent American message. And while this reply stated that it seemed
useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained
no threat or hint of war or of armed attack.¹²²
Japan, disregarding the ethics of war, had committed a reckless act that
wrecked diplomatic relations with the United States. With that, World
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War ii in the Pacific now became a large-scale conflict. At almost the same
moment, Japanese troops attacked Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippines,
Wake Island, and the Midway island chain.¹²³
In his speech, Roosevelt assured his people that the final victory would
be theirs.¹²⁴
As Hitler’s Germany did in Europe, Japan held the upper hand in the
early years of the war, but it became exhausted over time, until it was
finished off by the atom bomb. Indirectly, the acceleration of Indonesian
independence was also a “blessing” of the atom bomb. August 17, 1945, is
the official date of the birth of the Republic of Indonesia, only seventeen
years after the Youth Pledge of 1928 that declared the unity of nation,
motherland, and language. We see therefore that Indonesia is a young
nation, less than a century old.
With this fact in mind, Indonesia no longer needs to bear the onerous
burden of history, the burden of a people colonized over a long stretch
of time. As a nation, Indonesia was colonized for less than a quarter
of a century, including three and one-half years by the Japanese. The
milestone of history that can be used to mark the formation of this nation
can be either the moment the Indonesian Association was established in
1922 or the Youth Pledge of 1928. I want to dispel all the myths about
Indonesian history, including the myth about the exaggeratedly long
period of colonization.
We shall next consider the formation of the 1945 Constitution (known
as the uud 1945). The uud 1945 was the work of the Investigating
Committee for PreparatoryWork for Indonesian Independence (bpupki),
which was set up on May 28, 1945, and then continued by the Preparatory
Committee for Indonesian Independence (ppki) from August 18, 1945, to
August 22, 1945. The ppki completed its work in only five days, while the
bpupki worked for eighty-three days. The uud 1945, which in its final
formulation consisted of thirty-seven articles, was a brief constitution and
was completed in quite a short time. Whether in the bpupki or the ppki,
the majority representation was nationalist and Islamic groups, or, for
the latter, more precisely santri groups, as the nationalist groups were for
the most part also Muslim. The categorization of groups into nationalist
and Islamic must be read in the context of the political orientation of
that time, not from the aspect of an individual’s religion.
According to Anhar Gonggong, bpupki Chair Dr. K.R.T. Radjiman
Wedyodiningrat played amajor role in formulating the uud 1945. Even the
formulation of the Small Committee chaired by Engineer Sukarno, which
produced the Jakarta Charter, was redrawn from scratch by Radjiman,
who “insisted on holding discussions on general issues.”¹²⁵ As a Budi
Utomo member of standing, Radjiman would certainly not have been
islam and nusantara 97
happy if Islamwere seen as dominant in the uud 1945.Thus, the changes in
the text of the Jakarta Charter of August 18, 1945, cannot be separated from
the efforts of bpupki Chair Dr. Radjiman, even if these were accomplished
through the authority of Mohammad Hatta as the deputy chair of the
Committee of Nine.
After the draft uud was overhauled, on the proposal of Otto Iskan-
dardinata the ppki in its evening session of August 18 elected Sukarno as
president and Mohammad Hatta as vice-president.¹²⁶ When the Procla-
mation of Independence wasmade, Indonesia did not yet have a president
and a vice-president, and so Sukarno and Hatta had signed the draft
proclamation “in the name of the Indonesian people.” At first, Hatta
hoped that everyone present at the home of Admiral Maeda, where this
vital text was composed, would participate in signing. But Sukarni, from
the youth faction, stepped forward and loudly said, “Not every one of us
here has to sign the draft. It’s enough if just two persons sign in the name
of the Indonesian people, that is, Bung Karno and Bung Hatta.”¹²⁷
And so, at ten o’clock in the morning of August 17, 1945, the text
of the Proclamation was read out by Sukarno at No. 56 Jl. Pegangsaan
Timor, Jakarta, where he was living at the time. Like lightning, the
Proclamation flashed to every corner of Indonesia. The entire people
greeted it with tumult and uproar. A pi figure, whom I have much quoted
here, Ali Sastroamidjojo, had only moved to Jakarta in April 1945 from
Pamekasan,Madura. Ali, who had not been involved in the Proclamation,
was surprised to hear the shouts and clamor of children who had heard
that Indonesia was now independent. This was Ali’s reaction as he took
in this tremendous historical event:
It would be difficult for me to describe our reactions here. My wife,
whom I rarely ever saw crying, right then and there sat down, dazed,
with tears flowing down her cheeks. I too felt very moved. All kinds of
memories of the past rose in my mind. Indonesia merdeka! Indonesia
was independent! The words that had symbolized the aspirations and
dreams of our nation for which we had struggled so long and with such
suffering and sacrifice, were now reality! Our nation, our country was
free. Many different emotions rose within me. Joy mixed with sorrow.
Happy, because God had allowed me to experience the realization of
our nation’s dreams, and sad from remembering our friends in the
struggle who were no longer among us and could not enjoy the fruits
of their struggles and sacrifices.¹²⁸
Ali’s sincerity in these sentences is felt very deeply. The same feelings
were indeed flaring up in the breasts of Indonesians throughout the
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archipelago, not just fighters like Ali Sastroamidjojo. It was entirely proper
for Ali, who had first thought of himself as a part of the Indonesian
nation only during the 1920s, to grieve for all the fighters who had not
lived long enough to experience what the Proclamation of Independence
meant for themselves and the nation.
During the period of the Revolution, the uud 1945 could not be
implemented fully. Political friction among the national elite led to Sutan
Sjahrir’s emergence as prime minister, and he even served three terms.
This meant that the presidential system adhered to by the uud 1945
had been disregarded, even though Sjahrir still very much depended on
the prestige of Sukarno and Hatta to maintain his government; for the
intellectual Sjahrir, although he was the major figure in the Indonesian
Socialist Party (psi), did not enjoy significant mass support. In the
1955 general election, his psi, which was supported by intellectuals, was
reduced to only five seats in Parliament. Sjahrir seems to have been too
cerebral at a time when most Indonesians were still illiterate. No one
doubted Sjahrir the brave and tenacious fighter. But we can never forget
that Sjahrir and his group were quite weak in their ability to communicate
with the masses.
The fragile uud 1945 was replaced in 1949 with the uud ris (the
Federal Republic of Indonesia), which was the outcome of the Roem-
van Roijen Round Table Conference. ris was able to survive only briefly
before being replaced by a unitary state with the promulgation of the
uuds (the Provisional Constitution) of 1950, with Mohammad Natsir of
the Masyumi Party as its first prime minister. Sukarno was delighted
with the formation of this unitary state and enjoyed a honeymoon for
several months before divorcing over differences of opinion concerning
the Irian Barat issue, to which we shall return further on.
The uuds lasted for about nine years and then was torpedoed by
Decree No. 5 of July 1959, which reinstated the uud 1945. This legislation
remains in place to this day, even though it has been amended four times
in the Reformasi (Reform) period, after the fall of the New Order in
1998. Because these amendments are seen on various sides as signs of
its weakness, it needs to be amended again, which is exhausting work.
Indonesia in its sixth decade is still constitutionally unstable and as far as
ever from achieving social justice.
Let us return to the Revolutionary era. The Dutch accepted that the
end of the war would also bring an end to European domination over
colonial lands. Colonized countries were moving to liberate themselves
in historical waves – irresistible waves. In contrast, the Dutch still would
not give way over Indonesian independence. Helped by the British, and
through underhanded maneuvering, the Dutch returned in October
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1945 to resume their colonial rule. They appeared to feel no shame
at having been so roughly booted out of Indonesia by the Japanese.
They supposed that Indonesia, which for decades had prepared itself
mentally for independence, would be easy to rule again. At the cost of
much sacrifice and with whatever military preparations were at hand,
Indonesia had to fight for four years to uphold its Proclamation of
Independence. It was only in December 1949 that the Dutch would
recognize Indonesian independence as a result of the Roem-van Roijen
Round Table Conference, held from August 23 to October 29, 1949, in
The Hague. It was this conference that produced the short-lived Federal
Republic of Indonesia, before the nkri (Negara Kesatuan Republik
Indonesia; the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) was formed
on August 17, 1950, with Mohammad Natsir of the Masyumi Party as
prime minister.
The impetus for the nkri was Natsir’s “Integral” motion in Parliament,
which was supported by all the factions, including the pki (Partai
Komunis Indonesia; the Indonesian Communist Party), Masyumi’s
clearest political rival. Sukarno was quite satisfied with how Natsir
overcame conflicts between the states created by the Round Table
Conference. The later abuse of the unitary state concept in the interest of
homogenization was not Natsir’s fault, but entirely due to the centralized
politics that killed the aspirations of the regions to flourish.
In the Round Table Conference, the Indonesian delegation led by
PrimeMinisterMohammadHatta sat across from PrimeMinisterWillem
Drees of the Netherlands. The official transfer of sovereignty by the
Kingdom of the Netherlands was performed on December 27, 1949,
in Amsterdam. In Indonesia, at the Presidential Palace on the same
date sovereignty was transferred by the representative of the Dutch
government H.V.K. Lovink from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to
the government of the Federal Republic of Indonesia, represented by
Sultan Hamengkubuwono ix. At that gratifying moment, the Dutch flag
was lowered and the Red and White raised. Lovink immediately went to
the Kemayoran airfield to return to Holland. On December 28, 1949,
President Sukarno left Yogyakarta, the capital of the wartime Republic of
Indonesia, and returned to Jakarta as president of the Federal Republic
of Indonesia.¹²⁹
The nkri was established on the basis of the 1950 Provisional
Constitution, which opened the door for a systemof parliamentary/liberal
democracy in Indonesia. This system lasted until July 5, 1959, when
the uud 1945 was reestablished by presidential decree. This move was
opposed by some of the political parties, including Masyumi, but without
effect. The army under the leadership of A.H. Nasution fully supported
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this decree, for Nasution had been moving in this direction since 1954.
President Sukarno himself was only convinced of the need for this change
in 1957. In other words, the idea to return to the uud 1945 arose at first in
the military, not on the civil side. Later on, most of the parties supported
it because of the strong current of national politics at the time.
Ideological Clashes: The 1955 General Election and Islam versus
Pancasila, 1956–1959
In September 1955, the first pemilu (general election) was organized
under the aegis of the uuds 1950, a first in the entire history of Nusantara.
There were two agendas to be achieved by this election: to choose a
parliament and to form a Majelis Konstituante (Constituent Assembly)
with the task of framing a permanent uud to replace the provisional
version. The first agenda went well, and while the second one proceeded
smoothly, after three years (1956–1959) the session choked on the issue of
the foundation of the state: Pancasila or Islam.
At the outset, three proposals were submitted for the foundation of the
state: Pancasila, Islam, and Social Economy. Only a minority supported
the third of these proposals, and so the fierce battle was fought over
whether it would be Pancasila or Islam. At the end of the session on
June 22, 1959, both of these forces failed to obtain the backing of two-
thirds of the vote in the Assembly. The majority of the political forces said
that the Assembly had failed to frame a uud, even though in fact only
10 percent still lacked interparty consensus, that is, on the foundation
of the state. This is what provided the impetus for the famous Decree
No. 5 of July 5, 1959, with its two decisions: (1) the declaration of the
reinstatement of the uud 1945 to replace the uuds; and (2) the dissolution
of the Constituent Assembly that had been produced by the 1955 general
election. This meant that Pancasila, as contained in the uud 1945, had
won by decree its confirmation as the foundation of the state from July 5,
1959. Because of the number of academic studies related to the foundation
of the state, we need not lengthen the discussion here.¹³⁰ But there is one
reflection that I need to record here.
Let us step back a little. In speaking about the foundation of the state,
we cannot simply jump to the post-1955 general election period that ended
with Decree No. 5. In the bpupki, which had been established by the
Japanese occupying forces as Dokuritsu Junbi Chōsa-kai on May 28, 1945,
several weeks before the August 17 Proclamation of Independence, the
issue of the foundation of the state was brought up by the organization’s
chair, Radjiman Wedyodiningrat. According to Hatta’s notes, on June 1,
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the fourth day of the session, Radjiman asked, “What is to be the
foundation of the state that we will form?”¹³¹ At first, impatient for
independence, the members responded coolly. Sukarno, however, was
quite prepared to answer such a philosophical question. His speech
became known as the birth of Pancasila, because Sukarno went on
in great detail for one hour without text to explain his views on the
foundation of the state. A first-class orator, Sukarno easily understood
how to proceed at the bpupki session.
After modification of the five principles put forward by Sukarno, on
August 18 the formulation of Pancasila as we know it today was agreed
on. It was thus Sukarno, and no one else, who came up with the idea
of Pancasila on June 1, 1945. Muhammad Yamin’s claim that he had
attached five principles similar to Sukarno’s Pancasila to his own speech
of May 29 cannot be accepted. No eyewitness has supported the idea
that Yamin was the originator of Pancasila. After the system of Guided
Democracy collapsed in 1966, a gradual de-Sukarnoization movement
was recklessly conducted, particularly as it related to this foundation
of the state. Sukarno, it was now said, had not sparked the concept of
Pancasila, but rather Yamin in the “smuggled” attachment to his May 29
speech.¹³²
My important note on this issue is that whether or not we approve of
Sukarno’s politics during the Guided Democracy period, we may not
falsify history. Doing so cheats us of our civic education and shows far
from noble ethics. Sukarno, at the end of his life, was subjected to insult
on top of injury and was even robbed of his great work, Pancasila, for the
purpose of erasing his deeds and good services. Sukarno’s many mistakes
in the last years of his power have no bearing on the debate in the bpupki
in 1945.
There is no justification for the belief that the idea of Pancasila was
Muhammad Yamin’s.¹³³ It is a historical lie used to launch the de-
Sukarnoization process by Soeharto’s New Order (1966–1998). Yamin,
who had been close to Sukarno, had already died, while Sukarno himself
passed away on June 21, 1970, at the age of sixty-nine. To be scrupulously
accurate, we cannot say that the term Pancasila itself originated with
Sukarno; rather, it was chosen on the advice of a linguist.¹³⁴ Who was
that linguist? It might have been Muhammad Yamin, who was an active
member of the bpupki session.
I need to discuss the 1955 general election objectively here, even though
its results were sabotaged by Decree No. 5 of July 1959. It was a gift of
history that this general election was carried out democratically, directly,
by secret ballot, and peacefully. Barely ten years after independence,
Indonesia bravely conducted a democratic process in a civilized manner
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in the midst of sharp ideological and political conflicts between the
parties, especially between Masyumi and the pki. Of course, modernist
politicians remember this event proudly, because it was organized by the
1955–1956 cabinet of Burhanuddin Harahap.
Harahap was a Masyumi leader of simple presence but possessed of
great self-confidence. The drafting of the General Election Law and its
preparations had been underway since the Wilopo-Prawoto Cabinet
(1952–1953) and had been carried forward by the Wongso-Arifin Cabinet
(1953–1955), but it was well conducted by Burhanuddin Harahap’s cabinet.
Wilopo taskedMinister of Justice LukmanWiriadinata (psi) andMinister
of the Interior Mohammad Roem (Masyumi) to draft the legislation
so important for this young state.¹³⁵ The event itself was extraordinary.
Indonesia had organized a general election that was virtually flawless in
its execution.
Because the 1955 general election was an important milestone of
democracy in Indonesia, we need to study it further and locate it in the
history of a recently independent nation. Intellectually, Burhanuddin
Harahap was not as prominent as other Masyumi figures. Neither was he
a writer of the stature of Natsir, Roem, and Sjafruddin. Burhanuddin
was more of a man of action in erecting a national politics that was
moral and ethical. And there is no doubt that he was an intelligent and
consistent statesman. His career in politics was partly fused with the
energetic performance of the Masyumi Party in its efforts to erect the
pillars of democracy and constitutionalism. This party was martyred
precisely because it denounced the methods of authoritarian politics that
were fatal to democracy and denigrated the Constitution.
Wemay debate the involvement of Burhanuddin Harahap in prri/Per-
mesta (1958–1962), but his good services in upholding democracy
under the uuds were phenomenal. For over half a century the name of
Burhanuddin Harahap has been buried in the dust of history, when in
fact the 1955 general election was the very important work of his cabinet.
It was a democratic performance that Indonesia can be proud of. We
need an analysis of Burhanuddin’s role to connect the links in a broken
chain and critically spotlight the historical significance of a countryman
who has been condemned to oblivion for decades now.
Burhanuddin Harahap’s cabinet did not last long, but it is vitally
important to remember his role in the general election. Only in 1971 was
there a second general election; however, its quality was far inferior to
the one in 1955, as it was organized within the superficial democratic
environment of General Soeharto’s New Order regime.
Sixteen years separated the two elections. According to law, general
elections should be held once every five years, but after Decree No. 5 of
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July 1959 and until 1998, democracy existed in name only in Indonesia.
The winning parties were determined before the vote was held. From
a democratic perspective, such a general election is no more than a
political farce. The reality was an authoritarian political system within
the environment of a semi-feudal culture.
This was the tragedy of democracy in Indonesia. Its main cause
was the disputes that frequently broke out between irresponsible and
narrow-minded leaders.The result was an unhealthy course of democracy
and the risk of failure to create prosperity for the masses, as had been
demanded with such spirit in the August 17, 1945, Proclamation of
Indonesian Independence. In the end, although Burhanuddin Harahap
and his Masyumi Party experienced disaster, and this greatly harmed
the development of an egalitarian political system in Indonesia, the
peaceful 1955 general election is a milestone of democracy that cannot be
forgotten.
What I fail to understand about modern Indonesian history as it
relates to democratic dreams and ideals is that the attitude of certain
political parties during difficult periods is inconsistent with the defense
of democracy. The political elite is so pragmatic that its members have
no trouble at all in selling themselves to those in power at the cost of
democracy. In my view, this tragedy has occurred at least twice since
Indonesia achieved independence. The first time was when the pni,
nu, pki, and psii, together with several other small parties, accepted
Guided Democracy in 1959. The parties that refused, Masyumi and
psi, and to a certain extent Partai Katholik, were in the end powerless
to block this move, and Masyumi and psi were dissolved. The second
time was in the era of Pancasila Democracy. Even though, beginning
in 1973, the number of political parties was shrunk to three – Golkar
(GolonganKarya; Functional Groups]), pdi (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia;
Indonesian Democratic Party), and ppp (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan;
United Development Party) – their role was not significant. The decisive
power in Indonesian politics during this period was Soeharto, supported
by the military and Golkar. The other two parties were merely “direct
objects” with no independent sphere of action, although at the end of this
era, the pdi began to demonstrate an opposition stance and presented
Megawati as a central opposition figure confronting the New Order
regime.
Pancasila Democracy finally collapsed, triggered primarily by the 1997
monetary crisis in Thailand that then shook Indonesia and several other
East Asian countries in the following year. The indirect cause of the fall
of the Soeharto regime in May 1998, though, was corruption. The New
Order had survived for three decades, but in the end it too disintegrated,
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leaving the people with their lives turned upside down, just as at the end
of the Guided Democracy that the New Order had replaced.
In 1998, the era of Reformasi (“Reform”) arrived, giving much hope
for the people’s welfare and prosperity. Eleven years later, however, in
2009, the hopes for overall improvement had yet to be realized.
In one of my columns I concluded that the central problem Indonesia
has faced since Proclamation has been ineffective leadership at the
national level.
Indonesia, by contrast, with a population ten times that of the neigh-
boring country [Malaysia], is like a paralytic elephant because of the
lack of strong and effective leadership. Some have even long suffered
from the disease of slavish mentality as a residue from the colonial
system of olden times. This disease is chronic for the interests of the
future …. Therefore, let us draw the same conclusion that Indonesia’s
main problem in today’s era is the problem of leadership. Period!¹³⁶
Can the system of democracy that we espouse give birth within the brief
period of independence to the quality of leadership needed to respond
to the complex problems of the nation? It is hard for me to say, but we
should not always be dreaming of killing democracy because of its half-
failures, so we can then turn the clock back to an authoritarian system.
The only wise attitude to take is not to despair in the effort to repair
Indonesia’s democracy, which has not yet brought prosperity to the mass
of people. Democracy is indeed exhausting. For me, though, the idea
of returning to an authoritarian dynastic system will only increase the
height of the place from which we are bound to fall. Because of that, our
choice of democracy is the right one, even though to make it work we
have to learn from all the mistakes we have lived through.
If learning is still too difficult, thenmyquestion is, Does the Indonesian
nation not feel ashamed in front of the world as it survives one failure
after another? A more serious question is, Has Islam, embraced by the
majority of Indonesians, run out of the energy to build a strong and
healthy democratic system? I remain optimistic that the Indonesian
nation will ultimately be able to answer those two questions with the
willingness to redirect bad behavior into a positive and constructive
direction. All Indonesians must move in this direction and work hard to
avoid the consequences of our mistakes and weaknesses.
Among those weaknesses we have seen all along are the attitudes of
the elite who so easily split into factions and fail to act responsibly in
guarding the pillars of democracy. Those pillars support the freedom
of the people to voice their aspirations, and they support the freedom
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of the press and the opening of the doors of the bureaucracy to the
public, widely and without discrimination. I still share Hatta’s optimism:
“Democracy can be repressed because of its own mistakes, but after being
put to the bitter test, it will reemerge with full awareness …. Therefore, it
can never be completely lost.”¹³⁷
Hatta’s faith in democracy was so strong, but how difficult was it for
that system to operate in Indonesia. I wrote this in one of my columns
about democracy in the hands of “the Crazy Guy”:
America, which calls itself a fortress of democracy, can still produce a
president who is power-crazy. President George W. Bush is the best
example from the beginning of the twenty-first century. Because the us
is a superpower, this “Crazy Guy” can use his power to oppress other
nations.
The biggest victims are Muslim countries. Afghanistan is a poor,
weak country, and Iraq is a rich but ill-fated country. In 2003 Saddam
Hussein, the dictator, was crushed by Bush and his allies using false
charges. The Iraqi people, divided into Shia, Sunni, and Kurds, are
among those who have suffered the most in recent years. Afghanistan is
poor and yet has been plundered by foreign powers. First by the Soviet
Union, then by the West. The average life expectancy in Afghanistan is
only about 47 years, far below that of 69–72 in Indonesia. Compared to
Afghanistan, Indonesia is far better off. But is that comparison relevant?
Of course not. Indonesia is a country with thousands of islands,
rich in natural resources that can support the well-being of its people,
provided the country is headed by someone with sensitivity and good
conscience. Afghanistan is a barren land with a harsh environment. If
there is any similarity between these two countries it is the religion.
The majority in both countries embrace Islam. If democracy is forced
upon Afghanistan from outside, in Indonesia democracy has been the
choice since the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, in theory,
democracy’s roots in Indonesia are strong, so why hasn’t it brought
prosperity to the people? This is the question that has never been settled
since Independence, more than sixty years ago.
Are the Indonesian elite all crazy? Clearly not. But it is an open
secret that some are power-crazy and money-mad. This is one reason
for the chaos that damages this country. Democracy in the hands of
people who are mentally unstable will lead to catastrophe, such as
has beset Indonesia for so long. Even though Hatta had argued that if
democracy disappears then Indonesia’s independence would disappear
as well, democracy in our country is far from being healthy. Hatta’s
hope that democracy would bring prosperity is still far from reality. We
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may say that Indonesian democracy is a “leaky” democracy, or, for a
more vivid expression, “rbi” (Leaky Republic of Indonesia).
Everywhere we hear about leaks: national budget leaks, regional bud-
get leaks, political leaks, economic leaks, haji affairs leaks, educational
budget leaks. Every day without end there is news of leaks.
Wherever our Mr. Crazy holds power, that’s where those leaks
become unpluggable. Now that the regions have become autonomous,
the number of Mr. Crazies has soared. Out of about 460 Level ii
Regions, not even 5 percent have been run on the principles of good
governance. Education, health, and clean water sectors have received
serious attention in almost none of these regions. Some 80 percent
of regional budgets go to salaries, so that the development process is
severely hampered.
Such an atmosphere must be improved as quickly as possible. If not,
democracy will become a burden on us all, while other, better systems
are yet to be found elsewhere. Whatever political system we follow, if
the humanity supporting it is lacking, the hope for a better future for
our nation will become more and more remote. Quo vadis, Indonesian
democracy?¹³⁸
This is the tragedy of democracy in Indonesia – a tragedy that can of
course repeat itself so long as “crazies” are elected as players on the
political stage. It has been exceedingly difficult for our people to learn
from bitter experience in managing the state in the post-Independence
era. I will continue my discussion about democracy in connection with
Islam in the next chapter. I am critical of democracy in practice, but I
defend it in theory. There should be no wide gap between theory and
practice, such as we have lately observed in Indonesia. The killing off
of the Masyumi Party by an authoritarian regime greatly damaged the
course and development of Indonesian democracy. That party was led by
statesmen who were the product of Western education but who had a
profound commitment to Islam and nation. In terms of political morality,
they were the vanguard of democracy in Indonesia. In contrast to the
Socialist Party of Indonesia (psi), which did not have strong support at
the grassroots level, Masyumi had deep roots, especially in Jakarta and
in many provinces outside Java, as was manifested in the 1955 general
election.
The question that is difficult for us to answer is, How could such a
deep-rooted party be destroyed so easily? I will not answer that question
here, other than to say that in the chess games of national politics, it would
not be too difficult to destroy any political party that is not sufficiently
strong in Java. Even the pki, which had been one of the great waves
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in Java, was in the end crushed by the machinery of power wearing a
military mask.
Who could have imagined that Masyumi and the pki, two political
forces that had widespread mass support, would cease to exist so, their
destruction occurring within less than six years of each other? Critical
studies of these two mutually hostile parties are ongoing. The central
question remains: Why were these two political ideologies – of the
extreme right, such as Darul Islam (the House of Islam) and Tentara
Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Army of Islam), and of the extreme left –
unable to survive for very long after independence. (The Masyumi Party
cannot be included in the extremist category because it was led by broad-
minded statesmen and intellectuals.) I hope that serious researchers will
be interested in answering this question.

Chapter 2 Islam and Democracy
A handful of people are unable to see the connection between Islam
and a democratic system, an understanding of diversity and pluralism,
tolerance, and the message of anti-violence. There are even those who
glibly charge that these values are opposed to Islam. What is the truth?
This chapter embarks on the long explanation required to answer this
question, by tracing the authentic Islamic sources and citing the views of
contemporary Muslim writers who are apprehensive about the state of
the Islamic world today. Admittedly, there are still groups that condemn
democracy and pluralism as haram, and consider their supporters as
deviant, even unbelievers. My hope is that those who read this detailed
account will be in a position to think more lucidly and objectively about
these matters.
Why Is Islam in Harmony with Democratic Concepts?
The previous chapter described how democracy was implemented
in Indonesia in the 1955 general election. (In the end, however, the
democratic system was intentionally destroyed by extra-parliamentary
forces.) Here I shall cite a set of theories about democracy that several
Muslim writers have developed. Indonesian Islam is fortunate in its
acceptance of democratic principles, and Indonesia’s Muslim umat finds
no difficulty in harmonizing the teachings of Islam with these democratic
principles. A noteworthy example is Masyumi, the Islamic political party
that was martyred for defending democracy and the Constitution. Those
Muslim writers who oppose democracy, however, are unable to support
their position with persuasive religious arguments.
Let me reemphasize that from the beginning the majority of the
Muslim umat in Indonesia have supported the democratic system. In
contrast to their coreligionists in other parts of the world who reject or
have doubts about democracy, the Muslim majority of the Indonesian
people actually see democracy as the realization of the shura principle
as taught in the Quran.¹ Aside from considerations of religion, the
Indonesian umat supports democracy based also on the reality of the
weight of their numbers as the majority in Indonesia: the democratic
system allows the democratic majority to fight for their aspirations for
Islamic community life and statehood. Therefore, political parties with
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Islamic features have emerged both before and after Proclamation in the
context of erecting the pillars of that democracy, even if these have been
thrown down along the way.
Let us take a brief look at what democracy really is in the minds
of contemporary Muslim writers. The substance of democracy is the
guaranteed liberty of people to freely choose their leader or formal
political system, or bring a leader down if that person fails to respect the
constitution.
The Egyptian writer Fahmi Huwaydi, who is not too tied up in
academic definitions, has written this about democracy:
The substance of democracy – leaving academic definitions and
terminology aside – requires society to choose someone who will
govern them and regulate their affairs, and does not require them to
choose a leader or system that they do not like. In addition, according
to democracy, they must have the right to demand accountability by the
leader if he is in error and to bring this leader down if he commits an
irregularity. And they may not be directed toward views and opinions,
or economic, social, cultural or political methods which they don’t
know and agree with.²
Huwaydi is surprised by Muslims who reject democracy and asks this
question of them: “Then is democracy, substantially as described above,
contradictory to Islam? Where does that contradiction derive from? Is
there a definite argument in the Quran and hadith that supports that
charge?”³ More strongly yet, he says, “The fact is, people who truly
understand the substance of democracy will find that this substance
comes from Islamic concepts.”⁴ Huwaydi includes religious arguments to
defend his theory of democracy in no fewer than twenty-three translated
pages of his work.⁵
Anywhere in the world, democracy in practice demands three or
four complementary conditions: a sense of responsibility, broad-minded
tolerance, a fair-minded willingness to accept defeat, and refusal to let
one’s awareness become rigid; as Vaclav Havel said, the spiritual energy
to change human consciousness is part of true democracy.⁶ Naturally,
Indonesia’s experience in operating a democratic system for so many
decades has not always met those conditions, so that the system has
even become the tool for mutual undermining, rather than for mutual
promotion. At certain times, democracy can produce disasters and
catastrophes, as we witness everywhere. The result of this is narrow-
minded people frivolously accusing democracy of being the scapegoat
that must be cast out. Radical groups swim in this antidemocratic
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current using specious religious arguments. They are generally oriented
to the Arab world, which for a long time has been shackled under
antidemocratic tyrants. Their minimal knowledge of Indonesia has
brought them to ahistorical conclusions about it. Their sociological filters
are fragile, but they feel they are still on the right road.
The Moroccan writer and sociologist Fatima Mernissi was a sharp
critic of the Arab mentality that rejects democracy but defends the rule of
despotic and corrupt kings.⁷ Under this system, what is called social and
economic justice is never realized. Wealth is generally monopolized by
rulers who are given sharia legitimacy. According toMernissi, discussions
about democracy in the Arab world have gone on for 150 years, but
democracy is still rejected as a “Hellenistic” import. Strangely, though,
this does not hinder the same people from enjoying other foreign imports
such as cars, electricity and telephones. The rejection is not because of a
thing’s foreignness, but because democracy will jeopardize the interests
of the elite. Democracy is sure to open the eyes of the masses to the
depravity of those in power. In a democratic system, a citizen has the
right and the responsibility to participate in the decision-making process,
which is taboo under a monarchy or pseudo-democracy. Mernissi writes:
In the debate that goes on now [the 1980s and early 1990s], the
traditionalists hold that a person cannot be a Muslim and practice
dimuqratiya both at the same time, because that is foreign to Islamic
culture. Regimes that take their legitimacy from Islam (Saudi Arabia,
for example) paint their opponents that propose democratic methods
as faithless, unbelievers.⁸
Here you can see that a culture of fear has so haunted Arab rulers on
the subject of democracy that even religion is sacrificed to uphold the
legitimacy of their corrupt power. They do not want to see democracy
empowering and enlightening the general public, as Huwaydi has
explained. This fear is rooted in the possibility of being overthrown
once the people are given the right to determine their own fate through
a democratic system. That democracy suffers from many, sometimes
chronic, diseases is something I have said in several places. But all diseases
can be cured whenever the political elite espouse common sense, broad-
mindedness, and a high sense of responsibility. What is certain is that in
democracy the people are given access to learn openly how themachinery
of power is operated and how the economy and finance are structured
and allocated. And more than that, they have the basic right to participate
in directly running the machinery of power. In a system of democracy
they truly become independent human beings.
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Mernissi also criticizes the weakness of the culture of tolerance in Arab
society. On the contrary, the society defends the culture of intolerance
toward differing opinions. She provides the example of the writer Anwar
Jundi, who “convicts” public intellectual and fellow-writer Taha Hussein
of being an unbeliever, when in fact Taha had written a number of
excellent works, including a history of the life of the Prophet. Thus, the
hope for freedom of opinion in Arab society is dim, because freedom is
seen as inviting chaos.⁹ Mernissi describes the duplicitous performance
in global forums of the same Arab heads of state who rule as religious
autocrats. “This shows the role played by religion in the hazy drama
offered by our heads of state: they have to put on a modern face before
the un in New York and the face of the Abbasid Caliph to terrorize us at
home.”¹⁰ Mernissi is not alone in such thoughts, but the great wave of
thinking required for change to lead to a more civilized world has yet
to arrive. Wealth overflowing in certain Arab countries is not used for
enlightenment but to pillory the independent thinking of their people.
But everything corrupt that is hidden will come to light sooner or later.
This will be pioneered in the Arab world by intellectuals who have been
enlightened by the long and bitter experiences of their lives.
Mernissi paints a worrisome picture of the consequences of bitterness
and despair in Arab societies. She writes:
The mix of despair and religion emerges explosively throughout the
Mediterranean region. We must be prepared to be destroyed by its
violence if we do not ask every person from every race to analyze it,
understand it, and try to improve the bitterness and backwardness that
have crystalized it. That is the malaise that has affected intellectuals and
the common people. It creates a strong feeling of guilt among young
people and increases a mass migration of the most educated to the West
… the dream of happiness for many Arabs, and unemployed youth ….
[E]ven the rich industrialists vacation in Europe.¹¹
Bitterness that is given the approval of religion is a time bomb waiting
for the right moment to explode. Explosions have already occurred.
Meanwhile, the West, especially the United States, has made use of
this instability in savage ways. Arab fears of democracy actually come
from fear of loss of power and wealth. Meanwhile, ulama (religious
scholars) who do not understand the global map look for religious
arguments supporting the rejection of democracy. This is the Arab
tragedy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Mernissi continues
with her disturbing picture:
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In my view, the pain that all too much scatters this talent [because it is
not channeled] must be considered for an understanding of how the
Muslim umat, particularly lower-class youth – badly threatened by
the high level of unemployment – maneuver around the opposition
between Islam and democracy. Their love for this movement really
constitutes a cry for the chance to benefit from the culture of this
century and their skills. However, I will ask, How can a young person
who is threatened by unemployment oppose democracy and prefer
religion as the basis for struggling to succeed in the world? No matter
what else it may do, religion does not create jobs. But what it does
is provide room for renewal and reflections on the universe and its
injustices.¹²
Mernissi wishes that the religion being taught would be an Islam that
frees people from all suffering and injustice. A religion that provides
people with the space to actively participate in their sphere without fear
of being spied on. That space is only provided in a democratic system
whose implementation is in harmony with the cultural framework of
each nation, and which can be very different from what prevails in the
West.
Democracy and basic human rights in the modern era are intercon-
nected, and each needs the other. The Muslim umat worldwide does not
have the same attitude and use the same language when confronting
issues of democracy and basic human rights. If we follow the categoriza-
tions of Khaled Abou El Fadl, two groups may be roughly perceived as
standing face-to-face in confrontation over democracy and basic human
rights: the puritans and the moderates.¹³ Each has its reason for thinking
it embodies the correct interpretation of the faith. The puritans have
lately crystalized in the form of the Taliban in Afghanistan and among
Wahhabi circles in Saudi Arabia, who have exported their ideology,
funded by the abundance of petrodollars.
The puritan group takes its stand against all Western systems,
especially democracy and basic human rights, but continues to enjoy
Western technological products. In their minds, democracy and basic
human rights must be opposed because they harm Islam. They want to
create an ideal world based on their monolithic interpretations of the
Quran and the history of the Prophet.This group is spread throughout the
entire Islamic world, and in general its members have a single ideology –
they want to transform the world boldly and quickly, even at the cost of
bloodshed. Actually, this group has no clear idea of civilization, but is
bound up in a single fascistic ideology. Among the doctrines that bind
its adherents is the doctrine of an almost unconditional obedience to the
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ruler. Therefore, some would categorize them as a totalitarian faction
under the umbrella of sharia. They see death as trivial if one dies trying
to win Allah’s blessing, according to their vision and interpretation.
At the other extreme, the moderates also advocate using the Quran as
their guide, but their image of the world differs completely from that of
the puritans. The moderates generally accept and defend the concepts
of democracy and basic human rights. They are not concerned with
whether such ideas come from the West or the East. So long as such
principles support the ideals of the Quran for the upholding of justice,
peace, morality, and good relations with their fellow humans, why should
they be rejected?
For moderates like El Fadl, universal experience teaches that only in
a democratic and constitutional system of government can justice be
established and upheld, because the people have access to the institutions
of power and there is accountability in public offices. In contrast, in an
undemocratic system it is exceedingly difficult to hold the ruler to account
for the abuse of power.¹⁴ The moderate group has tried to reinterpret the
concept of ijma (consensus) to support the idea of democracy based on
the will of the majority of the people.¹⁵
It is interesting to note the encouraging fact that the three defenders of
democracy cited here all come from Arab countries: Egypt, Morocco, and
Kuwait. There are still others – I will discuss them shortly. This fact by
itself emphasizes that political systems that bridle human liberties, as has
been the practice in a number of Arab countries for centuries, are now
coming under serious challenge. Their own thinkers, like these three, are
highly critical of dynastic-authoritarian political systems wearing the
cloak of the caliphate, monarchy, sultanate, rajadom, emirate, or imamate.
Such systems are substantially the same: they reject transparency and set
themselves against the people.
Another term for puritanism is the fundamentalism that opposes
ideas that bring freedom to humanity. Saudi Arabia is the center of
fundamentalist conservatism of the most rigid kind. Ironically, this
country is a friend of the United States, which is warring against
fundamentalism everywhere. Mernissi’s criticism of Saudi Arabia is
sufficiently relevant to be quoted here:
Rejection of progressive ideas is greatly funded by Saudi Arabia’s
petrodollars. This simultaneously produces an excessive “culture of
princely Islam” and a rigid authoritarianism that shuts out love and
compassion (rahmah). A more apt term for the fundamentalism in
Saudi Arabia is “Petro-Wahhabism” whose pillars are veiled women.¹⁶
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These harsh words of Mernissi’s may still not penetrate the walls
of Arab conservatism, which is wrapped in that “culture of princely
Islam.” “Princely Islam” holds political implications whereby the tasks of
the masses are limited to obedience to their ruler. The people have no
place in that closed system of power. More than a few Saudi Arabian
intellectuals and some of those educated in Saudi Arabia see the “culture
of princely Islam” as something that is Islamic, because they do not want
to understand intelligently and honestly what its negative implications
are for human liberty.
However, in the darkest part of the dark night, there is sure to be a
star that shines and sparkles in the distance. At the end of the twentieth
century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, an increasing
number of Muslim-Arab writers have been defending democracy as a
part of Islamic politics. The time is ripe for them to change the backward
paradigm of thinking and reform the Arab mindset in order to speed
up the process of enlightening society at large, so that its members may
become aware of their rights as free and respected human beings.
With this freedom, the eyes of the people will open ever wider
when they see how much of the country’s assets have been misused
so tyrannically and irresponsibly. They will speak out loudly and clearly
when the tap of democracy is opened by their conscious intellectuals on
the basis of religious arguments. The time for such a maturation process
is drawing nearer.
It is possible that there will be bloodshed, because the walls of
authoritarianism and despotism to be thrown down are still thick and
mighty. But we must condemn the American-style attempt to force a
system of democracy upon a nation, as in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is
sure to be counterproductive. A foreign entity cannot force democracy
on another nation. But if the democratic idea comes from within in a
conscious way, its results will be stable and long-lasting.
One other writer no less outspoken in criticizing the tyrannical
conservatism of the Arabs and defending democracy is Muhammad
Shahrur of Syria. We would be remiss if Shahrur’s thinking were not
analyzed within the framework of building democracy in the Islamic
world. Shahrur traces the pre-Islamic idea of democracy in the form of
the Dar Al-Nadwa (House of Assembly) in Mecca, where the heads of the
most influential clans, such as the Bani Hashim, BaniMakhzum, and Bani
Umayyah held consultations on economicmatters and tribal politics.This
council was a consultative body for tribal society, especially in deliberating
over the system of trade.¹⁷ If in the pre-Islamic era, consultations were
based on tribalism, the practice was later taken over by Islam, which
gave it a stronger and universal foundation: the foundation of faith.
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From this noteworthy perspective, Arab society in pre-Islamic times was
far more democratic than in the Islamic era since the Umayyads and
thereafter.
Thus, it is not surprising how difficult it is for the Arab world to
appreciate democratic systems, since it has been sunk for so long in a
political culture that is opposed to liberty. Ironically, this same world
defends its systems with religious arguments. In such an atmosphere, it
would be futile to hope for the birth of a fresh and just Islamic civilization
within a system of politics that is against freedom of thought.
Shahrur rather sarcastically criticizes the democracy-allergic Arab
mentality: “A man who rides a donkey to go from one town to the next
has no right to criticize an airplane and demonstrate its defects and
dangers.”¹⁸ A democratic system “goes beyond the societies of family,
clans, tribes, groups, schools of thought, and sects, and it also goes beyond
patriarchal society,”¹⁹ which for so many centuries has dominated Arab
society, with differences of gradation from one country to the next. Thus,
the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (632–661ce) was a spectacular
historical breakthrough, but one that was sadly short-lived. Then the
Arab lands sank back into the slough of authoritarianism for centuries
more. It was this development that shackled Islam and kept it from
developing creatively.
A more basic theory of Shahrur’s is his view that the shura concept,
immortalized in Surah Ash-Shuraa, verse 38, which means, “And those
who have responded to their lord and established prayer and whose
affair [is determined by] consultation among themselves, and from what
We have provided them, they spend,” is an article of faith and religious
practice whose principles may not be changed by the Muslim umat.²⁰ But
what happened then was that the Muslim umat threw away and buried
this shura principle and replaced it with a system that shackled their
political and social freedom for centuries. “Freedom,” writes Shahrur,
“is the conscious desire to choose between denying or acknowledging
an existence. For its part, democracy is the practice of freedom carried
out by a group of human beings in accordance with the authority of
knowledge, ethics, aesthetics, and customs and traditions.”²¹
While still on the topic of democracy, now let us examine the view of
the late Kuntowijoyo, a renowned expert in history and social theory
in Indonesia. As he saw it, the commitment of the Muslim umat to
democracy in Indonesia need no longer be in doubt.²² Kunto then looked
for the roots in the practice of mushawara (from shura, or consultation)
that was commanded by the Quran, as mentioned above. For the sake of
clarity, Kunto’s explanation requires our attention:
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Practice shows how much the Prophet himself valued mushawara.
On the eve of the Battle of Uhud between the side of the Prophet in
Medina and that of the Quraysh in Mecca, he faced two possibilities:
hold out within Medina or take the war outside the city. The Prophet
consulted with the Muslims to make a decision. The Prophet himself
was of the opinion that it would be better to hold out within the city.
However, it seems the majority of Muslims wanted to take on the
enemy outside the city. What is interesting is that on the eve of the
battle, there was mushawara, when the voice of the majority drowned
out the voice of the Prophet and he bowed to the majority will. Even
though in that battle it turned out that the Muslims were defeated, it
was consultation that determined it. This means that in mushawara, the
process was more important than the outcome. This also means that
no matter how strong the voices of the minority were in their claim
to the truth, these had to submit to the voices of the majority … [on
the condition] there could be no violation of the rights of God and his
Messenger.²³
Thedefeat of theMuslims at Uhud had to be accepted because the strategy
had been discussed in mushawara before the battle, even though the
Prophet himself suffered physically in that battle.
As a historian who closely followed the course of history of theMuslim
umat in Indonesia and as a scientist of high personal integrity, Kunto’s
opinion cannot be taken lightly. He was not a politician accustomed to
bending the verses of the Quran to his own interest. Kunto’s conclusion
that democracy is in accord with the teachings of Islam was simply the
continuation of the views that had been held by the Muslim leaders of
Indonesia long before Independence, even if its adoption has been very
slow in Muslim Arab countries. Kunto’s authority is acknowledged on all
sides, and that includes those normally categorized as hard-line political
opponents of democracy.
Kuntowas not only a renowned scientist but also a recognized novelist.
The marriage between history and literature he achieved was among
Kunto’s strengths as a writer.
The Ebb and Flow of Democracy in Indonesia
At the beginning of this chapter, I emphasized that Indonesia is one of
the fortunate nations, because from the start the majority of its people
chose a democratic system to govern their newborn state. The Muslim-
majority population had virtually no “allergy” to democracy, thanks
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to the education they received from their leaders. This proved to be
important capital for further development in a responsible way.
The list of practicing Muslims who supported Indonesian democracy
and defended the Constitution includes names such as Agus Salim,
Sukiman Wirjosendjojo, Wahid Hasjim, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, Arudji
Kartasasmita, Masjku, Jusuf Hasjim, Burhanuddin Harahap, Imron
Rosjadi, Mohammad Natsir, Mohammad Roem, Idham Chalid, Prawoto
Mangkusasmito, Jusuf Wibisono, Kasman Singodimedjo, Sjafruddin
Prawiranegara, Yunan Nasution, and a host of others. They did not
necessarily share the same commitment to the ideals of democracy,
however, even if they all struggled together for that system in accordance
with their understanding and interests, as they saw them, as the situation
unfolded. That the results are still not up to expectations, owing to the
mistakes and shortcomings of the leaders themselves in political practice,
cannot be ignored.
The ebb and flow in the implementation of democracy in Indonesia
has been closely tied to the behavior of its elite – whether they have been
tolerant and liberal or impatient and irresponsible. Myopic and parochial
attitudes arise from a weak culture of statesmanship, which afflicts most
of Indonesia’s politicians. If their vision had surmounted the limited
interests of the individual, party, or group, Indonesia, with its natural
resources that could be developed for the sake of the prosperity of its
population, would have soared higher among the countries of the world.
In terms of its intellectual resources, Indonesia has not lagged behind
other countries. Many figures from the generation of the founders and
the generation of B.J. Habibie (president 1998–1999) were and are widely
known throughout the world. However, obstacles remain, stemming
from narrow political interests, which constrict the space for developing a
culture of tolerance in elite circles. Then, under the authoritarian political
system that lasted four decades (1959–1998), democracy was consciously
murdered, a policy supported, ironically, by certain parties, out of short-
term pragmatic considerations. They were slow to realize that giving
their pragmatic support to the hangman of democracy meant that they
were putting the noose around their own necks.
But because the Proclamation of Independence was closely linked to
the democratic spirit and the aspiration to create a healthy democracy,
every authoritarian tendency in Indonesia’s politics is sure to face
opposition, sooner or later. The strength of that opposition simply
depends on the context. Therefore, in my view, no matter how little
democracy has done for the welfare of the general populace, it is futile
to try to kill it and then clamor to return to its authoritarian opposite.
Indonesians should never again be driven by eagerness to accomplish this.
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This attitude would only cast Indonesia into a dangerous political vicious
circle, filled with uncertainties. We can understand that democracy, in
the hands of a greedy elite, often brings calamity. This is what took place
in Indonesia at the beginning of the twenty-first century, and it is much
to be regretted. But we must hold fast to Hatta’s certainty: “A declaration
before God to hold to Pancasila is not easily disregarded. And therein
lies the guarantee that democracy will not disappear in Indonesia. It
can be repressed in many ways for the time being. But disappear it shall
not. The disappearance of democracy means the disappearance of an
independent Indonesia.”²⁴
Hatta’s certainty that “the disappearance of democracy means the
disappearance of an independent Indonesia” is a valuable legacy, which
should be reflected on by those who have come later. I believe that no one
among the nation’s founders formulated the prospects of democracy in
Indonesia as acutely as that. Hatta’s analysis of the meaning of democracy
constitutes a milestone of optimism for Indonesia in defending and
enforcing its chosen political system. From this perspective, movements
launched by a handful of enemies of democracy will be short-lived. Think
of their methods as tiny ripples, never capable of becoming a wave. The
wheels of time too will grind these down. Even in the Arab world, which
these people so often use as a reference point, a new force has emerged
for democracy, because its peoples have had their fill of tyranny.
My conclusion is that Indonesia must knowingly declare that a
democratic system is the only choice for the country’s future and that
people should not look back with nostalgia on other ones. Farewell to all
political systems that put the liberty of the citizens in the stocks! Only in
a climate of freedom can we become fully human. Outside that is the
territory of slaves or semi-slaves. The doctrine of tawhid – the Oneness
of God – which is the essence of Islam’s system of belief, teaches that
freedom may not be stifled by any arguments whatever, wherever, and by
whomever.²⁵
As the closing note to this section and to reinforce the position of the
defenders of democracy in Indonesia, I include the observation of the
moderate Shia intellectual Musa Al-Musawi, born in Najef (Iraq) in 1930,
who firmly and explicitly states that the Prophet taught the principle of
democracy to his umat. Al-Musawi writes:
At the beginning of his preaching mission, God’s Messenger taught the
democratic system to the Muslim umat. This will not be found at any
time and among any people, even in the most modern times like today
or among people who are the most democratic people on earth. In the
history of democracy, whether in its ancient or modern form, I have
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not found a leadership like that of the Prophet. He is the founder of
a state, a thinker, and a public figure who would sit together with his
companions. When they were gathered in an assembly (in a circle),
there would be no difference with those in front and those behind.
Consequently, everyone attending sat alongside the leader.²⁶
The expression “everyone attending sat alongside the leader” describes
one of the best forms of democracy in practice. The Prophet, the recipient
of divine revelation, did not present himself as a being higher than
his companions when they consulted together. There was no hierarchy
in their seating. The noble appearance of the Prophet in the midst of
his companions will surely inspire a culture of egalitarianism in the
Muslim umat, once they are better acquainted with that legacy. Al-
Musawi has worked energetically and objectively to bridge the differences
between Sunni and Shia. Unfortunately, his fresh and bold thinking has
yet to be widely appreciated by the Muslim umat, whether Sunni or
Shia.
How difficult it is for this umat to open its hearts and minds to accept
new ideas – which are in line with the ideals of the Quran – about basing
community life on the foundation of equality. Humankind has only
recently recognized this doctrine. Very regrettably, Muslim rulers have
buried this doctrine under the ashes of history for centuries, so that some
of us do not know this glorious heritage, which is ours to revive in the
modern era.
Islam and the Challenges of Religious and Cultural Diversity
If we speak of religious and cultural diversity, we cannot divorce these
from the principle of freedom, which constitutes one of the main pillars
of democracy. But in the eyes of the Quran, freedom is not without its
limits. That is to say, it is limited by human nature itself. The following
conclusions reached by Machasin from his study of the verses of the
Quran will help us place this freedom proportionally:
Such freedom is not totally without limits. Mankind is only free to
perform deeds that are truly ikhtiariah – spontaneous and of one’s
free will; that means, within a person there is a choice of doing or not
doing. Not all aspects in one’s life can be controlled. Thus, a person
takes responsibility in matters wherein he or she is not compelled to do
or not do a thing.²⁷
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Because I do notwant to get trapped bymodern jargon on religious and
cultural diversity, I will try to deal with these important and sometimes
controversial problems on the basis of my understanding of the position
of the Quran.
We must acknowledge from the outset that the phenomenon of
religious and cultural diversity within the human community has been
with us from time immemorial. This is an undeniable fact, as plain as the
sun at midday. The Quran from earliest times has revealed this diversity
before our very eyes, for diversity is the essence of Allah’s creation.
Religious and cultural diversity may also be expressed as religious and
cultural pluralism. Yet if we speak of religious pluralism instead of
diversity, many people become highly agitated. Thus, I need to position
this problem rationally and in a balanced manner. The alarming situation
in which Islam finds itself trailing behind the leaders of civilization
should open our eyes and our hearts to look at ourselves and see what is
wrong in our understanding of Islam.
With regard to religious pluralism, the Quran is actually in the lead. It
teaches that not only must people acknowledge the diversity of religions
embraced by the human community, but even those without religion
must have a place to carry on with their life on earth. On this issue, the
Quran shows itself to be more tolerant than the majority of Muslims who
make atheists their enemy. The Quran always invites humankind to have
a religious creed, since having this is most important for life’s journey to
the hereafter. But if they still choose to not have a religion, must they be
condemned on the basis of religion? Of course, religious belief provides
an ontological security to humankind in its earthly wanderings, so filled
with shocks and challenges; but the question remains, What do we do if
a person does not need that ontological security?
The task of the prophets and their followers is only to invite humankind
to have religious belief in Allah and the Last Day in a civilized manner,
full of wisdom, far from compulsion.
From my understanding of several verses of the Quran, there is
no strong argument for compelling such people to have a religion. In
verse 256 of the Surah Al-Baqarah, “There shall be no compulsion in
[acceptance of] the religion.” Mufassir A. Hassan excellently clarifies the
content of this verse. First, “A person may absolutely not be compelled to
enter a religion.” Second, “A person may absolutely not be compelled in
matters of faith.”²⁸ This means that every form of compulsion to make
someone have a faith is the same as opposing the Quran or taking a
position of superiority to Allah. Is this not an unwarranted theological
arrogance? With broad-mindedness the door is open to a pleasant and
safe life for people without a religion on the face of Allah’s earth, bearing
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in mind that they certainly have to obey the constitution and regulations
agreed upon by a state. Of course, not many Muslim communities want
to understand this verse as Ahmad Hassan interprets it, including his
own radical former students.
Why does the Quran so strictly forbid the Muslim community from
forcing other people to believe as they do? Verse 256 continues: “The
right course has become clear from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in
taghut [worship that exceeds the limit set by Allah] and believes in Allah
has grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And
Allah is Hearing and Knowing.” The question arises here, if that truth is
so obvious, and still some people choose the path that deviates from it,
should they not be destroyed? My understanding tells me that all this is a
matter for Allah, and earthly courts have no right to judge such a person.
This means that, in life here on earth, someone may choose the wrong
path and not be shunned, as long as this person is willing to maintain
the pillars of harmony in social life. He or she must even be guaranteed
full rights as a citizen of the state with all its provisions.
The Indonesian commentator on the Quran who uses the name
Hamka (Dr. H. Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah: 1908–1981) has made
a lengthy analysis of verse 256 of the Surah Al-Baqarah, introducing
the reason for the revelation of this verse. Because it is important to
further investigate this issue to clarify the problem, I shall quote a part of
Hamka’s explanation here:
According to the story of Abu Daud and An-Nasaʾi, and Ibnu Mundzir
and Ibnu Jarir and Ibnu Abi Hatim and Ibu Hibban and Ibnu Mar-
dawaihi and Al-Baihaqi and Ibnu Abbas, and several other stories as
well: because they were in ignorance of divine guidance, the inhab-
itants of Medina before they embraced Islam felt that the Jews had
better lives than they did. Because of that, there were among them
those who gave over a child to a Jew to be educated; after growing up,
such children would become Jews. Also there was an Arab woman,
who every time she gave birth, the child died, so that when she had
another child, she quickly gave it to a Jew. And the child was raised as a
Jew. Then the people of Medina became Muslims and welcomed the
Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) and became the group
called the Ansar [“the Helpers”]. Then, after the Messenger moved to
Medina, a pact of good neighborliness was made with the Jewish tribes
that dwelled in Medina. But from month to month, year to year, they
broke that pact, whether subtly or grossly. Finally the Bani Nadhir were
expelled after they had twice been found to have wanted to kill the
Prophet (see interpretation of Surah 59, Al-Hasyr). Because of that, it
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was decided to drive out every last one of the Bani Nadhir tribe from
Medina. There seemed to have been an Ansar child among the Bani
Nadhir who had been raised as a Jew. The father of that child begged
the Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) that the child be
brought to Islam, by force if necessary. Because the father could not
force him to embrace Islam, as his child was a Jew. “Half of me will go
to hell, O Messenger!” said the Ansar. And at that time came this verse:
“There is no compulsion in religion.” If that child had become a Jew, he
may not be compelled to embrace Islam.²⁹
With this explanation of the reason for this verse, it is clear that the
question of faith at the highest level is the question of choice, even if
environmental influences are initially quite strong. This complaint of
the Ansar to the Prophet was answered by verse 256 of the Surah Al-
Baqarah, and that is the final answer of the Quran. It was up to the
Prophet alone to carry out that dictum, even though the Ansar felt very
sad because their natural children did not belong to the same religion
as they did. In cases such as that, the best attitude of a Believer is none
other than following the revealed teaching by discarding all sadness
and personal subjectivity. If compulsion had been the free choice of
the parent toward his child in this problem of faith, that free choice
would automatically be invalid. Feelings of pity and dismay may not
violate revelation. Faith that comes from compulsion is not authentic
faith and may not last long. Faith cannot be compared to a shirt that
can be worn and taken off at the whim of the wearer. Faith has a taproot
that is extremely deep, far exceeding that of relativist philosophy and
science.
How should we view atheism? As mentioned above, an atheist has
the right to live freely on the earth, but not free in any unlawful sense.
It is impossible for a society to be well ordered if there is a place in
it for lawlessness. An atheist must respect believers, and vice-versa.
That is because, as far as we know, this planet earth is the only one
that can be inhabited by living creatures, so there must be rules that
bind our lives together so that our lives can proceed harmoniously,
peacefully, and safely. A person with faith may not claim that he alone
has the right to live on earth, while atheists must be warred against
and exterminated. And by the same principle, an atheist has no right of
monopoly over the earth by saying that believers are mentally deficient
and the planet should be rid of them. Those who say that the earth is
only for those who are free from faith are thinking like insane people.
There is only one outcome from it – accelerating the arrival of the last
day of civilization!
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Atheists and theists must sit together to govern the earth so that life on
this planet can be shared in complete mutual tolerance and consideration
for differences. Neither side has the right to wipe out the other. Earthly life
is only possible if it is established on the principle of mutual acceptance,
not mutual denial. The Quran, as the main source of Islamic teaching,
has anticipated many possibilities. Even the Prophet himself seems to
have wanted everyone on earth to have a religion, but he is reprimanded
in the Quran for thinking like that, because matters of faith must be with
the permission of Allah: “And it is not for a soul to believe, except by the
permission of Allah.”³⁰
This means, no matter how we may long for all of humankind to have
religious belief, because religious belief is good and provides an answer to
the inner cry of humankind’s soul, if Allah does not will it, that longing
will not be realized. Remember the case of Abu Talib, the uncle who
always sheltered the Prophet, and who until the end of his life stayed
with the old belief, though the Prophet strongly hoped he would become
a believer. The following verse gives the final provision on this sensitive
issue: “And had your Lord willed, those on earth would have believed –
all of them entirely. Then, [O Muhammad,] would you compel the people
in order that they become believers?”³¹
According to Ibn Abbas, the Prophet really did want all of humanity
to have religious belief, but Allah did not will that to be.³² Why? I cannot
explain it. The feelings of the Prophet are really the feeling of humans
with faith, but these feelings must be subject to the provision of Allah
that atheists may carry on with their lives peacefully alongside theists.
In the eyes of Allah, atheists too are creatures He has created, even if
they do not acknowledge Him. They may have their own “gods” and
worship them, such as ideology, science, lusts, natural forces, and so
forth – which the Quran categorizes as taghut, as I have explained above.
It is difficult to understand humans. They are unique and do not
always appear in an authentic form. Within the concept of pluralism,
all uniqueness and diversity must be admitted as mental facts that are
inherent in humanity’s spiritual structure. To arrive at this admission,
there is no other way but that people develop the culture of high
tolerance – acknowledging the diversity and complexity consciously
and with a positive attitude. It is not just religion and culture that are
diverse, but also language and skin color are variegated and complex. Try
to follow the meaning of this verse: “And of His signs is the creation of
the heavens and the earth and the diversity of your languages and your
colors. Indeed in that are signs for those of knowledge.”³³ Thus, Allah
indeed created that complexity intentionally so that human civilization
would be filled with color and each would enrich the other.
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The question of tolerance needs a particular analysis, which I shall
provide before the end of this chapter. I continue with the problem of
different understandings held by the old and younger generations of
the Muslim umat in Indonesia concerning the relationship of state and
religion in its many variations.
In the final part of Chapter 1, I spoke of the heated debate on the
foundation of the state carried out between the supporters of Pancasila
and the supporters of the concept of a state based on Islam. This debate
was halted by Decree No. 5 of July 5, 1959, which decided in favor of
Pancasila. I will not expand further on this issue. But subsequently, a
breakthrough occurred in the thinking of Muslim intellectuals who have
emerged since the early 1980s, and who were no longer interested in
raking up yet again the issue of Pancasila. I must note, however, that at the
same time a new force appeared, a small group within the Muslim umat
that still insisted on making Indonesia into an Islamic state, or at least
incorporating sharia into the Constitution. Thus, the 1980s generation
was also not monolithic, even though the great wave of the educated had
travelled the road that led in the opposite direction to that taken by the
Islamic party leaders before Decree No. 5 in 1959.
The members of this big intellectual wave, some with Western
educations, others with domestic educations, all thought similarly about
the philosophy of the Indonesian state. Researchers have concluded
that Nurcholish Madjid was a major pioneer of the line of thought
in the Muslim umat that no longer felt the need to dream of making
Indonesia an Islamic state, for having the Pancasila as foundation
was sufficient to accommodate the aspirations of the Muslim umat
in statehood. Other figures in this category included Harun Nasution,
Munawir Sjadzali, Taufik Abdullah, Abdurrahman Wahid, Achmad
Siddiq, M. Dawam Rahardjo, Mohammad Amien Rais, Djohan Effendi,
Kuntowijoyo, and others. These were followed by the next generation,
with much the same outlook, among them Bahtiar Effendy, Siti Musda
Mulia (a radical female thinker, certain of the principles she held),
Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Azyumardi Azra, Saiful Muzani, Komaruddin
Hidayat, M. Amin Abdullah, Abdul Munir Mulkhan, M. Syafii Anwar,
Moeslim Abdurrahman, Fachry Ali, Syafiq A. Mughni, Haedar Nashir,
Masdar F. Masʾudi, Muhadjir Effendy, Husein Muhammad, Budhy
Munawar-Rachman, Ulil-Abshar Abdallah, and Abd Aʾla.
A still younger generation is now emerging in a gathering wave,
among which are Yudi Latif, Sukidi Mulyadi, Zuhairi Misrawi, Syamsul
Arifin, AbdulMoqsith Ghazali, Raja Juli Antoni, AhmadNorma Permata,
Hasibullah Satrawi, Zakiyuddin Baidhawy, Hilman Latief, Fajar Riza Ul
Haq, and Moh. Shofan. Only time will tell if they are capable of making
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Indonesia into a nation that is just and dignified. Opposed to them is a
small group that has not fully accepted Pancasila and still wants to offer
a different philosophy for Indonesia. These are the descendants of the
generation of Islamic groups that had previously fought to make Islam
the foundation of the state. I suggest, so that the two sides do not waste
their energy in useless fighting, they open themselves up to a dialogue
that is completely academic.
I hope that this generation of intellectuals does not just busy itself
with discourse and speeches, while leaving the Indonesian nation to
become increasingly fragile. Some of these intellectuals must enter into
the power system with far-reaching intentions to establish justice and to
oppose all forms of tyranny against anyone, without partiality.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century the world of the santri
Muslims of Indonesia got a great shock. President Abdurrahman Wahid
was a santri, as were the chair of thempr (People’s ConsultativeAssembly),
MohammadAmienRais, and the chair of the dpr (People’s Representative
Council), Akbar Tandjung. The three of them were together at the
very summit of power. But regrettably, these three leading figures had
clashing political chemistries – to borrow a saying of the Minangkabau
people, “swaying together but not equally dizzy; living together but
not in accord; under one umbrella but miles apart.” The three of them
have never discussed in any deep way building up the nation through
a healthy democratic system under the conditions I have outlined
earlier.
In other words, even when santri leaders are at the very peak of
power, if they place their egos and power interests at the forefront,
then the general populace will conclude that it makes little difference if
their leaders are santri or not. That would be an extremely dangerous
conclusion, because the santri, so proud of their faith and so well trusted,
after being tested for public positions will turn out to have failed. Thus,
the next generation must observe this intelligently and critically, so that
pride in Indonesia as the biggest Muslim nation in the world will have
real substance: its liberation from the shackles of poverty, ignorance, and
dishonesty; from disorganization and divisiveness and backwardness. We
truly wish for an Indonesia that is just, properous, intelligent, enlightened,
dignified, and completely sovereign.
In fact, with the acceptance of Pancasila as the philosophical foun-
dation of the state by the majority of the new generation of santri, the
opportunity is now wide open to build the nation and set aside the anger
associated with theological-philosophical differences. For almost two
decades, the energy of the Indonesian elite was to a large extent drained
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by such disputes. The issue has been well resolved and with complete
understanding, because the new generation of Muslim intellectuals,
with their more comprehensive and historical perspective, reached the
conclusion that the trademark “Islamic” is not needed in the national
name. For them, the important thing is that Islam’s moral principles,
which aim at establishing justice for all, were to be made a program for
action. As for the several Islamic legal principles touching on public law,
these could simply be integrated into the national legal code, so as not
to be enshrined in the Constitution to the exclusion of other religious
practice, except for those laws dealing with family law, such as marriage,
inheritance, endowments and donations, and also the matter of religious
tithes.
This new generation appears talented enough to become reliable
Muslim thinkers, as long as they continue to develop themselves by
constantly accessing new literary sources for incorporation into their
own written work. Writing is a strategic means of introducing one’s
thinking for independent appraisal in the public sphere. It clearly requires
moral courage to appear as a new thinker. Some of these thinkers are
widely known; others are still known in limited circles and environments.
By tireless writing, over time they will achieve maturity as thinkers.
Indonesia longs for the appearance of serious young thinkers who are
highly committed to remaining in the Indonesian milieu. What this new
Muslim generation must remember is to never discard moral integrity in
their public careers.
Some of the younger generation mentioned above have indeed
produced new writings. I leave it to readers to discover these themselves;
I shall not provide excerpts from them here. Among them, some have
succeeded in emerging as tested bureaucrats, such as Azyumardi Azra,
who has built the image of Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University
(uin) as an institute of higher learning. In Azra’s hands, uin became
a campus of intellectual santri. However, one small question remains.
Having developed its general study programs, can the university preserve
a high-quality Islamic studies curriculum that remains attractive to
students? If general studies dominate the curriculum, while serious
attention to Islamic sciences flags, a gap will emerge within its alumni
circles. Feelings of inferiority may arise among alumni who have not
come out of the centers of excellence in the same campus environment.
The greatest challenge faced by Islamic studies is located in particular
in the inadequate numbers of truly professional lecturers; that is, those
who are equally well grounded in the classical Islamic literature and in
the modern world, and who then deal with both of these intelligently
and critically. Without this advantage, Islamic studies will be hard-
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pressed to compete with general studies. In the classical Islamic world,
Ibn Rushd – known in the West as Averroes – can be categorized as just
such a professional figure, while in the modern era Fazlur Rahman is an
outstanding example.
The Status of Women in Islam
I have written this section in appreciation of K.H. Husein Muhammad, a
religious scholar of the Fahmina Institute Foundation in Cirebon. This
kiyai (religious sage) has worked hard to position women in a proper and
dignified place in line with the teachings of Islam. This friend of mine is
among those who responded to this book not long after the publication
of its original edition in June 2009, especially regarding its shortcomings
in not speaking about equality of the sexes.
For centuries in Muslim communities, women have not been appreci-
ated and respected commensurate with their dignity as complete human
beings. If Kiyai Husein had not provided critical notes about this issue,
perhaps this important section would not be included here. This was,
first and last, negligence on my part. In fact, my stance with regard to
this issue of equality does not differ from Kiyai Husein’s. The discussion
would not be complete if Kiyai Husein’s critique as it relates to the status
of women were not quoted here:
It is most unfortunate that Buya [Maarif] forgot to speak in some
measure about the question of feminism. Although he mentioned
Fatima Mernissi, the Muslim champion of feminism, he did not touch
on her brilliant thoughts on feminism. It is said it would be incomplete
if feminist discourse were not included in a discussion on democracy,
basic human rights, and pluralism. Of course, [Maarif] is not the only
one to frequently forget this issue.
Look how women as a group in many places are not only excluded
from the stage of human history, but even become victims of the
structure of patriarchal civilization. Discrimination, marginalization,
and violence still stalk and trap them on all sides and through many
ideologies and patriarchal social systems. In many instances, human
interpretations of religion join in reinforcing this. Listen to the words
of this deplorable song: “Women are satans created for us. / And we
beseech the Lord’s protection against such satans.”³⁴
I admire the courage of Kiyai Husein’s opinion, which ought to serve as a
model for other kiyai.
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One of the major reasons that women are sidelined in public life is
that discourse on Islam is controlled by men. Traditions such as the
Javanese konco wingking (the friend in back), which limits a woman’s
activities to the kitchen, also play a role. The situation is worse when
women are not given access to a level of education equal to men. Not long
ago, when the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, women were forbidden
to leave the house and so to school. Ironically, commands such as
that were given religious underpinnings by men. Muhammad Iqbal,
speaking on the question of women’s education, made the profound
philosophical remark: “Whereas educating aman is the same as educating
an individual, educating a woman is the same as educating an entire
family.”³⁵
In Saudi Arabia, women’s lives are heavily repressed, not much
differently than the “friend in back” tradition. For decades, women
there have fought to be permitted to drive cars, but the results were not
encouraging, although glimmers of light are now visible, thanks to the
education that they have gained. A proper education will definitely lead
to a free people, men and women. Islam is the religion that liberates
humanity in a true sense. But men’s treatment of women has snatched
away the rights of that liberation from them, not infrequently buttressed
by religious arguments, as I shall discuss below.
Before Allah, the position of a woman is equal to that of a man. Both
genders can have a relationship with Allah without an intermediary. If
someone performs good deeds, Allah will not differentiate between aman
and a woman in allotting the rewards reserved for them. Verse 97 of the
Surah Al-Nahl explains those just rewards: “Whoever does righteousness,
whether male or female, while he [or she] is a believer – We will surely
cause him to live a good life, and We will surely give them their reward
[in the Hereafter] according to the best of what they used to do.” Based
on that verse, a woman of faith is no different before Allah from a man
who also conducts himself virtuously. Both will be rewarded equally,
without discrimination. Therefore, the discriminatory treatment meted
out against women is no different from opposing the commands of the
Quran. This is the patriarchal culture that must be buried once and for
all.
If there is any difference, it is entirely due to personal achievement,
which is open to everyone, not due to a difference of sex. We read
this provision in Surah Al-Hujurat, verse 13: “O mankind, indeed We
have created you from male and female and made you peoples and
tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you
in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is
Knowing and Acquainted.” For me, this verse affirms the teaching of
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equality among human beings, whether men or women. To capture
the highest position of righteousness will very much depend on the
earnestness and sincerity of a person who is indeed striving greatly
in that direction. Men and women are given the same opportunity,
regardless of sex.
Fortunately, in the twentieth century several female Muslim thinkers
emerged who, using strong religious arguments, bravely challenged
the male domination of women. Among them were Professor Riffat
Hassan (b. 1943, in Lahore), who holds a PhD in Islamic Philosophy
from Durham University, uk. Hassan is among the most outspoken of
feminist activists from the perspective of Islam. In an interview with the
journalist Samina Ibrahim, Hassan explained her position. “For me,” she
said, “feminism means that women have the same rights as men.”³⁶ These
are the rights seized from Muslim women for hundreds of years, using
religious arguments that had been interpreted incorrectly. And these
are the rights that must be returned to them by a thoroughgoing and
serious struggle. We get a sense of her bitterness at the fate of women
in the Islamic world from these words: “The more I saw the justice and
compassion of God reflected in the Quranic teachings regarding women,
the more anguished and angry I became at seeing the injustice and
inhumanity to which Muslim women in general are subjected in actual
life.”³⁷
From the starting point of this bitter reality, Riffat Hassan proposed
that a discourse be written on women’s theology in Islam. Her reason
is clear: it is because the sources concerning Islamic tradition that are
said to be based on the Quran, the hadith literature, and fiqh (legal
interpretation) have been interpreted only by men who have arrogantly
determined the status of women. Yet these men are mostly ignorant in
the fields of ontology, theology, sociology, and eschatology. Hassan also
rejects the view that woman was created from the rib of man, because
that belief was imported from Jewish and Christian doctrine that entered
Islam through hadith.³⁸ Such a bold view may provoke anger in some,
but we must balance that with the Quran as it is correctly and sincerely
understood if we really want to place the status of women on an equal
level with that of men.
Professor Yunahar Ilyas of Indonesia does not agree with Riffat
Hassan’s view on the creation of woman. Yunahar writes:
Riffat Hassan rejects the creation of Hawa [Eve] from Adam’s rib,
assuming that creation from a rib bone is lower in value than creation
from earth. In fact, such an assumption has no basis. The commentators
themselves do not view the creation of Hawa as reflecting women’s
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inferiority. The origin of the creation does not determine the value of
humans. The value of humans is only determined by the achievements
they attain.³⁹
Yunahar’s final sentence, “The value of humans is only determined by
the achievements they attain,” certainly contains truth. But how can
women attain high achievements in a cultural environment so completely
dominated by men? Riffat Hassan points out that nowadays more and
more Jews and Christians reject the traditional interpretations of their
religions about the origin of woman, while the Muslim community still
holds fast to such stories to maintain the integrity of an Islamic way of
life.⁴⁰
It would appear that more time is still needed before the adherents
of the Abrahamic religions are ready to liberate themselves from the
sources of their respective faiths that do not treat women fairly. In the
Quran there is absolutely nothing to justify the claim that speaks of
woman coming from a rib bone, even though the majority of the Muslim
umat believe it because it is found in Bukhari-Muslim hadith literature,⁴¹
which Hassan says was imported from Jewish and Christian teaching.
But verse 7 in the Surah Al-Aʿraf quoted by Yunahar, which is not found
in Hassan’s article, requires us to bring this into our analysis: “O children
of Adam, let not Satan tempt you as he removed your parents from
Paradise ….”⁴² This verse indeed uses the expression abawaikum (the
two parents), who according to the beliefs of the Muslim umat are Adam
and Hawa (Eve). My problem with this reading is that we do not find the
word “Hawa” in the Quran and also that the Quran does not speak of the
creation of woman from man, as I have said.
This crucial issue needs to be debated further. Nevertheless, I still
hold that there is equality between men and women in the sight of Allah,
even if they are not yet considered equal in society, a view that must be
demolished in the endeavor to build a more just civilization. The “friend
in back” status of women in traditional Javanese society is an insult to a
creature of Allah who is glorious, according to the Quran, which uses the
term bani adam for both men and women. (See Surah Al-Isra, verse 70.)
I have not found the word for rib in Arabic, dhilaʿ, in the Quran,
either in the form of the verb dhalaʿa-yadhlaʿu (to side with, support
something) or in its derivative, such as dhilaʿ. Let us look in the hadith
literature on the question of a rib bone as the genesis of woman, as cited
by Yunahar from the commentator Abu Al-Fadl Shihab Al-Din Al-Sayyid
Mahmud Afandi Al-Alusi Al-Baghdadi (1802–1854): “Tell each other to
treat women nicely, for woman is created from a rib. And truly the most
curved portion of the rib is its upper portion, so, if you should try to
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straighten that curved bone, it will break, but if you leave it as it is, it will
remain crooked.”⁴³ It is not surprising that Riffat Hassan rejects hadiths
that are unfair to women. I too believe they need to be reexamined, for
why would the Quran remain silent on a question that has so greatly
affected the course of human history?
Hamka, the Indonesian commentator, discussed this issue compre-
hensively, long before Hassan rejected the view that woman originated
from the rib bone of Adam. Hamka’s conclusion was:
Thus, it is not incorrect in the view of this feeble commentator [Hamka
himself] if there are those who do not hold firmly to the conviction that
Hawa came from the rib bone of Adam, for there is no Divine Word
that mentions it in the Quran, nor anything spoken by the Prophet
that precisely explains that. There are only messages or interpretations
of Abdullah bin Abbas and Abdullah bin Masʾud and several other
companions, who most probably heard that story from the Jews who
read the Book of Genesis from the Torah.⁴⁴
Hamka also repeated the Bukhari-Muslim hadith cited by Yunahar, but
with slight emendations, and then commented, “When we closely note
the tone of this hadith, it cannot be made the reason for saying that
woman, especially Siti Hawa [Eve], came from the rib bone of the Prophet
Adam.”⁴⁵ Hamka, however, agreed that the spirit of that woman was
bent,⁴⁶ which I cannot accept. That woman was the same sex as all our
mothers, the mother of all humankind. If truly the spirit of woman had
beenmade bent, how cursedwith bad luckwas themother of humankind!
In my view, the validity of hadiths like this one need to be reexamined,
as Turkish religious scholars have been doing since 2006 in the Diyanet
Project on Hadith.⁴⁷ Diyanet, a Turkish word derived from Arabic, is the
Presidency of Religious Affairs, which has its center at Ankara University
in the Divinity School.
The Christian Science Monitor, in a piece by Yigal Schleifer (March 11,
2008) under the headline “Turkish scholars aim to modernize Islam’s
Hadith,”⁴⁸ reported on this hadith project, but its heading wasmisleading.
Turkish scholars did not want to modernize the hadith, but rather to
examine those hadiths whose authenticity is doubtful, using the Quran
as the primary reference. I will not go into this matter any further, except
as it is connected with the issue of the status of women in Islam.
Ismail Hakki Unal, the head of the project at Ankara University,
clarified how Islamic literature based on hadith in earlier times greatly
demeaned women. He said, “The issue of women being of lesser mind
and faith was something that was accepted in those days without any
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argument, but it is not today, which is one of the reasons that we are
trying to eliminate it …. We are saying that this is not in line with how
the prophet lived and the Koran itself, so it cannot be accepted.”⁴⁹
Unal took as an example the prohibition against teaching women to
read and write, supposedly because they are “of lesser mind and faith.”⁵⁰
That improper reading may be linked to the Taliban ruling that forbids
women to pursue knowledge and leave the house. It has far-reaching
consequences: women are considered as less than complete humans;
they are the servants of men, no matter how cruel; or they are “satans,”
as we saw in the song lyric condemned by Kiyai Husein.⁵¹ My blood
boils to read of the brutal treatment of women that is justified using
religious texts. Who among you would want his or her mother treated so
degradingly, as it is in an oppressive patriarchal culture? And what about
the saying that is so often quoted, “Heaven lies under the feet of your
mother”?
To reinforce our arguments for male-female equality, let us link this
discussion with Khadijah binti Khuwaylid, the employer and later the
wife of Muhammad, long before he became a prophet. Could you say
that Khadijah was weak in her faith and her reasoning because she was a
woman (to use the language of the hadith)?Who sheltered and comforted
the Prophet when he faced serious problems, both when he received
the troubling divine revelation and when facing his enemies? Khadijah
was the one who stood at the forefront to defend the Prophet, because
her faith was hard as steel and her mind functioned perfectly. So noble
was Khadijah in the eyes of the Prophet that when this was mentioned
near Aisha, a displeased look was seen on the face of this daughter of
Abu Bakr. But how could Muhammad not mention Khadijah for the
great deeds she rendered to the Prophet and to Islam, precisely at those
decisive moments in the beginning? Did not Muhammad take no other
wives except Khadijah while she was still by his side?
All the sources say that Khadijah’s role in the success of Muhammad’s
mission was unmatched, not even by Aisha. Karen Armstrong describes
this critical situation, and writes of Muhammad receiving the divine
revelation: “Trembling, he [Muhammad] waited for the terror to abate,
and Khadijah held him in her arms, soothing him and trying to take his
fear away.”⁵²When Iwrote about this drama of Khadijah andMuhammad,
I could not keep the tears from pouring down my cheeks.
The Muslim umat of Indonesia should follow the example of Turkey,
not to reject the hadiths, but to screen them carefully to ensure that
they do not contradict the Quran and common sense. Collecting the
hadith literature for about two hundred years after the Prophet’s death
was no easy task. Thus, we cannot merely rely on the authority of some
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claim about the validity or weakness of a particular hadith. There is no
question but that those who gathered the hadiths did a great service, but
they were humans like us, with all their strengths and shortcomings.
The hadiths that are seen as unfriendly to women need to be set aside
following serious, honest, and responsible study by those who have the
authority to do so.
Not all views aboutwomenwill be discussed here, such as the questions
of inheritance and bearing witness in court. But there are other crucial
issues that are tied to the position of women based on the verse often
translated as “Men are in charge of women …” (Surah Al-Nisa, verse 34)
that need to be discussed. The segment of the verse quoted here says that
men (husbands) are qawwamuna over women (wives). The experts differ
in interpreting theArabicword qawwamuna.Thismuch-debatedQuranic
term comes from the root qwm and becomes qama-yaqumu (upright,
standing) and qawwam (the singular of qawwamuna), which means
protector, guardian, director, manager, and so forth. Some commentators
interpret it as meaning leader. All those interpretations are feasible. The
question is, based on this verse can a woman not become a protector,
leader, guardian, and so forth, for the male community? Does this
verse limit the range of leadership exercised by men to the household
only?
Naturally, in certain cases it is the man who steps forward to protect
the woman. Hamka has these amusing words to say about this question:
While [husband and wife are] squabbling in the house over rights and
obligations, suddenly a criminal comes to rob them. Without any prior
command, it is the man who is ready to confront this enemy [and] it is
his wife and children whom he orders to hide. And if there were any
grown male children, he would order them to stand firm with him.⁵³
Of course, Hamka is right when it comes to confronting a danger such as
this one. But it would be different if, for example, the woman in such
a situation were a master of karate while her husband was a timorous
soul who didn’t know the first thing about self-defense. In that case, it
could be the husband who would go hide with the children. Thus, with a
change in the picture our interpretation of the religious teaching would
have to change, without changing the text.
In addition to Riffat Hassan, there are many other female Muslim
scholars who defend the status and dignity of women in Islam. Names
like Dr. Amina Wadud Muhsin, Dr. Fatima Mernissi, and Dr. Azizah Al-
Hibri are found among the defenders of feminist principles and basic
human rights in Islam. In developing their views, they have generally
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been influenced by Fazlur Rahman’s methodology in this area of study.
Al-Hibri is not yet as well known in Indonesia as she is in other parts of
the world.⁵⁴
Studies on the status of women in Islam will blossom and proliferate
in the future, because women are increasingly attaining the highest levels
of education. This is an extraordinary advance in the Islamic world. Men
must be grateful as they observe this development and need not fear that
women will dominate them so long as the Quran remains their point
of reference. Men and women can be equal partners in governing the
public interest and other social problems that confront humanity.
The Place of Tolerance in Islam
Taking as a point of departure “there shall be no compulsion in [accep-
tance of] the religion” and that the Prophet indeed did forbid compelling
others to adopt a religion, then the best and rightful path for Muslims in
communal life is to develop a culture of tolerance. Because the Quran
upholds the diversity of ethnicities, nations, religions, languages, and his-
tories, all of these groupsmust live together in harmony, safety, and peace,
if an attitude of broad-mindedness and liberality is to bind humankind.
Such an attitude must arise from a high level of self-confidence, not from
a spiritual atmosphere or powerlessness. Having self-confidence means
not to panic at differences, no matter how sharply perceived, as long as
solutions to these differences can be reliably found by working together.
If these prove difficult to overcome, we should let history be the final
judge, provided that harmonious progress toward communal existence is
not disturbed or damaged.
In a society that has not yet matured psychologically and emotionally,
differences are too often seen as hostile and inimical, when in fact the
strengths that have given birth to great civilizations have been driven
precisely by differences of opinion. The resulting friction, if dealt with
in a mature dialogue, will engender stronger and more comprehensive
formulations. People must not feel that they are always on the right side
before they test this view through healthy dialogue in an atmosphere of
openness and tolerance. In this connection, I shall discuss the claims
of truth brought forward by the streams of thought in Islam in the
contemporary era that Khaled Abou El Fadl has grouped into two
categories: puritan Islam and modern Islam.⁵⁵
Those in the puritan group hold to a single, monolithic truth and
have virtually no interest in a culture of tolerance. Those in the modern
group, usually termed “moderates,” while certain of the truth of their
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religion, are broad-minded and liberal enough to allow other sides to lay
claim to truth as well. Each side needs to maintain respect for whatever
differences exist. The attitude reflected in “I have a monopoly over the
truth,” which denies the other side a similar opportunity, is the source of
chaos in society. The intensity of this chaos increases as the lust for power
enters into the dispute. This is what happens in various Muslim societies
throughout the world. As a result, history’s great task of creating peace
among fellow Muslims or between Muslims and non-Muslims falls by the
wayside. Throughout history, conflicts, and even bloodshed, have been
more common between Muslims than have between Muslims and non-
Muslims. This is one of history’s hard facts of which the Muslim umat
must be aware, so that it will be particularly cautious and open-minded
when it becomes involved in politics.
A young nu intellectual of considerable potential, Zuhairi Misrawi,
was so disquieted at the lack of tolerance in Muslim society that he wrote
a book titled The Quran: Book of Tolerance.⁵⁶ As his motto, Zuhairi quotes
a hadith from Ibn Abi Shaybah and Bukhari: “The religion most beloved
by Allah is the one with the most straightforwardly tolerant teaching.”⁵⁷
In several meetings with Misrawi, I reiterated that the Quran was far
more tolerant than some in the Muslim umat. At the end of his work,
Zuhairi came out with this strongly worded statement:
In this way, the Quran can be made an oasis in a barren land, one that
has long been afflicted by intolerance. With the paradigm contained in
the Quran, both the verses of tolerance or reinterpretation of verses
that frequently are used for intolerant acts, the Muslim umat must
open a new horizon to greet a better future. The slogan, “Return to the
Quran and the Sunnah” is a noble one. Nonetheless, sloganeering and
ideologizing are not the best way to express the pearls of wisdom in the
Quran. The best step is a wise, open-minded, and contextual reading of
it. Because, in this way, hope for creating tolerance on the face of the
earth will not be a dream. Tolerance will be both text and reality.⁵⁸
An excellent book on tolerance and religious pluralism has been written
by the young nu intellectual Abdul Moqsith Ghazali. Drawing on in
his doctoral dissertation at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University
in Jakarta, Moqsith has written an academic book with a long reach
that attempts to show the friendly and sympathetic face of Islam as the
model for Indonesia in the future. The closing sentence in this work is:
“No one may be discriminated against and excommunicated based on
the religion he or she has chosen. In this connection, the Muslim umat
needs to develop a tolerant, sympathetic, and empathetic attitude toward
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groups or communities of other religions.”⁵⁹ In following Moqsith’s line
of thought, which I also present in this work, I have increasingly found
confirmation for arguments that will in time surely become a great wave
in the discourse of Islamic thinking in Indonesia.
The emergence of a cohort of tolerant and knowledgeable young
intellectuals, from both the nu and Muhammadiyah, will guarantee
that in Indonesia’s future the religion will show a face that is friendly
because it is self-confident. Because of its strong and highly developed
self-confidence, its adherents will surely be tolerant, democratic, and at
ease in the face of anyone or anything, anywhere. Thus, the generation of
intellectuals now emerging in the umat must safeguard their image and
moral integrity so that the broader society’s trust in them and in their
leadership grows ever stronger, without question. I am not exaggerating,
for the empirical evidence has supported very convincingly what I am
saying here. The fear of the non-Muslim communities is not a fear of
Islam, but of the interpretation of Islam by small groups that rage with
an almost primitive culture of violence. Furthermore, it is not only
the non-Muslim communities that worry about these groups’ violent
conduct; the majority of Indonesian Muslims are also angered and
offended by those methods, which fall very short of the standards of
public ethics.
One Islam, One Thousand Expressions
It is a fact of history that Islam as it developed over time experienced
a succession of ebbs and flows. During the time of the Prophet and
the Rightly Guided Caliphs (632–661ce), the expression of Islam was
relatively simple. Especially under the leadership of the Prophet, all
problems arising in the circle of the Muslim community could be quickly
resolved by the absolute authority of the Prophet, so that the attitude
of the community was: “We hear and we obey”.⁶⁰ In the era of the
Rightly Guided Caliphs, even though there were political frictions
that led to civil war, Islam had not yet been split into sects (firqah)
that stood in theological opposition. As has been explained above, the
emergence of groups such as these was generated by political rivalry
between Muawiyah and the Caliph Ali bin Abu Talib, which ended with
the Siffin War (657ce), only twenty-five years after the passing of the
Prophet.
As a result of the Siffin War and the treaty at Daumat Al-Jandal in that
same year, the Muslim umat split into three sects and three expressions:
Sunni, Shia, and Khawarij, each with its own theological system. At the
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beginning of the twenty-first century, Islamic expressions, according
to Abdul Munʾim Al-Hafni, number approximately seven hundred,
representing tiny ripples or great waves.⁶¹ Their sources can be traced
back to these three expressions, which in the beginning were Arab in
form and feature. Because Islam was born in Arabia, the several variants
that have emerged in different parts of the world over fifteen centuries
refer to their respective Arab sources. Some Muslims who were born
and live in the “areas of the margin” (that is, far from Arabia) cannot
differentiate between Islam as a religion and doctrine of belief and Arab
culture, which surely does not represent Islam. This phenomenon is
especially visible in those parts of the Muslim umat that do not get much
accurate information about Islam.
Before we scrutinize the phenomenon of radicalism in Indonesia, I
shall present Johan Galtung’s theory of global fundamentalism in each of
its variations,⁶² for I see radicalism as a historical symptom and a brother
of fundamentalism. Why Galtung? This thinker is known for being
relatively objective and neutral, as well as courageous and independent.
He appears to be free of any baggage in expressing his views on various
world problems, including when speaking about fundamentalism, which
he feels has shackled humanity at the beginning of the twenty-first
century.
Professor Johan Galtung is a well-known sociologist, thinker and
peace activist, born in 1930 in Oslo, Norway. His works have become
reference points whenever people speak of peace, conflict, and war, and of
how to overcome war. When he was twelve years old, his father was sent
to a concentration camp by the Nazis; he thus began to understand how
cruel war is. Galtung is an admirer of Mahatma Gandhi, the legendary
leader of the nonviolence movement in India. His criticisms of those
who would make war are sharp, no matter their target. In 1970, Galtung
predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union. By his reckoning, the current
American empire will not last long because of its expansionist foreign
policies and indifference to international law, even if democracy and
basic human rights seem to be respected at home.
On September 14, 2002 in Cologne, in front of 25,000 German peace
supporters, Galtung called out, “Moderates of the world, unite!” In
this forum, Galtung spoke of three strains of fundamentalism that
have made captives of the peoples of the world. In contrast to the
bulk of the Western press, which, post-9/11, tends to direct accusations
of fundamentalism primarily at Muslims, Galtung focuses on three
fundamentalist forces that, while originating in different cultures, have
a similar philosophy. First, the Osama bin Laden Wahhabi faction,
responsible for the 9/11 attack; second, the Protestant Puritan faction,
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which originated in England and then spread to America; and third,
an expression that is rarely heard but whose workings are no less cruel,
market fundamentalism.
Wahhabi and Protestant fundamentalists both see themselves as God’s
chosen people. Both think as though they are people living in the holy
land promised to them. Both adhere to the doctrine “he who is not with
me is against me.” Both take the death of others in stride. When the name
of George W. Bush was flying high after the September 11 2001 tragedy,
Galtung named him alongside Osama bin Laden, only ascribing to the
us president a more terrible killing power. There are not many people on
earth with an international reputation who are as bold as Galtung is in
calling out for the demolition of barbarism, tyranny, and wickedness.
I feel humanity owes a great debt to the person with a primary and
consistent integrity. If he attacks barbarous practices, at the same time
he shows how to live in a civilized manner. He is not like those who
talk about love while their actions echo a culture of hate and violence.
Some speak of democracy and basic human rights, while turning other
nations into prey to be brutally destroyed. Galtung says the world is full
of problems, with one bigger than all the others. Its name is the “geo-
fascist” United States. Inside there is a bit of democracy, and outside,
fascism. In a September 2014 speech to 25,000 from the German Peace
Movement in Cologne, Galtung said, about the United States, “They
think they are above the law, [and] directly under God, so that there is
no space for the un, international law, and human rights.” Galtung also
takes aim at Israel which, also under the control of the fundamentalists,
routinely flouts United Nations resolutions.
According to Galtung, the United States is beset by a third strand of
fundamentalism, market fundamentalism. The Chosen Ones there are
called ceos, with their corporations. There is a holy land as well: the
market. He says that, under such fundamentalism, whoever does not
believe in an unfettered market and has other economic ideas and ideals
must be dealt with as a traitor. The market fundamentalists also take
human life lightly, with 100,000 deaths every day because the market
cannot meet the basic needs of food and health; one-fourth of this total
dies of hunger.
In conclusion, let us repeat Galtung’s appeal: “Moderates of the world,
unite!” I would add to that: “All stripes of fundamentalism are the true
enemies of humankind and the sworn enemy of common sense.”⁶³
For the survival of life on this earth, the wise approach is to show
broad-mindedness and generosity toward differences of opinion and
then to manage these differences to obtain a truth that is acceptable to
all.
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My view is that in an uncertain and very unjust world, enlightening
ideas such as those Galtung broached are vital. They give hope to the
world’s people that clear and objective thinkers still exist, even if they
are hard to locate among the morass of narrow, short-term interests.
The words of George bin Laden and Osama Bush lead to the conclusion
that the two of them differ from each other in only minor ways –
both are destroyers of civilization, but of course Bush’s criminality is
far worse because it is masked by a superpower state and abundant
dollars.
We now return to my original analysis and to Nusantara, where I
shall scrutinize the emergence of the “new-style Khawarij” movement.
It appears in the form of the mmi (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia; the
Indonesian Mujahidin Council) and the fpi (Front Pembela Islam; the
Defenders of Islam Front). Then there is hti (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia;
Indonesian Party of Liberation), which is transnational and bears the
flag of the Islamic Caliphate. There are many others as well, too many to
discuss here. These three groups arose out of Sunni Islam. mmi and fpi
are led by Indonesian citizens of Arabic origin. Although these two do
not necessarily support the path of violence in achieving their aims, their
basic philosophy does not greatly differ from fundamentalist doctrine,
as described by Galtung. There is no truth outside their respective
organizations.
There exists some literature on the characteristics of these radical
movements.⁶⁴ Among their most prominent features is their demand
for Islamic sharia to be imposed constitutionally in Indonesia. mmi,
for example, greatly regrets the sidelining of the Jakarta Charter, in
particular the crossing out on August 18, 1945, of seven words from the
first sila (principle) of the Pancasila,⁶⁵ which said “with the obligation
to uphold Islamic sharia for its adherents.” The rejection by the great
current of the Muslim umat of the constitutional implementation of
sharia automatically put the majority into the category “unbelieving,
fascist, and tyrannical,” as far as mmi was concerned.⁶⁶ mmi was really
very bold to have come out with a judgment of such ill will toward its
fellow Muslims. (In contrast, nu and Muhammadiyah tended to hold
to the principle of “fundamental objectives of sharia,” in the form of
establishing justice, equality, and eternal solidarity among humankind,
without discrimination.) But, as is often the case in various parts of the
Islamic world, the hardline groups are very vulnerable to splitting. That is
what happened with mmi in August 2008, when the “emir” was expelled
by his deputy and charged with many painful accusations, such as being
a Shia, an Ahmadi, and a communist.⁶⁷
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The Egyptian writer Yusuf Al-Qardhawi, many of whose fatwas
have become reference points in Indonesia, when speaking about
“fundamental objectives [of sharia],” based his interpretation on the
opinion of Ibn Al-Qayyim: “The basis and foundation of sharia is the
benefit of mankind in this world and the hereafter. The entire sharia
contains justice,mercy, benefit andwisdom.”Al-Qardhawi thus rejects the
approach of the literalists “who cannot see the meaning, substance, and
true essence, but rather the form.”⁶⁸ If we use Al-Qardhawi’s parameters,
then the mmi, fpi, and hti are surely within the literalist category by
neglecting the meaning and substance of sharia.
As an antidemocratic group, mmi, for example, seems to doubt its own
powers to fight for its political aspirations. On August 15, 2000, it met
with Golkar, ppp (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; United Development
Party), and pbb (Partai Bulan Bintang; Crescent Star Party) at the
Parliament Building in Jakarta to convey to them the principles of its
thinking as they had been formulated at the Mujahidin Congress i in
Yogyakarta a few days earlier, onAugust 5–7.⁶⁹ As an antidemocratic force,
mmi should not have been setting foot in the Parliament Building and
meeting with these political parties – all of them symbols of democracy
in Indonesia. But it looks as if in politics, such inconsistencies are
business as usual, even if they do betray the slogans of a movement’s own
ideology.
A notable researcher in Indonesia’s Islamist movements, Deliar Noer
(1926–2008), was sitting on the executive board of mmi as an outcome
of Congress i and Congress ii. I had no idea that this senior to whom I
paid my respects had taken this step; I did not pay much attention to
the other names, although some were those of my friends. Deliar Noer,
one of whose works, Gerakan Moderen Islam di Indonesia, 1900–1942
(The Islamic Modernist Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1942), has become
a classic, seemed so unlikely to be attracted to this radical movement.
Did he despair of Indonesia’s murky future and thus place his hope in
mmi with its simplistic and black-and-white ideas? But Deliar Noer also
criticized the lack of clarity of the ideas of this radical sharia group in
relation to state institutions in a foreword:
In the question of the relationship of religion (Islam) and state, it is
a certainty – believed in by the majority of those categorized as the
radical factions – that such a relationship exists in and must be reflected
in civil life. Thus, sharia must be established and enforced in the ideal
state. Sadly, the relationship proposed here is very unclear, except,
as usual, what relates to the law: cutting off hands, stoning, and the
like.⁷⁰
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This radical group is really no different from other hard-line groups,
whether in thinking, in emotions, or in actions. Al-Qardhawi categorizes
it as “a newZhahirimadrassa,” with six prominent characteristics: literalist
understanding and interpretation, harshness and complexity, haughtiness
in its views, rejection of differing opinions, indifference to fitna (slander
and libel),⁷¹ and branding as “infidel” differing opinions.
These literalists are not satisfied with rejecting people whose opinions
differ from theirs, but they make a bigger issue of this, that is, they
view them prejudicially [buruk sangka], treat them as deviationists
[membidaʾkan] and as iniquitous [memfasikkan], and even call them
infidels [mengafirkan].
The principle governing [their condemnation of] people who differ
in opinion with them is [satisfied by] an “accusation.” In fact, according
to human law, the principle governing someone who is accused is
“innocent (not guilty)” until proven by a court decision (on the basis of
the principle of presumed innocence). This is emphasized by Islamic
sharia. But for them, the principle is that the accused is guilty until
proven innocent. And the person’s innocence is in their hands, not in
anyone else’s.
To refute thoseMuslim thinkers who do not go alongwith them, they
write a lot of big books which they treat to deluxe printing.They broaden
the scope of their refutation by accusations of personal deviationism,
depravity, and even infidelity to Islam. Among these thinkers they
oppose are Sheikh Muhammad Al-Ghazali, Dr. Muhammad Imarah,
Fahmi Huwaydi, and I myself.⁷²
Of course, not all hard-line groups are quick to call people infidels. The
Indonesian Mujahidin Council (mmi) appears to be the most prominent
in this business. Its members want to monopolize the truth, a kind of
arrogance that will only lead to the destruction of civilization by people
wearing blinkers!
Now I shall look at the next radical group, the Defenders of Islam
Front (fpi). fpi raised its head during the Reform era; more precisely,
it was established on August 17, 1998, at Pesantren Al-Umm Ciputat,
Tangerang, and was engineered by several friends and kiyai.⁷³ It is said
that the context of its emergence was the long oppression suffered by
the Muslim umat in places like Aceh, Lampung, Tanjung Priok, Haur
Koneng, and Sampang, but these acts of oppression were never brought
to light or taken before the courts.⁷⁴ But here is the irony. The news was
broadcast that there was some military presence in its early meetings,
and that the military even provided assistance in the form of funds
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and military training.⁷⁵ If this is true, it means some army thugs were
playing with fire that could in time burn Indonesia. Experience shows
that fpi’s anarchic actions against churches, Ahmadiyah, and others,
often go unopposed by any force. This means that law enforcement
agencies do not seem to care about such criminal deeds. fpi sees all these
acts of violence as playing a part in preventing disobedience to God’s
word.
The issue here is not that anyone is arguing that disobedience to God’s
word can be allowed to happen, because clearly the pillars of social life
would be destroyed by narcotics, fornication, gambling, and drinking
alcohol. My question is, In a country of laws like Indonesia, are private
armies permitted to act against sin? Would all this not be the job of
the police? So why are the police silent? As long as the police adopt an
attitude of indifference to the behavior of the private armies, the public
at large will remain suspicious that there may be something going on
between them. In such a revolutionary mental climate, it would be very
easy indeed for the police to use fpi as a tool for the purposes of power
politics. President B.J. Habibie’s government, which is quite modern,
oddly enough received strong support from radical groups because this
was seen as “benefiting the Muslim umat,”⁷⁶ although the same groups
rejected democracy.
Wasn’t Habibie chosen through the democratic process? This writer
also supported Habibie, because Habibie was the father of Indonesian
democracy after Mohammad Hatta. It was Habibie who reopened the
democratic faucet after it had been closed off for almost forty years,
since the start of the Guided Democracy period in 1959. So I would
like to know, do the radical groups oppose democracy in theory but
enjoy its results in practice? Seen this way, for them any contradiction
between theory and practice poses no problem at all. They are actually
just pragmatists, taking shade under a parasol of sacred verse.
The tragedy of June 1, 2008, when fpi attacked the akkbb (Aliansi
Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan; National
Alliance for the Freedom to Embrace Religion and Faith) at the National
Monument in Jakarta, led to the public losing sympathy for all forms of
violent action. The police were quite effective in overcoming the riot.
Several leading fpi figures were arrested without a struggle. This proves
that if law enforcement agencies carry out their functions properly, acts
of violence can be dealt with successfully, or at least minimized. Society’s
perception of the sluggishness of these agencies in anticipating disorders
is justified. The National Monument tragedy must awaken us to one
thing: violence can be prevented, if law enforcement agencies are not
negligent in carrying out their duties.
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The next focus will be on hti (Indonesian Party of Liberation).
In contrast to mmi, which has local Indonesian features, hti is a
transnational Islamist political movement conceived by Taqiyuddin
Al-Nabhani. The goal of his struggle is the formation of a caliphate that
will subsume the entire Islamic world under one political umbrella. In
hti’s imagination, the caliphate system is the only system allowed by
sharia. But in fact, the caliphate system that arose in Islamic history after
the era of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs was a complete and serious
deviation from Islamic political ideals with their strong egalitarianism,
as found in the early era of Islam under the leadership of the companions
of the Prophet. Although that new system still referred to itself as the
caliphate, in reality it was no different from the usual dynastic political
arrangement, with the same cruelties and bloodshed. hti is completely
insensitive to this obvious deviation.
In a later section I provide an excerpt from a paper I prepared at the
request of psik (Pusat Studi Islam dan Kenegaraan; Center of Islamic and
State Studies) at Paramadina University in Jakarta in March 2008 (with
occasional editorial changes and additions) on the origin of this caliphate
system in the perspective of history. No one contests hti’s right to want
to raise the banner of the caliphate, on condition that the democratic
mechanism be used, and with attention to the Indonesian Constitution.
But if hti carries on this quest outside the constitutional framework, the
movement will surely be confronted by the state, which must preserve
the enforcement of its constitution.
The dissolution of the caliphate of Ottoman Turkey by the Turkish
Parliament in March 1924⁷⁷ ended the system that had been in active
existence for more than thirteen centuries, at least in name if not
necessarily in the form permitted by the Quran. For Shah Waliyullah
(c. 1702–c. 1762) of Delhi, the caliphate that flourished after the era of the
Rightly Guided Caliphs differed only slightly from the imperial systems of
Byzantium and Persia.⁷⁸ In terms of morality, justice, and egalitarianism,
naturally that early period of the first four caliphs was relatively ideal for
establishing a reference point, so that Ibn Taimiyah called it the Caliphate
of Prophethood.⁷⁹ Still, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the three
caliphs after Abu Bakr (r. 632–634) died covered in blood. Umar bin
Khattab (r. 634–644) was killed by a non-Muslim, while Uthman bin
Affan (r. 644–656) and Ali bin Abu Talib (r. 656–661) were the victims
of tragic, sensational, and shameful political maneuverings with fellow
Muslims.
As a product of the post-Muhammad age, the theoretical position of
the caliphate is nothing more than an issue of ijtihad (interpretation,
through reasoning and judgment, of the Quranic code), although for
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the time being the jurists defend it as having a sharʿi character (in
accordance with religious provisions). I myself do not support this
latter view, because there is not one valid religious argument that can
justify it. Social and political theory has surely experienced development
and change throughout history. Only those who do not believe in the
principle of change will still cling to something that is moldy with age.
Let us trace the roots of the theory of the caliphate even farther
back, especially as it was propagated by the Sunni jurists in the post-
Muhammad age. When the Prophet departed this life in June 632, he had
been “the effective prophet-ruler over most of the Arabian Peninsula,”⁸⁰
but there was no sign of how to carry forward his task to lead the
community of Muslims that had just been born, nor was there any
mechanism for doing so. As a result, the Muslim community, still in its
adolescence, “was hit by a constitutional crisis,”⁸¹ to use the parameters
of modern political theory. Neither the Quran nor the Sunnah Nabi (the
deeds, sayings and permissions, and other examples of the Prophet)
gives clear orders about how a political system should be built after the
Prophet was no more. The delay in burying the Prophet’s body reflects
the seriousness of the problem of the transfer of leadership in the Muslim
community. Finally, after long and heated discussions at the pavilion of
the Banu Saʿida tribe, the Emigrant leader Abu Bakr was chosen as the
first caliph to lead the umat, although prophethood and messengership
could not be inherited.
As history records, the two companions of the Prophet who had the
most influence, Umar and Abu Bakr, immediately came to the pavilion of
the Banu Saʿida to deal with the ongoing crisis, which they did effectively.
It is quite probable that without the intervention of these two, the unity of
the umat, the main asset for the future of the Muslim community, would
have faced grave danger. “Thanks to the decisive intervention of the two
companions of the Prophet, Abu Bakr and ʿUmar bin Al-Khattab,” writes
Helmut Gätje, “this dangerous crisis could be overcome.”⁸² In a strict
sense, the terms “caliph” and “caliphate” refer to the period right after the
death of the Prophet. So, too, the term “imamate” (imamah), a political
concept developed by jurists in the Middle Ages, was a later formulation.
As for its then being sanctioned under sharia, this was entirely in the
interest of preserving the formal leadership of the Muslim umat. As the
fruit of human thought, it is bound to its space, time, and place. There is
no “certain and absolute provision” concerning this issue, as there are in
the provisions concerning daily prayer, fasting, tithing, and so forth.
If Yusuf Ibish mentions the succession process of the umat leadership
as a constitutional crisis, it is really only to illustrate just how acute the
situation was, because what was known as the Medina Constitution or
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the Medina Charter did not govern the issue of this rotating leadership.
As Prophet and Messenger, Muhammad could not be replaced because
the divine revelation stopped forever when he passed away. However,
there had to be a leader of the umat, for without one, anarchism and
wild confusion would ensue. So, to protect and guard the integrity of the
umat, urgent negotiations were held at the pavilion of the Banu Saʿida.
These talks produced the leadership of Abu Bakr, even though a minority
of the Arab elite of the Ansar clan opposed this result.
The choice of Abu Bakr as the first caliph was considered ijma (a
consensus) of the majority of the umat, which the Sunni then used as
a foundation in developing their political theory. Almost all of Sunni
political theory uses sharia arguments to accommodate a political reality
that changes over time. Particularly before the fall of Baghdad, the center
of the Abbasid Empire, at the hands of theMongols in 1258, the jurists and
the theologians centered their theories on the problem of caliph-leader.
Then, following the destruction of the Abbasids, jurists and theologians
like Ibn Taimiyah shifted their political doctrine from the issue of the
caliphate to the central position of sharia as the main binding force in
the life of the Muslim umat.⁸³ In other words, the jurists and theologians
formulated their theories on the basis of the historical reality that now
confronted the umat. Only then did they rack their brains to identify
sharia principles to justify their theories. Fauzi M. Najjar writes, “religion
was used to sanction the realities of political life.”⁸⁴
Taking our departure from that fact, we can see that even though the
caliphate became an institution in the course of Islamic history, there is
no place that justifies it in the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet.
Therefore, the efforts of some parties to provide a sharia-sanctioned
umbrella for the caliph or for a leader must be viewed as a politicization
of religion for the sake of seizing power. After all, those political theories
were devised by jurists more than three centuries after the Prophet, at a
time when the Abbasid Empire was in a period of decline in the tenth
century. This conclusion of mine does not close the door on developing
new political theories, but we must bear in mind that an absolutist
attitude will only constrict the umat into an intellectual back alley and
stifle creative thinking. In the end, Islamic civilization will mark time,
or the umat may even be told to lament for a brilliantly colored past,
while failing to build the present, let alone the future. This is the model
of thinking that I have worried about for a quarter of a century now.
Is there no solution for confronting such theories? As someone who
wants to see the Muslim umat have an authoritative, influential, and
dignified place in the global order, I believe there is no problem that
cannot be solved, but we must adopt an attitude of humility. One who is
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humble will surely grasp these verses: “give good tidings to My servants.
Who listen to speech [of someone else] and follow the best of it ….”⁸⁵ The
arrogance of people who think of themselves as being “the most right”
makes for an attitude that is unforgiveable in terms of sharia. Arrogance
is not a characteristic of a person of authentic faith, but rather it is a pride
in one’s origins that is bequeathed by the devil.
In a previous section, I said that difference and diversity in interpreting
religious teachings is a fact to be acknowledged. The historian Taufik
Abdullah, speaking sociologically, uses the expressions “Islam in Aceh”
and “Islam in Central Java,” for example. Here is a more complete citation:
Theproblembecomesmore important if we also remember that not only
the power of each religious dimension – that is, certainty, knowledge,
ritual, devotion, and religious experience – in each differing ethno-
cultural unit differs, even the size of the space and depth of religious
influence on social life differs as well. It is in this context that we can
speak of “Islam in Aceh” or “Islam in Central Java,” and so forth.⁸⁶
Even in Aceh itself, if observed closely, religious ways and means differ
here and there.
In terms of instruction, such differences do not present a problem.
However, the situation can become problematic if those differences and
the diversity of interpretations bring division and hostility toward fellow
Muslims in the umat. The existence of a kind of Acehnese Islam and
a kind of Central Javanese Islam is not unusual at all. No one can, nor
need, ignore local dimensions and influences, so long as all these are
connected to cultural manifestations permitted by the Quran. Indeed,
those who are enemies of diversity are those who would monopolize the
truth, and if need be, “use” God for their own purposes. I have observed
that what are usually categorized as hard-line groups tend to be intolerant
of differences in religious interpretation. But if we follow how Taufik
Abdullah interprets and examines the socio-historical map of the umat,
we will become adept at broad-mindedness and will not sink into divisive
monolithic interpretations. “The truth of the matter is that each problem
brings to itself new hope. Matters that are totally ambiguous are the
things that constitute the dynamics of religious and community life.”⁸⁷ It
is those who are quick to take offense who attempt to quash ambiguity
for the sake of a monolithic Islam.
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The Global Dimension of Indonesian Islam
The characteristics of Indonesian Islam are shaped by both local elements
and by global influences, through reading and through using the internet,
for example. These influences cannot and need not be avoided. What
we must consider is that the Islamic civilization being constructed in
Indonesia must not either be washed away and dissolved in backward
local elements or be dragged off by global currents that can bring disaster
to it, such as violence in the name of religion and materialistic lifestyles.
Therefore, the Indonesian Muslim umat must develop a kind of filtration
system for dealing with local “viruses” as well as global threats. In order
to assess what is negative and harmful, naturally the umat very much
needs a basic knowledge of Islam, because without this, it will toss about
aimlessly like someone with no self-confidence in the face of successive
attractions and tugs from left and right.
To cope with more complex intellectual and spiritual problems,
certainly a mere basic knowledge will not be sufficient. Supplying deeper
forms of knowledge will be the central role of institutions of higher
learning, research institutes, and other brain trust centers. These must
work seriously to prepare an effective filtration system so that Islam does
not become just another commodity to be traded back and forth. Islam as
an individual and publicmoral rulemust be given the paramount position
in human interaction, whether local, national, or global. Indonesian Islam
needs to create a first-class intellectual army, especially for confronting
ever more terrible global challenges. This army, besides having a good
understanding of the heritage of classical Islamic thought, will stand
with its feet planted firmly in the modern world, with all its tumult and
clamor. Ulama who know only the classical treasury but are blind to the
present will find it difficult to be invited to speak about the development
of contemporary civilization (or perhaps the rise in contemporary
barbarism).
Over the past several years, young nu and Muhammadiyah intellec-
tuals have emerged, along with those from other Islamic movements. I
touched on this earlier. They have an extraordinary potential to become
the core army of thinkers, whose numbers need not be too great. There
is but one condition, that they not be contaminated by the flattery of
power politics, which does so much to sap energy and waste time in
fighting for position. Not many politicians on the face of the earth are
truly guided by an idealism that inspires them to defend the interests
of the broad public. Therefore, a division of labor is needed between
politicians and intellectuals. So, if politicians want to obtain accurate
data about the society, nation, and state, they can invite intellectuals to
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discuss how they can acquire this information. Such cooperation has not
been widespread in Indonesia. The results of this are clear – politicians
exhaust their stock of ideas to give weight to their careers. This reality
will surely distract democracy in its efforts to achieve its objectives in the
interests of the people, and it may even end in suffering, confrontation,
and failure. Indonesia’s experience since Independence is clear proof of
its various failures.
Because intellectual work always requires zeal, intelligence, dedication,
time, and patience, Indonesia faces its own dilemma: how to secure
the economic underpinnings of this activity. An intellectual cannot be
allowed fall into poverty, but how to avoid that? I have yet to find the
best response to that question. But Indonesian intellectuals can approach
the authorities and Indonesian philanthropists to join in finding a way
out of this dilemma. The nation really does need an army of reliable
thinkers to preserve the continuity of the future of its people. Otherwise,
the culture of a nation will fall upon very hard times indeed, much like
the old saying about the dry sirih leaf on the stone – “reluctant to live
and afraid to die.” That is, unless the army of thinkers are sufficiently
prepared for the various challenges that arrive in an unending procession.
Culture can onlymove ahead if it is always guarded by creative intellectual
power.
Among the range of Indonesian entrepreneurs whom I know are some
whom we can approach to join in realizing these great aspirations. They
well understand that without an intellectual force with free minds and
self-confidence, Indonesians will always remain confused and uneasy
as they look into the future. I am unwilling to see this most numerous
of Muslim peoples in so frail a condition. I must observe, though, that
Indonesia truly lacks thinkers of excellent qualifications on a universal
scale.
Let us return to the potential of the nu and Muhammadiyah. In this
evening of my life, I have come to the conclusion that the cadres of these
two forces need to sharpen their vision. Within Muhammadiyah circles
the slogan is that the cadres must be formed in this order: association
cadres, umat cadres, and nation cadres (bangsa kader). In my view, this
order should be radically reversed and augmented as follows: humanity
cadres, nation cadres, umat cadres, and association cadres. I hope my
friends at nu will consider my proposal for their own formulation, and
place the humanity cadre category at the very top.
Why reverse the order? In accordance with the spirit of this work,
I propose positioning the humanity cadre first after a number of
considerations.
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. The mission of Islam is to be “a blessing for the universe,” as has
been frequently said. By making humanity the first point of entry,
this Muslim intellectual army will be driven to think on a global
scale: the entire community of humanity, whoever it may be, is, at
base, our companions. If hostilities occur they must be resolved
within the framework of civilized and equitable humanitarianism.
In a world filled with conflict and hostility, the dictum that exhorts
Muslims to be “a blessing for the universe” is heard too distantly, as
a remote ideal. But the Muslim umat may not let go of this dictum,
for it comes from the Voice of Heaven, no matter the atmosphere
that has prevailed on earth for thousands of years of disputes and
even bloodshed, not least between fellow Muslims. In other words,
pioneered by Muslim intellectuals with a global perspective, the
wheels of civilization must turn toward the creation of a universal
brotherhood of the community of humanity. The world of Islam,
which stretches from Morocco to Merauke, is a world that is still
being torn to pieces, both because of the scourge of poverty and
the tired old differences in religious understanding. I am optimistic
that the Voice of Heaven can and must be brought down to earth,
because it came down to us for the good of the earth. The Muslim
umat cannot merely casually cite and read these messages from on
high. The entire civilization that must be built has to aim at this
doctrine from Heaven. If we fail, we will mumble futilely when we
speak of Islam’s superiority. We must bring the message of Islam’s
superiority to the world of reality, not only sermonized from the
pulpits of mosques and in religious discussion groups. Beyond that
is a sea of poverty and suffering. How can we offer a message of
superiority if the umat has exhausted its efforts to do what is best
for the good of the umat of fellow human beings?
. From the humanity cadre, we descend one step to the nation cadre,
because we live and breathe in the nation-state of Indonesia. Muslim
intellectuals and the Muslim community overall should not confine
themselves in a narrow byway of umat, in a limited meaning of that
word. In a pluralistic society, the concept of umat, besides being
located within the framework of universal humanity, must expand
to see the haven of national identity as the launching pad for moving
farther outward. With this philosophy, the Muslim umat will appear
as the vanguard in defending and treating the interests of this nation
together with other umat in an atmosphere of profound and honest
brotherhood.
. Human beings were of course created, not in a single sociocultural
form, but within the diversified environments of communities, each
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with its own special characteristics. The existence of these special
characteristics is the sign that Allah, the One and the Only, did
not favor uniformity, for sameness could result in a humanity with
narrow perspectives and awkward social intercourse. This is an
irrefutable historical fact. Therefore, let each different umat turn out
its own cadres for the benefit of their different environments, but
within a vision of living in a tent of national identity, over which
spreads the vast tent of all humanity, virtually without end. My
beliefs have not encountered the slightest problem in expanding
the radius of my social association and companionship with every
kind of humanity, on the condition of holding fast to the concept of
litaʿarafu (of greeting each other and exchanging experiences and
courtesies).
. My analysis is linked to the condition of an Indonesia that is still
forming its identity, in which nu and Muhammadiyah have been
“predestined” to be the two main wings of the Muslim umat up
until the present day. Thus, each of these wings naturally requires
its own cadres to creatively continue its movement and mission. In
the Muhammadiyah environment, these are known as association
cadres, while the nu has its own term for these, and there they have
their own features. Whether Muhammadiyah or nu, these cadres
have the perspective and the mental grasp that exceeds the radius
of their respective Muhammadiyah-ness and nu-ness, so to speak.
Both become one with the three above-mentioned domains of social
intercourse: humanity, nationhood, and community. And all of
these require a change of mindset and mental attitude that is both
courageous and radical. I myself regret having reached this kind of
thinking only at this late point in life, when physically I have much
aged.
If I repeatedly mention the potential of the nu and Muhammadiyah here,
it does not mean that I do not also to some extent criticize both of them
in the context of Islam’s ideals and aspirations to spread its universal
blessings. There are several key questions that need to reach the leaders
and members of these two big organizations.
The first question is, are Muhammadiyah and the nu certain that
the doctrine of nonsectarianism or aswaja (ahlusunnah wal jamaʿah),
which they have always held as their internal philosophy, is adequate
to be brought to the creation of such a universal brotherhood? I very
much doubt it. Just open the basic documents of these two movements.
Does it not occur to us, especially for Indonesia, to create a broader
Islamic perspective that is post-Muhammadiyah and post-nu Islamic?
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This is not to say that these two forces must be replaced, but their vision
cannot simply remain unchanged within the narrow radius that they
made their reference point for action. Muhammadiyah and the nu are
simply instruments for achieving the objectives of Islam, is that not
correct?
If these instruments lack the lubricant of dynamic and creative Islamic
ideas to solve the many different problems of a broader humanity, would
these instruments not need to be renewed? Burying itself in the treasury
of classical Islam, however rich that may be, but failing to deal with
present-day problems, is a disaster for Islamic civilization that has to be
neutralized. All the products of human thinking are bound up in space
and time. However awesome has been our past in the fields of science
and civilization, for example, the original owners were not us, but those
who created these things. Thus, for me, the past is not to be idolized, but
criticized, so that we who come later must have the steadfast resolution
to surpass our forebears both in quality and quantity. But I worry that
the Muslim umat will lack the courage to think like this and to rise up
from its suffocating rear-guard position in today’s civilization.
My second question is, did the energy that Muhammadiyah and the
nu have mobilized over the many decades produce the optimal results as
demanded in their respective articles of association? Or are these articles
even read at all? Have they become a kind of museum object? As someone
involved in the whirlwind of the Islamic movement for many decades, I
have become increasingly uneasy at seeing a large part of the energies
of these two forces wasted, not infrequently on divisive power politics.
In this connection, I hope that at least some talented intellectuals from
both wings of this umat will be better at governing their lives and careers
to attain something greater, more abiding, something I feel powerless
now to do.
Third, have ideas and visions of the future of Indonesia over the
next twenty years ever entered the minds of the leaders of these two
organizations? Or are we happy with drifting along until our nation glides
into increasingly more difficult waters? I appreciate how tempting are the
attractions of power politics, but there still must be a stock of intellectuals
who think as visionaries, and are not sunk in pragmatic politics, which
leaches out everything of value. I do not deny the importance of political
power. But more important is the answer to the question: What is power
actually for?
Fourth, areMuhammadiyah and the nu quite satisfiedwith the present
condition of Islam, which is still unable to find a comprehensive and
intelligent solution to the problems of nation, state, and humanity? Why
are their leading figures not more far-reaching in their thinking to break
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up the legacy of old and now-irrelevant opinions to solve the problems
of humanity in this century? I think the answer lies to some extent in
their day-to-day preoccupations with running their organizations, so
that they lack the time to pursue new thinking that is no less formidable
than our classical heritage. Ironically, some of these leaders are very
suspicious of their younger generation of thinkers, whom they consider
no longer suitable for the Muhammadiyah identity, or to have turned
away from the path of non-sectarianism. Do the formulations of the
Muhammadiyah identity or non-sectarianism stand for something that
is final and then to be idolized?
With these four questions, to which I could add more, I want to knock
on the heart’s door of the leaders of both wings of the umat to engage in
regular dialogue. Major themes for the agenda would deal with culture,
the economy, society, politics, humanitarianism, the global situation,
capitalism, and a thousand and one other issues. Junior members will
surely assist their seniors in preparing the material for these intellectual
dialogues. Through frank and high-quality dialogue, I am certain they
would arrive at many meeting points for the benefit of the nation and of
humanity itself.
One thing to beware: the older and more established generation will
not take lightly to the sight of a new generation emerging with intellectual
capacities and commitment beyond its own. This is a disease of the old
we can call “museum culture.” It leaves people incapable of meeting the
demands of the current age.
But please understand, if I criticize the senior generation, I am
stripping myself bare, because I too belong in that category. I am doing
this so that we seniors will not disdain the fresh buds that are starting to
blossom, because these same buds will be continuing the long caravan
journey pioneered by earlier generations. Through this self-criticism I
grow all the more aware how massively we, the older generation, have
been afflicted by weaknesses and shortcomings, however little some of
us are unwilling to acknowledge them. This is one of the reasons why the
generation gap in thinking seems so unbridgeable. But this is not the
right way of putting it: better to say, our unwillingness to open ourselves
up to each other bravely and honestly is what complicates the creative
intergenerational dialogue. In a world that is growing ever more open, a
secretive attitude is a calamity that obstructs enlightenment. There is but
one risk: the stagnation of the culture.
Besides the intergenerational dialogue of both wings of the umat,
we must not forget the other groups of the Muslim umat, which are
considerable in number and diversity. Who knows? Within the younger
generation there might emerge brilliant and inclusive thinkers, but
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mostly unknown to the mainstream if they are poor communicators. I
do not know, for example, if the intellectual Yudi Latif comes from the
Muhammadiyah culture or the nu one. If someone enters the world of
intellectuals on the strength of his or her creative works, the issue of
origin is no longer relevant. We are sure to meet in big themes, which
are always emerging, because that is the habitat of the true intellectual.
One thing that we should always be conscious of is that the egos of the
intelligentsia are often too big to appreciate their friends – but this can
be overcome if each one is aware that he or she too has limitations and
deficiencies. The attitude of true humility, which our religion teaches us,
should never be put aside. Follow the philosophy of the rice stalk: “The
more rice the stalks bear, the lower they bend.”
Let us not forget, then, that the interfaith dialogue we have pioneered
over the past several years must be intensified. The experience of being
together with other people has enrichedmy perceptions of their humanity
andmy love for the Indonesian nation, which is no less than the love felt by
the majority umat here. They are our companions within the framework
of a just and civilized nationhood and humanity.The occasional friction at
the grassroots level must be swiftly resolved so as not to grow into bigger
conflict. The people of Indonesia are tired of their bitter experiences in
overcoming conflicts that, in the end, have no true religious foundation.
In closing Chapter 2, I shall quote from the thoughts of Jaudat Saʿid (b.
1931), a religious scholar from Syria, and a spokesman for an Islam of
peace with a resounding message of anti-violence. I shall refer here to
my article on this figure – who is not well known either in the Islamic
world or in the West – in the weekly publication Gatra.⁸⁸ In my limited
readings about Jaudat Saʿid, I have found very many ideas of his that need
to be explored further, because of his courage in “deviating” from the
mainstream of Arabic thinking, fettered as it is by the political tyranny of
the rulers.
In contrast to Fazlur Rahman, Fatima Mernissi, Khaled Abou El Fadl,
Mohammad Arkoun, and many others who circulate their thoughts on
Islam in Western languages, Jaudat Saʿid, a graduate of the Faculty of
Arabic of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, writes in his mother tongue of
Arabic. Jaudat has produced several works, among which are There Is
No Compulsion in Religion: Studies and Discussions on Islamic Thinking,
published in 1997, and before this, The Doctrine of the First Son of Adam:
The Problem of Violence in Islamic Activism, published first in 1996.
This work is the antithesis of the writings of Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966),
particularly Signposts Along the Road, published in 1964, in the midst of
the sufferings he underwent at the hands of the Nasser regime.
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Qutb, hanged in 1966 by the authoritarian regime of Gamal Abdel
Nasser, was a revolutionary. He wanted to change the world through
revolution because, for him, the twentieth century was no different from
the Age of Godless Ignorance that must be overthrown. In his exegesis In
the Shade of the Quran are found sparks of that revolution, which have
inflamed young people of the Muslim umat into becoming involved in
changing the map of the world, and who to this very day are risking their
lives with bloody results. The emergence of fundamentalist groups like
Islamic Jihad and Al-Takfir wa Al-Hijra (“Excommunication and Exodus”
is one possible literal translation) in the Arab world is a manifestation of
Qutb’s thinking.
Jaudat initially joined the Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hassan
Al-Banna, and then broke away from it in opposition to the violent
methods taken by some of its members. As a hafiz (one who has
memorized the Quran), Jaudat was unwilling to see the revolution that
the movement inspired in the end destroy the pillars of civilization of
whatever remained of humanity, assaulted by waves of crude secularism
and religious fundamentalism. Both have the same outcome: “destruction
on earth.” The Quran strongly opposes all forms of destruction and
violence as opposing the Divine Truth of the creation of humankind
as noble creatures.⁸⁹ Even more difficult to understand is that acts of
destruction and violence are frequently committed by people filled with
pride and cries of Allahu akbar. If religion is allowed to be the companion
of such deviant behavior, everything will become halal (permitted). Does
this not contradict Islam’s message of peace? Islam is in no way a religion
that calls for blood, even if some members of its umat do precisely that
in its name.
Jaudat well understood what this ugly phenomenon held for the
future of Islam and its umat. That was the reason he flew the banner of
enlightenment and peace in the midst of a growing current of religious
fundamentalism that impeded his steps to convey the truth of Islam as
a universal blessing. Jaudat has been isolated and treated as an enemy
by fundamentalist forces, but this old man insists on expressing his
thoughts; initially these were much inspired by Abd Al-Rahman Al-
Kawakibi, Muhammad Iqbal, and Malik bin Nabi. The influence of these
three thinkers from Syria, India, and Algeria, respectively, is among
the reasons why Jaudat left the Muslim Brotherhood. The essence of
Jaudat’s message is fused with his teachings of anti-violence, opposition
to compulsion in religion, and advocacy of peace. For Jaudat, violent
methods and religious compulsion arise out of a human mentality that
lacks self-confidence; those who believe in themselves will surely take the
road of peace to achieve their aims. The Muslim umat, for him, must not
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sink so deeply into historical romanticism as to forget historical reality.
Qabil’s (Cain’s) killing of his younger brother Habil (Abel) in Jaudat’s The
Doctrine of the First Son of Adam became a starting point for Jaudat in
constructing his Islamic theories of anti-violence. Jaudat sees Habil as the
paragon of the human who loves peace. His character is immortalized in
the Quran: “If you should raise your hand against me to kill me – I shall
not raise my hand against you to kill you. Indeed, I fear Allah, Lord of
the worlds.”⁹⁰
Who would not be moved by Habil’s attitude in letting himself become
a victim of the cruel act of his older brother? This brother was “an early
pioneer of fundamentalism” who took the path of violence to seize for
himself a woman who was none other than his twin sister, who should
have been the spouse of Habil. Jaudat’s philosophy has been summed up
by the writer Novriantoni Kahar as follows:
According to [Jaudat] Said, the story of Qabil and Habil gives forth a
deep meaning. First, there is an element of total resignation to God.
Second, there is the ability to make a sacrifice, even one’s own life, so
that others may find the path of truth. Third, it provides the model for
breaking the cycle of violence. This became an exceedingly important
parable for Said. Because of that, he hoped the school of non-violence
would also become a part of the principles espoused by Islamic activists,
who at that time were seething and raging in crying out for armed
resistance.⁹¹
I have incorporated Jaudat’s thoughts here as part of the dimension of
global Islam in the hope that they will soon be disseminated widely in
Indonesia, and contribute to the beneficial image of a peaceful Islam. I
hope that this image increasingly comes to dominate the perceptions of
the public. This is needed, for the bomb blasts in Bali, at the Marriott
Hotel, and other acts of violence have yet to fade frommemory, as if Islam
is a religion of destruction and a continuation of Qabil’s act in ending the
life of his own brother Habil, himself a symbol of anti-violence. (Habil
made the choice not to defend himself.) Readers who would like to know
more about Jaudat’s message of peace, apart from reading his works,
may also follow his thinking through his website either in Arabic or in
English translation.⁹²
Jaudat has proselytized formore than forty years to pass on themessage
of peaceful Islam and anti-violence. A number of Muslim activists in
the Arab world have gravitated to him. This is a noteworthy success in
midst of all the opposition by conservative groups, which accuse him
of being “a materialist in Islamic disguise.”⁹³ This business of tossing
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accusations back and forth is nothing new in the history of Islam. Even
worse, differences of interpretation have been known to ignite warfare
within the Muslim umat. These are among the stains upon the surface
of Islamic history, even though the Quran forbids them, an eternal
prohibition that must never be violated.
Islam, as a message of peace, must sound and resound throughout
the entire Muslim world through all modern media: print, digital, the
pulpit, and all others. If a faction that misunderstands the religion and
chooses violence has been able to spread its ideas massively, then there is
no other choice for the flag bearer of peace but to actively counterbalance
this message equally massively, but through methods that are civilized
and polite. Civility and politeness are hallmarks of a society that is
psychologically stable. In stark contrast, barbarism and the culture of
violence are the marks of a government that is unstable and reactive,
and is lacking self-confidence. The Muslim umat must do all it can to
show itself as a community that serves as a big tent where people can
take shelter. But all of this can only be realized if we are superior in our
sciences and refined in our morality.
Over the course of time, we believe that the force behind the message
of peace will win this match, because the culture of violence has not got
the least place in Islamic teaching. Something that has no place to stand,
theologically speaking, will disappear with time. There is an expression
in the Quran, according to which the froth that represents iniquity will
not last long before it vanishes when confronted by water, the symbol of
the truth that will be eternal on earth.⁹⁴ Because of that, the flag bearers
of peace must be convinced of that verse with all their hearts to stand
firm in carrying out their humanitarian mission without ceasing, without
doubt, and without exhaustion. Islam truly needs many armies of peace,
because the prophets sent into the world carried out a great mission
for the spread of blessings and mercy, and the establishment of genuine
peace in the midst of the universal community.
As for those who take the way of violence in achieving their aims, we
hope there will come a time when emotions have begun to calm and the
condition of the Muslim umat will gradually heal, and they will then
prefer to follow the ways of peace. A community that feels assailed from
without naturally will not be able to think clearly and rationally. It would
appear that to make our way to a climate of reason and enlightenment,
we will need time – on condition that people want to learn and mix with
their fellows.

Chapter 3 Indonesian Islam
For some time now, we have been concerned that the majority Muslim
umat of Indonesia and the quality of their lives have been lagging badly,
placing them far behind in every field, especially in science, technology,
and economics. For that reason, in order to move forward, the Muslim
leaders of our countrymust address the problem of quality so that this gap
in achievement can be steadily reduced. Otherwise, the disadvantaged
majority will become a burden on Islam, which seeks to build a strong
and sophisticated civilization.
Education is a decisive factor. We are being punished for our lack of
serious regard for education by the backwardness of our umat in the
fields I have mentioned. When I say “our umat,” I mean almost 90 percent
of the population of Indonesia. An encumbered umat is no different from
an encumbered nation. It is irrelevant to speak of national construction
when the majority of the people are neglected.
The Quality of Education in Indonesia
Even though illiteracy has been vanquished to a great extent, the
quality of education in Muslim-majority Indonesia is far from what
it should be. Indonesia as an independent nation has never developed
or prioritized educational strategies. This is the main reason why the
level of development and achievement in education in Indonesia is still
below regional standards, to say nothing of global ones. Indonesia is not
competitive in science, technology, and economics. If we use the United
Nations Development Program (undp) report as a measure of progress
in education, we see that Indonesia is still at the back of the pack. The
Human Development Index (hdi) for 2015 shows how far back that is. In
the undp report for 2016, Indonesia’s hdi for the year 2015 ranked 113 out
of 188 countries. Compared to other countries in Southeast Asia, we are
far behind Singapore (fifth position), Brunei Darussalam (thirtieth), and
Thailand (eighty-seventh).¹
If we take the Human Development Index that places Indonesia at
113th out of 188 countries as a measure of the quality of its education,
then our backwardness looks extremely serious. Without the support
of high-quality education, it will be very difficult for Indonesia to be
considered an advanced nation. How did this happen? The answer
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is connected with the low priority the government generally gives
education policy. Suyanto writes:
An increase in educational funding will not have much of an effect
on the situation of education in Indonesia. From early on right to the
present, our education policies have been general in character and
not marked as a priority, for example, pursuing excellence by the year
2020. In response to this, we need a breakthrough in development
that does not constantly depend on government capability alone. To
clarify, the United States should be our point of reference. In the United
States, many educational institutions – from elementary schools to
post-secondary education – behave like businesses or participants in
the world of industry. The result is that many institutions of private
education are excellent in their fields.²
In fact, in Indonesia, the private sector plays quite a large role in
national education, although very few private institutions are on a
par with government schools. How can they catch up? Should the
curricula of private schools follow government standards? This network
of private educational institutions needs government assistance, because
it lacks virtually every resource. Copying the private schools popular
in the United States would not be a simple matter, to say nothing
of moving education into “the world of business” or “the world of
industry.” The implications would surely be far-reaching. One of these
would be a steep increase in school fees, especially in post-secondary
institutions, and result in a more elitist system of education. Only those
who could afford the private school would be able to attend at this
level. If this happens, bright children from rural areas are sure to be
disappointed.
The problem of education in Indonesia is a true dilemma. In steering
education toward “business” and “industry” models, we would certainly
place it beyond the reach of poor youth in the tens of millions. But if we
do nothing about current conditions, the quality of our education will
simply mark time, or even regress. But at least, as Suyanto writes, if the
government developed a consistent strategy, our backwardness in the
area of education would not be as serious as it is now.
As to the issue of teacher welfare, the government has been giving
this area serious attention since 2008. Though long overdue, this is
nonetheless something to be grateful for. However, the improvement in
teacher welfare will not automatically lead to an improvement in the
quality of instruction. Ongoing self-criticism is still needed in the effort
to address the problem of quality. But at least we no longer need to hear
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about, for example, a school principal who doubles as a ragpicker in
order to put food on the table. Hair-raising stories about the conditions
of teachers have been around forever, but improvement had to wait
many decades. Teachers belong to that part of society that is the most
patient and long-suffering in Indonesia; it is as if their modest destiny is
inscribed in the lines of their palms.
The number of teachers with a true calling is very small. The majority
of them teach simply to have some kind of work. So after the government
has paid attention to teacher welfare, the next step will be to improve
the teacher training. This will certainly take time and have a high price
tag. Although the process has started, we are still in a transition period.
Once a bachelor’s degree becomes a requirement for primary school
teachers, we hope that, step by step, teacher competency will improve. If
our teachers are well trained, future generations will definitely receive a
better education. The long-term indifference of government in tackling
the problem of education is the main reason Indonesia’s position on the
Human Development Index is so far below standard.
But, despite all the gloom, there are still sparkling stars that light up
the heavens. By this I mean that, despite the deplorable state of education
in Indonesia, there are students who do progress. This is not thanks to the
educational system they pass through, but because of their strong drive
not to surrender to the conditions they are in. They study independently
with total discipline. It is certain that they will make full use of the
internet and cybertechnology to improve themselves. The spread of the
internet to the rural areas has barely begun, and the number of villages
that have access to it is still very limited. In the future, teachers and
students will have no other choice but to immerse themselves actively in
sources of information they access online. That is a truly limitless source,
and the cost is relatively affordable. In this way, the backward state of
Indonesian education can be overcome, slowly but surely.
It is impossible for the Ministry of National Education (Depdiknas)
to work all by itself to speed up this “internetization” process. It is going
to have to work together with other ministries, such as the Ministry of
Communications, and entities in the private sector. When rural areas
do not have access to the internet, the gap in perspective and insights
between urban students and rural students will widen to an unsustainable
degree. If this gap is not quickly bridged, the pull of urbanization cannot
be blocked, since the centers of excellence in education will continue
to be monopolized by the cities. Yet the rural population is far greater
than its urban counterpart. In the nation’s march forward, unhealthy
tendencies such as this will greatly affect the national integration process,
which even to this day is not firmly grounded.
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What I have been speaking about here is connected with the problem
of national education overall. Since the colonial era, the Muslim umat has
also established centers of general and specifically Islamic education, in
the form of the pesantren (rural Islamic boarding school) and madrassa.
After Independence, these came under the aegis of the Ministry of
Religion (Depag). Thus, Indonesia had two “commanders-in-chief of
education,” in addition to various departments that organized and
operated schools to accommodate special interests. As is the case with
education managed by Depdiknas, madrassas, which are under Depag,
may be either public or private. Only education within the pesantren
system is fully private. As far as I know, there are no government-owned
pesantren, even though to some extent they receive state assistance.
Assistance for education is of course the state’s obligation, because
according to the Preamble to the Constitution, it is the responsibility of
the government to provide enlightenment to the people. This assistance
is not given out of the goodness of the government’s heart but entirely
because it is carrying out the will of the Constitution. By operating
private schools, the private sector has helped the government in this
enlightenment process. Therefore, private parties need not feel indebted
when they receive assistance or subsidies from the state for education –
which is the state’s responsibility. I repeat: state aid for private education
is not done out of the goodness of the government’s heart, but because
that is its constitutional obligation.
The “Unity of Knowledge” Concept
Recently, we have begun to hear the idea of putting education in Indonesia
under the one roof of Depdiknas for easier regulation and more efficient
management and quality control. This is actually quite ideal, but it would
appear that historical and political considerations need to be studied
further. If we speak of political considerations, for example, Depdiknas
is open to being led by a non-Muslim minister, while this could never
happen with Depag. However, since Proclamation, Depdiknas has never
been under a non-Muslim, even though the provisions of the Constitution
do not prohibit this. Therefore, perhaps the historical experience has
become a kind of convention for the two “commanders-in-chief of
education” to be reduced to one under Depdiknas. In other words, the
system of madrassa education and the like, right up to university level,
would be adequately handled by a director-general within Depdiknas.
And private non-Muslim education can be placed below a directorate-
general within Depdiknas.
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My question, however, especially for the Muslim umat, is, with a dual
system, even one placed under the one roof of Depdiknas, will the quality
of Islamic education become first-rate in the long term? There is no
quick answer to this so long as the dichotomy of religious education and
Western-style general education is not overcome. To this day, the Muslim
umat has not yet arrived at the concept of “the unity of knowledge.” In
this concept, what we know as secular education and what we know as
religious education will have lost their relevance. Instead, all the branches
of science will be directed at bringing humanity closer to Allah, as the
highest source of all there is. To put it differently, the term Islamic for
various branches of science, such as Islamicmedicine, Islamic psychology,
and so on, will no longer be necessary. Those attributes will lose their
meaning under the big tent of “the unity of knowledge.” And under
this tent, the efforts at “Islamicizing science” by some contemporary
Muslim thinkers will be fruitless. If all the activities of science are to find
Allah and draw near to Allah by reading the signs of His greatness and
power, attaching Islamic attributes to academic disciplines will no longer
be needed. If we still must speak about Islamicizing, what needs to be
Islamicized is the center of human consciousness, which is in the brain and
in the heart.
The Quran itself, notes Fazlur Rahman,³ seems drawn to three types
of science for the benefit of humankind. First, the natural, or physical,
sciences – those sciences that can be mastered by humanity. Second,
history and geography – both very important for the progress of human
civilization. Pay attention to this verse: “So have they not traveled through
the earth and have hearts by which to reason and ears by which to hear?
For indeed, it is not eyes that are blinded, but blinded are the hearts which
are within the breasts.”⁴ Bywandering on the face of the earth, humankind
will understandwhat has happened to civilizations in ages past, the factors
that gave rise to them and the reasons for their downfall. In this, the
sciences of history and geography become crucial for humanity, so we
do not go astray in our wanderings.
Third, knowledge about humanity itself – in addition to knowledge
about the natural world. The Quran proclaims: “We will show them Our
signs in the horizons and within themselves until it becomes clear to
them that it is the truth. But is it not sufficient [for you] concerning your
Lord that He is, over all things, a Witness?”⁵
Based on the verses in the Al-Hajj and Fussilat suras just cited, what
is meant by knowledge here is scientific knowledge, because it is based
on observations through the eyes and ears. But ultimately, that science is
to touch the heart and kindle the perceptions of humankind. In this way,
humankind will transform its scientific and technological capabilities in
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accordance with moral perceptions that we hope will be born within
humankind itself. Rahman then concludes, “Without this perception,
scientific and technological knowledge can – and definitely will – become
positively dangerous.” He tells us that the Quran, in its criticism of the
Meccans who were materially prosperous in their worldly existence,
makes the following comment: “They well know the external side of
worldly existence, but show no concern for the final consequences of
this.”⁶ In the language of the Quran itself: “… they, of the Hereafter, are
unaware.”
The dualism of the educational system almost everywhere in the
Islamic world may perhaps gradually be resolved into the concept of
the unity of knowledge. What I am suggesting here still requires a
comprehensive and rational framework, in the form of a philosophy
of Islamic education. I admit that writing a philosophy of Islamic
education is probably beyond me. Therefore, the following discussion
produces, with occasional modifications, the rough ideas on education
I brought forward several years back. These were then developed by
Muhammadiyah, which so far has not formulated a philosophy of Islamic
education.⁷
The Muhammadiyah on Education
Speaking of Muhammadiyah education from the philosophical point of
view is no easy matter, because this Islamic movement – as far as I have
read – has not yet made any comprehensive and articulate formulation
of its educational philosophy. The word pendidikan for “education,” for
example, first appeared fleetingly in 1943, during the Japanese occupation.
(Arabic termswere current at the time.)Theword now is part of a package
of formulations that are becoming increasingly comprehensive; my
discussion of the official documents of Muhammadiyah will touch upon
these. But formulations of a philosophical nature about Muhammadiyah
education are still nonexistent, especially if an understanding of the
Quran is our departure point.
The term mendidik (“educate”) first appears in the Articles of Asso-
ciation of Muhammadiyah in 1934, that is, in article 2f, which says:
“to educate children and young people so that later they will become
Muslims who are “meaningful” [orang Islam yang berarti].” (This is a
difficult formulation, which I will develop in the following pages.) In
article 2a here, we find the words “teaching and training” in the following
context: “to advance and enliven teaching and training in the Islamic
religion in the Dutch East Indies ….”⁸ When did the word “education”
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(pendidikan) appear in the Articles of Association of Muhammadiyah?
From the documents I have traced, this word first appears in the Articles
of 1943, as I have suggested; but it is only mentioned briefly in a letter of
Ki Bagoes Hadikoesoemo as the deputy founder of Muhammadiyah to
the head of the Dai Nippon (Japanese occupation) military government
in Jakarta, as follows: “disseminate printed materials for the propagation
of the faith [tabligh] and general education.”⁹
The following formulation appears in article 3b of the Articles of
1950: “to advance education and teaching [memajukan pendidikan dan
pengajaran].”¹⁰ A more complete formulation only appears in Chapter iv,
article 4c, of the Articles of Association of 1959: “to advance and renew
education, teaching and culture, as well broaden knowledge according
to the demands of Islam.”¹¹ This formulation survived in the Articles
of 1968. In Chapter ii, article 4c, of the Articles of Association of
1985 resulting from 41st Congress in Surakarta, the formulation was
expanded, but the word “teaching” (pengajaran) was left out, so that it
now read “advance and renew education and culture as well as broadening
knowledge, technology, and research according to the demands of
Islam.”¹² The words “technology” and “research” only appeared in the
Articles after Muhammadiyah had been in existence for seventy-three
years.
Chapter i, article 3, paragraph 1 of the Standards of Primary and
Secondary Muhammadiyah Education of 1988 clarifies the objective of
Muhammadiyah education as follows: “the realization of pious Muslims
of noble character, intelligent and with self-confidence, loving the
motherland and useful to society and state, doing good works for the
realization of the main society, just and prosperous, blessed by Allah,
glorified and exalted be He.” Paragraph 2 states the further objective: “to
advance and stimulate the growth of knowledge of society, the nation
and the State.”¹³ This formulation is clearly guided by the Articles of
Association that resulted from the 1985 Congress in which political
pressure by the authorities was so strong that certain articles had to be
amended.
From the above documents it should be clear that we have not been
able to fully grasp the philosophical aspects ofMuhammadiyah education,
because what is available are floating and general fragments. In several
of these formulations, the concept of the unity of knowledge is seen
only vaguely. But what is stated in the Articles of 1934 is “to educate
children and young people so that later they will become Muslims who
are meaningful,” and this can be developed further into a philosophy
of Islamic education in line with the vision of Muhammadiyah. The
key expression in the formulation of this objective is that the members
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should be educated “to become Muslims who are meaningful.” Who are
these people and what are their criteria? The attribute “meaningful” is
crucial and fundamental, in my view.
To find out just who that Muslim is naturally cannot be separated
from the concept of humanity, because a Muslim is a part of the human
umat, though with special criteria: a Muslim is someone who, with full
consciousness, surrenders himself or herself to Allah. As we know, the
discussion of the concept of humanity has never ceased since it began
in ancient times. The higher the level of the philosophy, the less clear
are our perceptions of that very creature known as the human. But we
must not despair, because we have the Quran to consult and discuss,
and according to our belief this Sacred Book comes from Al-Khaliq, the
Creator of humankind and all that is in the universe. In my opinion,
education of this sort is an effective means to form the type of humanity
that we wish for, that is, humanity that matters, based on a certain view
of life – in this case the Islamic view of life, or even more specifically, the
Quranic view of life. There is yet to be a satisfactory formulation of the
Quranic view of life made by the Muslim umat of Indonesia, other than
individual works that need to be developed further, especially those that
directly relate to the problems of education.
Humans Who Are Meaningful in the Perspective of the Quran
Who are those humans who are “meaningful”? Physically speaking,
humans do not greatly differ from other creatures. When humans die,
their bodies return to the earth, exactly like other living creatures. The
Quran explains that humans were first created of “an extract of clay”¹⁴
or “clay from an altered black mud.”¹⁵ Then, in the womb, the creative
process goes on and on until there is formed the physical shape of a
human being. Additional information about the process of the creation
of humans comes from the Surah Al-Muʾminun: “And certainly did We
create man from an extract of clay. Then We placed him as a sperm-
drop in a firm lodging [a womb]. Then We made the sperm-drop into a
clinging clot, and we made the clot into a lump [of flesh] and We made
[from] the lump, bones, and We covered the bones with flesh; then We
developed him into another creation [a creation with another shape]. So
blessed is Allah, the best of creators.”¹⁶
But what was special in the process of that creation was the key
expression: “So when I have proportioned him and breathed into him
of My [created] soul ….”¹⁷ Here occurs a spiritual revolution. If I may
be permitted to use symbolic language in this connection, I would say:
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“There is seen in this process of creation an intervention of a spirit from
Heaven into the chemical makeup of the earth for the perfection of the
creation of a creature called human. Extraordinary!” The Quran gives
a noble position to humankind: “And We have certainly honored the
children of Adam” is an affirmation of this Sacred Scripture.¹⁸ After
the process of creation was completed to perfection, all the angels were
commanded to prostrate themselves and do homage to that glorious
creature, but a malevolent spirit rejected that command because this
spirit had originated in a furiously hot fire.¹⁹ In this way, the malevolent
spirit looked askance at the human creature, which originated from the
soil – why should he have to prostrate himself to it?
But the glory of that human being was not unconditional, for there
was this provision: “And by the soul and He who proportioned it [with
facilities well-suited for its creation], and inspired it [with discernment
of] its wickedness and its righteousness, he has succeeded who purifies it,
and he has failed who instills it [with corruption].”²⁰ It is clear, according
to these verses, that human beings have within themselves wicked and
good potential. Thus, among the functions of education is to motivate the
potential for good within the learner to grow and develop almost without
limit, while controlling the potential for wickedness through guidance
so that it is not activated. I have already mentioned the formulation of
Muhammadiyah’s Articles of Association of 1934. Its words “to educate
children and young people so that later they will become Muslims
who are meaningful” must be read in the light of the verses above,
so that the philosophical dimension has a firm spiritual foundation.
In modern philosophical terms, we would say, “so that the building of
Muhammadiyah education has ontological security as well as functioning
to shape capable and skilled people who have faith in themselves.” The
“ontological security” here from the perspective of the Quran is only
possible if belief in Allah and the future is made the foundation of human
existence. Without that foundation, all discussion of good character,
morality, a just, prosperous society, and a civilized society will not be
relevant.
Before concluding this section, we should analyze the definition of
education provided by the Muʿtazilah writer Al-Jahiz (d. 869). Al-Jahiz
provides his definition as follows: “a comprehensive system of education
of a Muslim who is both civilized and of good character and who makes
the whole world a target of his curiosity and knowledge.”²¹ Note the use
of the word “civilized.” This definition does not differentiate between
what is termed religious knowledge and knowledge of the physical world,
a dichotomy that is foreign to the eyes of the Quran but has been retained
as a myth for centuries in the world of Islam. My sense is that Al-Jahiz’s
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definition is closer to the sense of the Quran because through it runs the
red thread of the concept of the unity of knowledge. Verbal signs are no
longer pitted against phenomenal signs and indications, or sociological
terms, an opposition that has produced fragmented individuals within
the learning environment from the lowest levels to the university. Over
recent centuries, the world of Islam has been densely inhabited by such
fragmented personalities, with all the negative results for the structure of
the collective life of the umat. There are factory guards or politicians who
do not know how to pray, and there are many who are good at praying
but do not understand the world around them.
Regarding the description of such fragmented personalities, we may
follow the complaints Muhammad Iqbal made in his book Bal-i-Jibril
(1935) to Rumi, his spiritual teacher:
My lofty thoughts reach up to the heavens;
But on earth I am humiliated, frustrated, and in suffering.
I am unable to manage the affairs of this world,
And I constantly face stumbling blocks in this path.
Why are the affairs of the world beyond my control?
Why is the learned in religion a fool in the affairs of the world?
Almost without a pause, Rumi provides a reply that is right on the mark:
Anyone [who claims to be able to] walk on the heavens / Why should it
be difficult for him to walk on earth?²²
Totally false claims, the result of ignorance in understanding the
doctrines of the Quran on the concept of knowledge, are the main reason
why the Muslim umat is powerless in the face of other civilizations
that keep moving on, their wheels constantly turning. The solution for
breaking through this dead end could be to leave behind the concept
of dualism in the education system. Do not Allah’s signs stretch to all
corners of the universe and within humankind?²³ Do not the natural
sciences, astronomy, history, sociology, geography, economics, and many
others besides, represent an organic part of Allah’s signs that some,
however, categorize as secular knowledge? The integration of knowledge
in a conceptual-philosophical manner is not yet complete in the Islamic
system of education. What we have witnessed is a system of education
sheltering under one roof, while its spirit has long been split in two.
Briefly, then, the learner who is meaningful in the eyes of the Quran is
the one who is free from a personality that is split and disintegrated. He
or she is a good person, whole and complete, self-confident, and able to
perform works on the face of the earth that are based on faith and pious
deeds, for the benefit of all creatures.
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Toward the Formulation of a Philosophy of Muhammadiyah
Education
Muhammadiyah has the right and obligation to formulate a philosophy
of Islamic education based on an intelligent and creative understanding
of the Quran. This philosophy of education, I propose, must be broadly
capable of reconciling the demands of the brain with those of the heart.
This is not what is developing in the modern world today. The West
is too preoccupied with matters of the brain and technology, while
a part of the East is still sunk in spiritualism and horoscopes. In the
language of the Quran, this is a system of education that can unite the
power of fikr (thinking) and dhikr (chanting praise of Allah), whose
aim is to give birth to ulu al-albab,²⁴ humans whose hearts and brains
exist dynamically and creatively in comprehending and feeling the
presence of the Source of their intellectual and spiritual development
and explorations.
Other terms in the Quran that have almost the same meaning
as ulu al-albab are ulu al-nuha²⁵ (having understanding, thoughts,
and intelligence) and ulu al-absar²⁶ (having vision, sight, and sharp
perception). In brief, the essence and stages ofMuhammadiyah education
must be directed at the formation of an individual who is at once ulu
al-albab, ulu al-nuha, and ulu al-absar, as well as being part of ummat al-
ʿamal (the community of action). So far, Muhammadiyah has given a
stronger impression of being an ummat al-ʿamal that is very active in
sharpening the intellectual life of the nation. Certainly, what may be
gained through a process of education that is directed in that way is a
diversity, not a uniformity, of individual qualities, something that is quite
natural and mutually enriching. In this process, the role and quality of
the teacher will be decisive. Muhammadiyah to a great extent has not yet
moved seriously to shape educators of high quality in conformity with
the reality it faces, however.
If this great philosophical idea can be realized within a period
of time that is not too protracted, then wisdom (al-hikmah) will
return to the collective life of the Muslim community, whose rays will
penetrate the collective life of the community of mankind. The modern
world, focused on the doctrine of cogito, ergo sum, which is overly
reliant on the achievements of brainpower, has long been silent on
the culture of wisdom. According to the Quran, the ulu al-albab are
those who are filled with virtue and wisdom: “He gives wisdom to
whom He wills, and whoever has been given wisdom has certainly
been given much good. And none will remember except those of
understanding.”²⁷
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The quality described above is the ideal quality for the direction
we must head in, if indeed Islam is believed to be the antithesis of an
increasingly secular and even atheistic Western civilization. Without
a deep awareness of the need and the willingness to formulate and
understand the philosophy of Islamic education as outlined above, the
Muslim community spread over the face of the earth will continue to
wander without a clear road map, exactly like other communities who
do not have the Quran. This is the heaviest challenge for which Muslim
thinkers who care about changing the philosophical paradigm of the
Islamic education system must find a solution.
In line with what has been discussed above, another important dimen-
sion that must enter into the content of Muhammadiyah’s philosophy of
education is the need to emphasize the trilateral relationship between
humankind and God, humankind and the universe, and humankind
and itself. In many official Muhammadiyah documents since 1968, those
dimensions have been touched on here and there, but they have yet
to be woven together into an integrated construction that takes as its
starting point our understanding of the sources of Islamic teaching: the
Quran and the Sunnah. The formulation of this basic issue needs to
be worked out by a cross-disciplinary team of visionary experts who
truly understand what is at stake here and have a strong commitment to
shouldering this collective task.
Once we have Muhammadiyah’s philosophy of education, no matter
how imperfect a construction it still is, a curriculum can be designed
systematically upon it. This great task will take quite a while to complete,
but it needs to be undertaken now. Hasn’t the educational process that
has existed in Indonesia for such a long time chalked up more failures
than successes? Therefore, we need to make a serious effort to think of
an alternative system of education for Indonesia’s future.
Indonesia’s national system of education is still unable to produce
graduates of high quality, with the exception of those who are willing to
undertake the hazards of sharpening their own intellect and enlightening
themselves. Indonesian education, over the course of time, has been been
co-opted by the interests of power politics. The statement in the Preamble
to the Constitution that one of the tasks of the government of independent
Indonesia is “to sharpen the intellectual life of the nation” has never
been seriously commited to; as a result, Indonesian education drags
along, directionless. Therefore, every breakthrough to advance education
must be supported and appreciated. This leaves the government in the
position of facilitating the activities of nonstate education and, wherever
necessary, providing guidance so that it does not stray beyond the bounds
of the Constitution. Once again, each piece of creative thinking by private
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institutions that helps to break through the dead end in Indonesian
education will surely be a strategic contribution to the progress of the
nation on the long road ahead.
Education in the Nahdlatul Ulama Environment
UnlikeMuhammadiyah, the nu,which has thrown its support for too long
behind the tradition of the pesantren – the rural Islamic boarding school –
has been a slow performer in the wider world of education. Conversely,
Muhammadiyah has been left far behind in the pesantren system because
its energies have been absorbed too much by general education and too
little by the madrassa. But now the nu, with its Perguruan Darul Maarif
educational institute, is working hard to also advance general education.
Muhammadiyah also does not want to be left behind in developing a
pesantren system. Among its best known pesantren is the Pesantren Darul
Arqam Muhammadiyah in Garut, West Java.
Actually, Muhammadiyah and the nu are not the only movers and
shakers in the world of education of the Indonesian Muslim umat. The
list includes Sarekat Islam, Persatuan Islam Al-Washliyah, Al-Irsyad, pui
(Persatuan Umat Islam; Islamic Community Union), Perti, Perguruan
Thawalib, Nahdhatul Wathan, Mathlaul Anwar, Al-Khairat, and many
others. We should note that pesantren-based education is not conducted
by the nu alone, even though the majority of pesantren have sheltered
under the umbrella of the nu; other Islamic movements have offered
equal services in developing this traditional educational system. In
East Java, for example, the Gontor Modern Islamic Pesantren is active.
However, for the purposes of this book, I will limit myself to the two
big waves of the Muslim umat of Indonesia: Muhammadiyah and the
nu.
Although the nu was only officially established in 1926, the main basis
of its strength lies in the world of the pesantren, whose roots may be
traced back to the end of the nineteenth century.²⁸ There is no clear
indication just when this traditional educational institution first appeared,
however: “We know very little about the origins of the pesantren.”²⁹
These centers of traditional learning of the Muslim umat are mostly
located in rural areas. In contrast to the centralized system of education
developed by Muhammadiyah, the pesantren have belonged to kiyai,
religious sages whomostly joined the nu out of a commonality of religious
understanding within the Sunni environment. In addition to pesantren,
the nu has recently developed a more modern general educational
system like that of Muhammadiyah, extending from kindergarten to
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the university level. These schools are still quite limited in number and
present a challenge for the nu, whose religious scholars have had years
to devote their efforts to the pesantren.
I will present here the awakening of a profound awareness in the nu
of the need for a new educational orientation, especially as reflected in
the 27th nu Congress at Situbondo, East Java, December 8–12, 1984. Two
important decisions on education were made at that congress:
. The educational orientation in nu circles must be … reorganized,
given the development of new and correct methods for measuring
the ability of students to perform real humanitarian and civic work,
and directed to an introduction to the necessities of life and the
sources of its fulfillment, without interfering with its basis in the
Islamic faith of the adherents to the Sunnah and the Community.
. Transparency, autonomy, and capability [are needed] in cooperating
with others to prepare a better future [as well as] the skills in
introducing science and technology, which are the realization of
dedication to Allah, glorified and exalted be He, and to create an
attitude of life that is oriented to the hereafter, and that is balanced
and dynamic, as reflected in the curriculum of education within the
environment of the Nahdlatul Ulama ….³⁰
Decision number 2 includes items (d) and (e), containing formulations
that are very advanced and may be appearing here for the first time
in an nu educational document. In item (d) we read of “awareness of
the need to use rationality in their [the students’] lives, the need to
anticipate and look closely into the future [to be future-oriented] toward
scientific and technological developments and their impact in later life.”
Item (e) emphasizes preparation for a professional career: “growing
a spirit of autonomy and creativity through the training of practical
skills.”³¹
The above statement clearly reflects the new wave of thinking about
education that has washed into nu circles. Previously, the nu was known
for its traditional Islamic education in the form of pesantren with
nonstandard curricula, or even without any formal curricula at all.
The appearance of this radical new wave is linked to the influence of
Abdurrahman Wahid, who was chosen to chair the Situbondo Congress,
replacing IdhamChalid, who had led the nu for twenty-eight years (1956–
1984)³² in spite of obstruction by the New Order regime. Apart from
the controversy inherited by Wahid in the nu, the breakthrough of his
revolutionary thinking transformed the nu into an Indonesian Islamic
movement that is quite phenomenal. Its 1984 statement on education
indonesian islam 173
illustrates that the nu really is changing dynamically, at least at the elite
level, although inclusion of the nu’s trademark expression “adherents to
the Sunnah and the Community” was not was not overlooked. In other
words, the nu is structuring itself to deal with modernity in education,
something long wrestled with by Muhammadiyah.
As mentioned, the pesantren in nu circles are the private property
of the kiyai, not the property of the organization. For example, Idham
Chalid, long before emerging as a national figure, had established the
Perguruan Darul Maarif in 1954, even though its vision and mission were
only formulated in 2000. (Its vision: “excellence in educational, social,
and civic services”; its mission: “First, to shape the youth of this nation
to have a noble character, be knowledgeable, and have faith and religious
devotion to Allah the One and Only God, to prepare [them] to be skilled,
of good quality, and able to live in society.”³³) Both in vision and in
mission this academy did not greatly differ from the official educational
policy of the Indonesian government. The nu expression “adherents to
the Sunnah and the Community” was not contained in that vision and
mission.
The Perguruan Darul Maarif has the objective of empowering the
commonpeoplewho have limited financial resources.Thus, it is a populist
institution. This is illustrated in the philosophy of Idham Chalid: “I
established this academy, not to earn profits like the Islamic elite schools,
but I wanted to provide schooling so that the children of the three-
wheeler taxis, the street sweepers, truck farmers in this district [Cipete,
South Jakarta] could get some minimal knowledge and receive a diploma.
I wanted to benefit the people who were neither rich nor well-educated.”³⁴
Such a philosophy limits DarulMaarif ’s potential for growth and financial
stability.
Abdurrahman Wahid, the revolutionary thinker in nu circles, was an
alumnus of a pesantren and also studied in Egypt and Iraq. Wahid wrote
about pesantren:
The pesantren hut is a cultural symbol that uses symbols of Javanese
culture; it is an agent of renewal that introduces ideas of rural develop-
ment; it is a center of community learning; and it is also the symbol
of Islamic education, which depends on the syllabus drawn up by the
prolific intellectual Imam Jalaluddin Abdurrahman Al-Suyuti more
than five hundred years ago, in Itmam Al-Dirayah [The Perfection of
Knowledge]. This syllabus became the reference point of traditional
pesantren huts until now, with the development of Islamic studies, which
are divided into fourteen disciplines that we now know, from classical
Arabic grammar to the interpretations of the Quran and the texts of
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the hadiths of the Prophet. All of this was studied in the pesantren
environment as an institute of Islamic education. And also, through
these pesantren huts, Islamic values were disseminated from generation
to generation.³⁵
The question is: can the contents and methods of Islamic education,
handed down for centuries, be relied upon to release the Muslim umat
from its atmosphere of backwardness? As an intellectual with a far-flung
circle of acquaintances and contacts, Wahid’s answer seems to be in the
negative, although it is not made explicit. With further reference to the
weakness of the system of Islamic education, especially when responding
to the challenges of modernization, Wahid writes:
Islamic education, of course, is willing and able to “straighten itself
out” in response to the challenge of modernization; however, awareness
of that issue is precisely what does not yet exist in Islamic education
anywhere at all. It is this very matter that is so worrisome to observers
including this writer, because in the end a proper reply to the following
question is needed: how do we make structural awareness a natural
part of the development of Islamic education? To put it differently, we
have to play close attention to the development of Islamic education in
various places and to make a clear map of the configuration of Islamic
education itself. This is a task that, like it or not, has to be handled
well.³⁶
Because the models of Islamic education are so varied and complex in
all the different regions that have shaped the many different types of
Muslims, and we do not yet have a complete map of these things, Wahid
in the end seems to surrender to the changing times: “The best road
would be to allow a high degree of diversity to stay in Islamic education
and let time and place be the determinants.”³⁷
To conclude this discussion of Islamic education as it is developing
in both Muhammadiyah and nu circles, the one issue that needs to be
underlined is that we have not yet satisfactorily concluded how Islamic
the education should be. Every human population imaginable needs a
well-developed system of education that appeals philosophically to its
self-worth. This book proposes formulating a philosophy of education
that makes the concept of the unity of knowledge its starting point
by using the Quran, assisted by the authentic Sunnah, as the main
point of reference. Work on this philosophical formulation cannot
be done individually; it must be the product of collective thinking,
or, say, collective reasoning and judgment (ijtihad jamaʿi). In today’s
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Indonesian intellectual environment, great minds are ready to start
thinking about how to formulate just such a philosophy of Islamic
education.
Conflicts in Form and Content
There is nothing wrong with the efforts of different groups to use
Islamic attributes as an emblem of their struggles or activities: Islamic
government, Islamic banking (muamalat banks), Islamic schools, Islamic
students, Islamic paramilitaries, Islamic restaurants, and the like. But they
will harm their own cause if these forms and features fail to present Islamic
values of high quality consonant with the great claim of this religion:
blessings andmercy for the universe. People are apt to neglect quality: this
is what I mean by the expression “form grappling with substance.” The
form can be magnificent but the content unworthy and unconvincing.
The gap between form and substance has long been obvious in all Muslim
nations around the world. For me, this phenomenon constitutes a very
serious problem that has beset the Muslim umat to this day. The solution
to it is none other than the need for courage to make a breakthrough so
that form and substance support each other.
Why is all of this still happening?The simple answer is that theMuslim
umat continues to be pinned down by form while at the same time it
neglects substance. In Chapter 4, where I discuss the “philosophy of salt
and lipstick,” this problem will be analyzed further in the dimension of
sociology. Here I will highlight only one example: the image of Indonesia’s
Islamic parties is steadily sinking, not because of growing waves of
Islamophobia, but entirely owing to unpleasant behavior displayed by
some of the elites of parties with Islamic attributes or names that represent
those attributes. Some of the party elites gnaw at the foundations of
the state instead of repairing and constructing it. The result is public
skepticism, because the Islamic parties and the secular parties behave no
differently.
In various forums I often toss out my view about the behavior of
party elites in Indonesia: there is not a lot of difference between those
elites who claim to believe in divine revelation and those who couldn’t
be bothered with religion. They all get down together in the mud of dirty
politics: corruption, opportunism, and cheap pragmatism. In such a
political culture, democracy has been made a tool, not to struggle for
justice and the prosperity of the people, but for the interests of the elite
and the groups that support them, Thus, democracy in the hands of
opportunists can become a disaster for the entire nation.
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To my mind, a strong and healthy democracy is a political system
supported by politicians who have a visionary outlook and, above all, a
moral commitment. One example who is not too distant from our time
is H. Agus Salim, a student in the Islamic Youth Association, who after
independence was active in leading the Masyumi Party until it was forced
to dissolve in late 1960. These were politician-visionaries and intellectuals
who had a high degree of commitment to the ideals of democracy as
a means of achieving the objectives of independence, as discussed in
Chapter 2.
Democracy will only become a healthy political system when the
participants in that system are people of morals with a sense of responsi-
bility. In one of my writings, I conveyed the bitter reality I saw on the
contemporary Indonesian political stage as follows:
But the aspirations of democracy will directly turn disastrous if
the politicians, those holding the cards in the game, are a gang
of opportunists for whom politics is an industry for making a liv-
ing and holding power. Their philosophy is very contemptible and
consists of “eat as much as you can while the eating is good.” We
note Erich Fromm’s theory of “acquire it and assimilate it.” In such
a society, Fromm says, not only are many things being produced
that are of no use (the law, for example), but at the same time
useless humans are being born as well. This is the perfect Homo
consumens who always thrashes and destroys democracy in prac-
tice.³⁸
In the hands of the opportunists “there is no hope for democracy as
a political system to achieve its noble ideals of realizing the common
good.”³⁹
Therefore, the people must be ever more intelligent in determining
their political choices so that the opportunist politicians can be marginal-
ized and deterred from entering the political arena. An intelligent people
can never again be tricked by worthless politicians, because they will
be able to penetrate into brains and hearts, beyond politicians’ external
posturings. Indonesian political culture must move in this direction so
that democracy energizes and excites instead of being boring. There
must be healthy competition to pit the positive values of democracy
against each other on the political stage. Indonesia’s experiences as a
nation and a state since Proclamation have handed us quite enough
bitter experiences to teach us to look at ourselves honestly in the mirror
with one single purpose: to build an Indonesia that is outstanding and
dignified. Most regrettably, we are reluctant to look at ourselves in the
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mirror – this is characteristic of nearly everyone. This is the sign of a
culture that lacks self-confidence.
Islam and Indonesia’s Future
In Chapter 1, I explained that Islam came to Nusantara long before
Indonesia was inscribed as a nation on the world map. Although I tried
to show from various angles the process by which the followers of Islam
have become the majority throughout this archipelago, it is impossible to
give a complete account. Historical reconstruction of the Islamization
process needs to be continued by gathering more comprehensive and
refined data, as difficult as this is to do. But one fact is impossible to
refute: Islam has been able to survive in Nusantara for centuries, with all
its strengths and weaknesses. After Indonesia emerged as a nation in the
1920s the followers of Islam remained the majority. The resilience of this
religion in its struggles in all weathers and seasons is truly extraordinary.
However, it is less praiseworthy that this majority community is still
bound up in the shackles of poverty, ignorance, and backwardness.
In spite of all concerns, the experience of the centuries shows that
this majority will continue to survive in the face of all challenges.
Indonesia too as a country that is some six decades old, despite all
the bitter experiences it has undergone, is still relatively whole as of this
writing. That, too, is a fact of history that cannot be denied. But moving
forward will depend on the ability of leaders and the people to govern
and defend the Indonesian nation and state with honesty, intelligence,
and responsibility. It is here that resides the importance of the idea I
have expressed, that the Muslim umat, the majority of the people of
Indonesia, no longer live in hollow pride. In outlook, they must appear
as humanitarian cadres, cadres of the nation, cadres of the community,
and only then as cadres of their respective organizations.
It has been my observation that, with all our vigilance to ensure that
our umat does not decrease in numbers, it is its improvement in quality
that must be prioritized. With good quality we can raise our collective
face in world society with complete self-confidence. The Quran’s dictum
about the need for the marriage between faith and knowledge as the
condition for becoming a first-class⁴⁰ community must be taken as an
axiomatic truth. If this dictum really is axiomatic, the Muslim umat has
no other choice for moving forward but to shape the message of this
verse into our living reality. That is why this work has spoken at length
about strongly urging the reform of the problem-filled education system
in the Islamic world, particularly in Indonesia, which people hope will
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become an example of a peaceful, open, and moderate Islam. If this hope
is realized, then Indonesian Islam will be the antithesis of the image of
Islam that has been marred by a handful of people who have chosen the
path of violence.
From my experience of over a decade of meeting and socializing with
leaders of all sorts of religious groups, cultures, and backgrounds, I have
come to the almost definitive conclusion that they all can accept the
leadership of a political Islam that is inclusive, broad-minded, pluralistic,
and fair. Non-Muslim groups have come to terms with the sociological
fact that Muslims are the majority group in Indonesia. But they will be
tormented and troubled if they are discriminated against and deprived
of the freedom to practice their religions and traditions. Their places of
worship have frequently been the targets of blind violence in the name of
God. These groups are quite open with Muslim leaders who are inclusive
and fair, and tell them their internal problems, which sometimes are no
less knotty than those within the Muslim community in all its diversity.
In this regard, I must emphasize that the democratic system, which
normally relies on the voice of the majority in reaching decisions, must be
operated very carefully. Democratic leaders must be sure not to sideline
fairness and consideration. Democracy is the chosen system, but it was
not chosen to allow the majority group to act simply as it wants. There
is also the principle of traditional customs that should and must be
considered. The safety of the future of Indonesia cannot be detached
from the willingness of the majority to hold to this doctrine: “Even
though we are the many, we will not trample you; and even though we
are the larger, we will use our size to shelter and shade.” This saying
comes easily to the tongue but is not always easy to put into practice,
except by those with a broad humanist and nationalist outlook and who
are filled with tolerance. At the same time and with the same breath,
minority groups must learn to carry themselves wisely in a democratic
environment that is still unhealthy. We are tired of seeing victims being
made every so often, simply because of the provocations triggered by
irresponsible parties or by the friction of amoral political interests.
Indonesia with its motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika [Unity in Diversity] is
a multiethnic, multifaith, and multicultural nation of multiple political
expressions. This diversity, if managed well, intelligently, and honestly,
will undoubtedly be a cultural treasure. That is the future of Indonesia
that we must defend and fight for with all our hearts, patiently and
broad-mindedly. Such a cultural treasure must never again be gambled
against meaningless and parochial interests. Parochialism is the enemy
of Indonesia’s future. Eman-eman, as the saying goes in Javanese, “it’s
regrettable” if we still suffer from the disease of shortsightedness in
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governing a nation and a state as big as this. An Indonesia that is led
by Mr. Myopia will surely be confused when looking into the future,
because of a vision that sees only its front yard and the eves of its roofs.
Another important matter that needs to be highlighted is the socio-
logical fact of the increasing weakness of the entrepreneurial spirit of the
Muslim umat. If we scrutinize the pyramid of Indonesian wealth, the
group that we know as the santri (observant Muslims) is a real minority
among those who manage to make it to the top. For the future of Indone-
sia, such conditions will surely be dangerously explosive if there is no
reform and improvements are not quickly implemented, because the
impoverished and powerless majority will very easily become victims
of extremist ideology from whatever direction. The experience of post-
Proclamation history is authentic proof that poverty and powerlessness
of a part of society always triggers off and encourages acts of violence.
Poverty and hunger are the true enemies of Pancasila. Why then have
not the two of them been subdued yet?
An interesting proposal has come from the Muslim feminist writer
Irshad Manji about how to overcome poverty in the Islamic world
by mobilizing businesswomen in rural districts through small-scale
enterprises, using loan capital. Manji sees such efforts succeeding in parts
of Kabul, Afghanistan, a city torn apart by foreign invasions and civil
war. As to the importance of mothers, Manji stated her philosophy as:
“Educate a boy and you educate only that boy. But educate a girl and
you educate her entire family.”⁴¹ An educated woman will make a great
contribution to the well-being of the family. She continues, “Muslim
businesswomen can not only save a family and its neighbors, but also the
people and places outside it. Entrepreneurial mothers create spaces for
trade – and imagination – for their children.”⁴²
There are many examples of Muslim “business mothers” in various
cities in Indonesia: Pekalongan, Ponorogo, Solo, Padang, Makassar, and
many others. However, because of the lack of skills training in business,
those ventures are still unable to overcome wide-scale poverty. The
Afghan example can spur us on and inspire us to develop the talents of
entrepreneurial mothers in Indonesia. Once mothers are empowered in
the commercial world, their positive impact for driving out poverty will
increase. Are not mothers more careful in trading, particularly in small
and medium-sized enterprises (smes)?
When the monetary crisis hit in 1998, people then concluded that
the economic force that could ensure the survival of the Indonesian
nation was the sme sector. But when the winds of crisis subsided, the
conglomerates that had been flung about by these events adroitly resumed
their position at the top of the pyramid; meanwhile the smes, which had
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provided the necessary services, began to be crushed once again. They
were unable to compete with the conglomerates, which were benefited
by the wave of global neo-capitalism. The bulk of the smes have their
basis in the majority population, which happens to be Muslim. It was
their ancestors, when Nusantara was still under the colonial system, who
defended Islam, so that they wear the badge of the majority to this day.
But once again, the label of majority minus quality will shake our
Indonesianness, so to speak, over the long term. The social explosions
that often hit this nation cannot be detached from the conditions of
the Muslim umat, which are far from being just or fair. If the rate of
poverty in Indonesia reaches 40 percent, then 90 percent of these poor
will be Muslims. If the government is unsuccessful in empowering this
majority, it will not stay silent. Their brains and hands must be set into
motion to change their lot in life. Their only choice is to rehabilitate
their lives by entering the world of education and enterprise consciously
and with total determination. Poverty cannot be made the scapegoat
for not making progress. Take the example of the Palestinians who have
struggled for over sixty years to gain their independence but have never
given up.
In striving to improve and raise the quality of life in the countryside,
for example, there are many roads that might be taken, on condition
that brains and hands are not kept unemployed. As someone who comes
from the isolated village, or nagari (to use the Minangkabau term), of
Sumpur Kudus in West Sumatra, I saw many opportunities available for
people to change their social status and move beyond dependence on
only one source for their livelihood. In Sumpur Kudus, out of an entirely
Muslim population of around 4,600, about 60 percent were in the grip
of poverty, although no one died of hunger. In this nagari, the source of
income in recent times has been almost entirely from rubber, so when
the price of rubber rose, life there sparkled. But the atmosphere would
change to overcast immediately if the prices plunged, as happened in
2008–2009. Because in general people there had yards and rice fields,
such property could be used for planting marketable non-staple crops.
From my experience of having lived in that village for eighteen years,
I remember everywhere there was empty land – while young people
busied themselves playing dominos or drinking coffee at the food stalls,
or just dozing away.
As a result, poverty inevitably throttled the village for decades. Over
the past twenty years, some of the people have become migrant workers
in Malaysia. Those who were thrifty and whose heads were full of
calculations succeeded in bettering their socioeconomic status after
returning to their nagari. There was only one condition: you had to use
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your brain and your hands to change your fate. If you didn’t, and just
stayed at home, the risk was that you would become an “unemployed
person” with all the problems resulting from that. Another way of
changing your life would be to merantau, to seek your fortune in the
world outside your nagari, a choice reinforced by Minangkabau tradition
for centuries.
The situation in other isolated villages in West Sumatra in general
does not differ greatly from that of Sumpur Kudus. The facts are similar:
the yards and rice paddies are never exploited to the maximum.⁴³
For the population of Sumpur Kudus, gradual improvements in the
transportation of goods and people, along with electrification, which
was brought in beginning in 2005, truly opened up opportunities for
improving one’s economic lot in life. The question is, what percentage of
the nagari population is good at perceiving opportunity? Sumpur Kudus
is a part of Indonesia, no matter how small. That is the reason I have
used it as an example to look through a telescope, as it were, into the
future of our country. Isn’t Indonesia made up of thousands of small
villages, almost half of which are in backward conditions?
Thousands of villages in Indonesia are thus still squeezed by poverty
and still have not felt the meaning of independence in the sense of having
been touched by prosperity. Speaking of rural areas is no different from
speaking about Indonesia, since 57.6 percent of our territory consists
of rural areas. According to data from 2006, the number of villages in
Indonesia totals 70,611. Of this figure, 32,379 (45 percent) are included
in the category of backward villages.⁴⁴ These are very high figures. The
nagari Sumpur Kudus, which I have cited, is but one of those many
backward villages.
Although the problem of nutrition is usually directly linked with the
level of welfare, based on direct experience I find that this assumption
does not always absolutely determine a person’s intelligence. At the same
time, we cannot deny that improvement in nutrition is an indicator
of a village’s progress. The 45 percent figure for backward villages is
clear proof that development in Indonesia since the Proclamation of
Independence has been precarious and verges on failure. So it is not
surprising that some people become nervous when speaking about the
future of Indonesia the moment they see these figures. Does this nation
have a proper future if the gap in development levels is not quickly closed
up? And the majority of those who live in backward villages belong
to the Muslim community. I do not know if the Muslim ministers in
the cabinet or the Muslim politicians have seriously consulted with
each other about these statistics. This question needs to be answered as
honestly as possible.
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If the answer is “Yes, they have consulted,” the next question is, to
what extent has the substance of their consultations been translated into
reality? The reason I submit such questions is simply because I want to
see, as quickly as possible, this biggest Muslim majority liberated from a
false pride, as if development has succeeded, while the statistics refute
it. Honesty in stripping oneself bare is one sign of maturity in living
in society, and as part of a nation and a state. Political rhetoric voiced
during presidential elections that covers over the running sores on the
body of the nation are a hidden betrayal of the nation. The risk is that the
people will become divorced from reality. A real statesman will explain
honestly exactly what the condition of this nation is. Concealing the
reality will only increase the height of the inevitable fall.
The title of this section is “Islam and Indonesia’s Future.” I have explained
how the followers of Islam quantitatively have survived for so many
centuries in Nusantara, up to the present day. Yet for the future,
the quantitative will not have much meaning if the followers of this
religion keep marching in place, in the sense that there are no radical
breakthroughs in thinking about improvement in the quality of the
religious character of the umat. If Islam dealt only with the vertical
relationship between humankind and God, then matters might be less
problematic, because that is completely personal and subjective. But
because the scope of Islamic teaching goes beyond the realm of the
personal, in the sense that it also demands the proper arrangement of
horizontal relationships within society at large as a reflection of the
vertical relationship with God, many problems arise that need to be
resolved. If they are not resolved, Islam will always exist in protracted
crisis. It is the tension between these vertical and horizontal dimensions
that calls for Islamic thinking of high quality. This is the field of ijtihad
(reasoned judgment and interpretation of the Quranic code) in a broad
sense.
There has not yet been complete agreement among Muslim thinkers
in various parts of the world, including in Indonesia, on how Islam is
to regulate political, economic, social, cultural, and other systems. In
building the nation, for example, what is the position of women? Can a
woman be the head of state or hold other executive offices, or are these
exclusively the domain of men? Neither Muhammadiyah nor the nu has
settled this matter conclusively, even as we argue in the meantime that
Islam is “suitable for every time and place.”⁴⁵
The broader issue is, if change and social development turn out to be
ever farther away from the domain of Islam as it is understood, arguments
like this surely will no longer be relevant. The weakness is in our inability
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to understand the religion’s teachings contextually, with the result that
changes occurring in society are increasingly removed from the safeguard
of revelation. In other words, the environment grows ever more secular
and unconstrained, while religion retreats into an ivory tower. Religion’s
adherents are busily squabbling over inconsequential matters that were
already tedious centuries ago. Islam’s great mission to build a civilization
that is both beautiful and just on the face of the earth is buried under the
dust of history. This is the tragedy of religion in the modern era. Will
Indonesian Islam appear at the forefront to provide an example of how to
build that beautiful civilization? The answer very much depends on the
quality of its ability to first solve its domestic problems in all earnestness.
Once its internal problems have been resolved, it is not impossible
that inclusive and moderate Indonesian Islam will be able to contribute to
erecting the pillars of a firm and friendly civilization over the entire planet
for the benefit of the human species. But we cannot simply speculate. We
need to cultivate a deep self-awareness to continually criticize ourselves
plainly and objectively, so we can enter a new era free from the false
pride that has afflicted the Muslim umat over the years.
Finally, for this section, I need to reemphasize that in the effort to
improve the economy of the Muslim umat, women entrepreneurs in smes
need sincere attention in the period ahead of us. This is not only because
women’s smes tend to outnumber men’s, but because trade in the hands
of women can develop in a more balanced fashion. In this connection,
the tradition of some heads of households to forbid their wives from
leaving the house, let alone from doing trading, is long outmoded and
thus needs to be buried, bearing in mind that the wives must preserve
their honor and morality in business interactions. Denying the role of
mothers in economic activities would be the same as not respecting
them as complete human beings, creatures of Allah, with the potential
to contribute to the well-being of the family no less than that of men.
So for that reason, Irshad Manji, with her broad and varied experience,
highly praises mothers who are active in business. Manji also nominates
Indonesia with its thousands of islands as an example of democracy for
the Muslim world, with its philosophy of “unity in diversity.”⁴⁶ Of course,
external observers greatly hope that Indonesian democracy will succeed
in bringing justice and prosperity to the people. If Indonesia succeeds in
building a nation and a state on the pillars of democracy, it may even
win the recognition of other Muslim nations that are mired in dynastic
and authoritarian political systems.
I have spotlighted how democracy in the hands of opportunists brings
calamity to a nation and a state. But even given that fact, there is no
argument that democracy is haram, or theologically proscribed, and its
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supporters are kafir (unbelievers). Thinking like this is more appropriate
to the dark ages when the rulers decided everything and their subjects
were little more than the slaves of those same rajas, sultans, caliphs, and
other titles that symbolized antipathy to the common people. If bizarre
ideas such as that still appear in these modern times, we will simply let
history judge them. As human values become increasingly universal,
surely, in the end, the people will be all the more aware of their own value
and dignity. The moment the people have a direct view of the corruption
that usually accompanies a system of concentrated power, sooner or later
they will surely oppose these despots.
We can be proud of Indonesia because democracy has been the choice
of this nation from the beginning, even if its road has frequently been
blocked by people with uncertain commitment to true democracy who
emerged on our political stage. For democracy in Indonesia not to lose its
luster, we must always make every effort to present competent political
players. If parties want to be long-lived, then they must carry out planned
political education for their supporters. Among the important elements
that must be incorporated in their curricula are the democratic principles
and political systems that have been known throughout history. In this
way, we hope that politicians will no longer appear to be deficient in even
the most elementary knowledge.
To end this chapter, I present a stern warning by Mohammad Amien
Rais about the habit of the government in the Reform era of selling the
nation’s assets without adequate calculations. We very much need to
take this warning to heart when looking to the future of Indonesia. Rais
writes:
The Indonesian government has become a foreign servant. Many
national assets such as state-owned enterprises and banks have sys-
tematically moved into foreign ownership. A part of our forests and
land has been rented out to foreign corporations for terms of almost
one hundred years, and our mineral wealth, both oil and gas and other
forms, almost all of it, is managed by foreign corporations. The colo-
nization of the Indonesian economy by foreign corporate powers is
given a legal umbrella by statutory law and various political decisions.⁴⁷
The irresponsible sell-off of assets is the same as pawning the sovereignty
of the nation and the state to foreign interests. Is this any different from
economic colonialism by modern neo-imperialist powers?
Chapter 4 The Future of Religion
It would be a catastrophe if a person claimed to have faith but was
dishonest in his or her actions. Such a person might appear observant
symbolically and ritually, but symbols and rituals are not the same as
the substance of a steadfast belief. At the beginning of the twenty-first
century, religion confronted complex problems, not only due to external
factors, but also to the internal conditions of its adherents, which are
far from resolved. At the same time, much of the world is unfriendly to
spiritual values. Need the umat surrender? Surrendering would be the
same as digging one’s own grave.
Islam: An Open Religion
What if the Quran were asked, does Islam have the courage to confront
the challenges of science, theology, ideology, Sufism, and philosophy,
challenges that arise almost anywhere? If the umat, which claims
to believe that the Quran is the final message from Heaven, is now
powerless to prove the truth of this message in the real world, will
God be silent and waive His responsibility to preserve the Quran as
the source of wisdom for humanity? We cannot surrender our search
for the answers to such questions merely to human reason, whoever
possesses it, whether ulama, theologians, philosophers, or famous Sufis.
We must be prepared to negotiate with the Quran about these formidable
problems.
With all its awesome capabilities, mankind is still limited. Mankind is
neither omnipotent nor omniscient. If the questions we address are in
the realm of the limitless, then we must call on faith to discuss them.
Reason and intuition at this stage only function as faith’s ancillaries.
This postulate is sure to be rejected by atheist philosophers, because a
theist in their eyes “is someone who lacks the nerve to be an atheist,” to
borrow the expression of the French Catholic writer de Bonald.¹ The
Quran, as I understand it, gives the freedom of choice to each person to
be a theist or an atheist, with all the risks of each of these. The reason
for this is that without free choice it would be difficult for us to locate
the proper place of human responsibility. For responsibility can only be
asked of a morally free humanity. It would be virtually impossible to ask
a slave or someone with a slave’s mentality to take responsibility for his
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or her behavior. Slaves generally act at the command of their masters
and do not have the freedom to choose.
If mankind is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, the energy stored in
its Ego, according toMuhammad Iqbal, is extraordinary, on the condition
the work of ijtihad is bravely performed. In the context of this stream
of thought, Iqbal’s concept that ijtihad needs to be given an adequate
portion continues to be relevant to the condition of the Islamic world,
which is still gasping to overcome endless internal problems. It would
seem extremely difficult to make the Muslim umat in general understand
absolute freedom of thought as a condition for a sincere ijtihad. In fact,
the success of prophetic values regarding social change and the advance
of civilization will very much depend on the quality of ijtihad performed
by theMuslim thinker bravely and with a complete sense of responsibility.
For Iqbal, ijtihad is the “principle of movement” within the Islamic
structure.² Because of that, the cessation of ijtihad for centuries now has
brought the world of Islam to a situation of rigidity and gloom. According
to Iqbal, for some this is the result of lazy thinking in confronting big
problems. In an era of spiritual decay in the world of ideas, the great
Muslim thinkers have been idolized.³ Their pronouncements are placed
above the Quran and the Sunnah, whether consciously or not. As Iqbal
sees it, the idea that the formulations of Muslim thinkers of the past,
no matter how breathtaking, are final, goes against the entire spirit of
the Quran. There is not a single authentic guideline found in the Quran
and the Sunnah of the Prophet that would have us stop thinking, that
would have us blandly accept everything that has been laid out by the
classic thinkers. This does not mean that their work is unimportant; on
the contrary, it is very important to study them. Did not the companions
of the Prophet themselves quarrel and argue? They even fought against
each other – which we, however, should not imitate.
If that is the case, what is demanded of those who come later? Nothing
less than a critical attitude in evaluating their thinking, because the result
of ijtihad is definitely bound up with the spirit and energy of the time
and the place. Thus, the ijtihad of our predecessors was born out of their
interaction with the times they lived in. How can we be certain that
even their contemporaries thought the same way as they did, let alone
us moderns, who live in such a different era? Iqbal argues, “The only
road open to us is to conduct an approach to modern knowledge with
the greatest respect, but with an independent attitude when evaluating
the teachings of Islam in the light of this knowledge, even if it may
happen that we will be guided to differ from those who preceded us.”⁴
Of course, Iqbal’s statement here must be treated with care to avoid our
being fettered by modernism, because that is not our direction either.
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Here is another question. Why do we fear to be different? Does ijtihad
not straighten out the road to agree or differ with mature and rational
arguments? We have to ensure that Islamic teaching can function with
stability and has the power to resolve problems that arise endlessly in
social life. At the highest intellectual level, it is revelation that has to show
the way for humanity whenever science and philosophy have thrown up
their hands in surrender. Science and philosophy, for example, will not
be able to answer the question of the meaning of life and death, for such
things are in the realm that transcends history.
It is not possible to make Islamic teaching something that lives and
gives life in our times if we are not brave enough to critically assess
all the unquestionably rich Islamic thinking of the past eras. And we
courageously take what is relevant to our own era and to our benefit after
we have tested this against the teachings of theQuran and the Sunnah, and
based on our ijtihad by referring to these two main sources. For example,
in political thought, with all our respect for Al-Mawardi (d. 1050), a jurist
and diplomat of the Al-Shafiʿi school of Islamic jurisprudence, with his
famous work The Ordinances of the Government,⁵ is this work not really
only a justification and defense of the rule by the Abbasid dynasty that
was crumbling from within? In one of his lectures in Chicago in 1981,
Fazlur Rahman very expertly laid out the argument that the political
system in the form of the imamate/caliphate did not represent a religious
commandment. “The caliphate,” he said, “is not a divinely ordained
political system, but that Islam needs a political power for rendering
its precepts and ideals into the reality of history is no doubt divinely
ordained.”⁶ Forme, speaking about political systems in Islam is simply the
work of ijtihad according to the spirit of the times, as has been examined
in Chapter 2.
The performance of ijtihad is without question a major task that needs
the perspective of breadth, depth, and intelligence. For Iqbal, a mujtahid
(one who performs ijtihad) must possess penetrating thought and fresh
experience for a reconstructive undertaking that stretches into the future.⁷
Reconstructive work by itself contains within itself deconstructive work
on the past, which we view as needing correction. There is really nothing
special in this process, because if it is not undertaken, it means that we
are making an idol of obsolete thinking, something so sharply criticized
by Iqbal. As an important key for performing ijtihad, a knowledge of
Arabic is indispensable, as is an acquaintance with a critical attitude
toward the record of Islamic history from the earliest times to the present.
This critical attitude will be increasingly stimulated by modern findings
and the world these create. Without an awareness of all this, our level of
intellectualism would seem to simply remain on the sidelines.
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Because the Islamic world has not fully roused itself from its deep and
protracted sleep, to begin its reconstructive work on the entire structure
of Islamic thought, we are confronted by a number of challenges and
obstacles. But these must be faced bravely. Iqbal, who called himself “the
first Adam in a new world,”⁸ was well aware of how difficult it would
be to penetrate the fortress of conservatism in Muslim society, which
survives in three power structures:
. Mullahism (ulamaism). The ulama have always been a source of
great power in Islam. But over the centuries, and especially since the
fall of Baghdad [to the Mongols, in 1258], they have become very
conservative and do not provide an opportunity for the freedom of
ijtihad in matters of the law.
. Mysticism. The Muslim masses have been diverted by a kind of
mysticism that blinds them to reality. From its elevated status as one
power of spiritual education, mysticism has fallen headlong into a
state of merely being a tool to exploit the ignorance and beliefs of
the masses.
. The rajas. The eyes of the Muslim rajas in earlier times (but how is
this different from today?) were firmly focused on the interests of
their dynasties. As long as these interests were assured, they never
hesitated to sell their countries to the highest bidder.⁹
If Islam is to function with sincerity in its entirety, the means that is open
is to penetrate the fortress of conservatism wisely and through dialogue,
but with total courage. (Iqbal may have gone too far in describing this
courage when he said, “I will not paddle my prau [boat] into the seas
where there are no crocodiles in the waves.”¹⁰) It is not just the fortress of
conservatism that must be attacked, however. The fatalistic worldview,
according to Iqbal, must also be opposed, because it goes against the truth
of life, which has to be enriched with the movements of endless struggle:
“If you are capable of composing poetry / Touch it to the touchstone of
life.”¹¹
For Iqbal, poetry does not just express a profound sense of beauty,
it has at the same time the mission to enhance the quality of life. The
Islamic world, which is at the margin of civilization, must give birth to
the poetry of enlightenment and consciousness, and Iqbal did this with a
great élan vital until death took the pen from his hand. Did not Allah
swear to the importance of the pen: “Nun. By the pen and what they
inscribe”?¹²
Ijtihad may be done only by someone brave enough to carry on
imaginative dialogue with God. In his philosophy of the Ego, Iqbal wants
the future of religion 189
to emphasize that mankind’s Ego (khudi) is creative and its wanderings
have a definite objective. It is in this creativity that the difference between
humankind and other, lower, creatures lies.¹³ In this way, the Ego is a
creative force that always moves forward, never thinking of stopping.
The environment is penetrated and subdued according to the will of the
Ego. In an imaginary dialogue of humankind, which speaks familiarly
with God in spite of its critical attitude, Iqbal gives us this poem:
God has decreed
This is the way things are
Forget about any further ideas you may have about it.
Mankind responds:
No doubt about it – that is the way things are
But this is the way they ought to be.¹⁴
For one fleeting moment, humankind looks as if it is rebelling, but it is
not that we see. What is intended here is that humankind should not give
up, so long as the challenge confronting it is still within the human grasp.
Humankind’s answer, “But this is the way they ought to be,” symbolizes
just how awesome its creativity is, if it only knew. Ijtihad demands
bringing the highest creativity to understanding the message of Islam,
so as to guard against social changes veering off onto the wrong track.
It is as if Iqbal invites God to discuss what God has created. If so, then
why hesitate to question the result of the ijtihad of past generations
of Muslims who were limited by their times? In this way, we see that
the enemy of creative thinking is simply and solely the fear of being
different, if that difference is crucial for a greater good. Why do we still
not have what it takes to think big, while the reality in front of us is
truly breathtaking? The Islamic world is being manipulated by other
groups simply because our quality leaves us easily manipulated. I fail
to understand how there still are Muslims who feel “happy” to live in
false pride while floundering in the shattered greatness of the past. False
pride is the refuge of people in despair, not much different from those
who espouse a theology of death. If Iqbal were still living, surely the
detonations of his poetry would knock down those who run from reality
out of fear of facing that reality.
The Ego’s advance is not movement without an objective in Iqbal’s
system of thinking, unlike what we find in the élan vital of the French
philosopher Henri Bergson, which moves aimlessly. According to Iqbal,
the Ego longs to approachGod under its own power and effort. Borrowing
power and energy from some other party is taboo, because this paralyzes
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the Ego in its efforts to get close to the Absolute Ego (that is, God). The
closer one gets, the more perfect one becomes (Insan Kamil), or in Farsi,
mard-e muʾmin, an expression borrowed by Iqbal from the linguistic
treasure house of the Sufis.
In breaking through to begin its advance, the Ego always encounters
a variety of obstacles. The greatest obstacles are matter and nature. These
obstacles must be opposed and overcome by courageous struggle. Only
someone brave can healthily develop the potential of his or her Ego.
A coward will never attain meaningful goals in life; the coward is by
nature a highwayman on the highway of life whose nature is unhealthy
for the development of human emotions. Iqbal would like humankind to
develop without fear to achieve emotional health. For this poet there is
no mountain too high to climb and no valley too deep to descend into.
The only condition is courage.
Iqbal was also an outspoken social reformer. His attention to the poor
was especially impressive. In a letter to his son, Javid Iqbal, our poet
writes:
The way of life of the rich man is not my way
I am a mendicant, a faqir,
My advice: do not sell your Ego;
Even in destitution, find time to drink your fill of satisfaction.¹⁵
How beautiful and profound is the poignancy of this advice, but how
difficult it is to realize without superior spiritual training. The writer
himself is still far from success in carrying out such spiritual practices,
which must be grasped through devout religiosity together with deep
meditation and thought.
Iqbal really does liken himself to a faqir who no longer has material
needs. He identifies himself as rooted in an impoverished society, not in
the society of the wealthy elite. In Rumûz-e Bekhûdî, his affection for the
humble folk comes through very clearly. The following excerpt clarifies
his social stance:
I am committed to the masses
It is a real blessing to me
A maturity of my essence
Originates from the masses
Draw yourself up close to them
As close as can be
Give yourself over to the people
As Khair-Al-Bashar has said:
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Only a satan
Separates us from the mass of society.¹⁶
For Iqbal, the Ego has meaning only if it unites with society at large.
Outside of society, the Ego has no meaning. Is not a wave called a wave
as long as it rolls along on the surface of the water? Thus, improving the
quality of life of the common people both externally and internally was
central in the social philosophy of the poet. His anti-elitism is keenly
felt. His social philosophy fuses with the beat of the pulse of those who
are discarded and ill-fated.
Brave deeds are needed to improve these social defects. The value
of practicing Iqbal’s thinking is located here, but it is ironic that his
message was received with indifference by his fellow countrymen. His
biography tells how Iqbal was very generous. He would always be ready
to help anyone who came to him. For Iqbal, philosophy without practical
value would only be empty speculative daydreaming, regardless of the
sophistication and complexity with which such speculations might be
framed.
Finally, the attitude of surrendering to fate using the excuse of
predetermination in Iqbal’s view shreds the teaching of Islam about
the responsibility to work and to struggle, since the essence of life is
stored in action (ʿamal): “In action is hidden the essence of life.”¹⁷ In
other words, it is only the results of our deeds that really belong to us.
The results of the work of others belong entirely to them.
Now let us return to the main point of our discussion. So that we do not
move too far off from these philosophically and theologically nuanced
problems, let us see the response of the Quran. The first question is about
the courage of Islam in confronting challenges. In one verse, the Quran
issues this challenge: “And if you are in doubt about what We have sent
down upon Our Servant [Muhammad], then produce a surah the like
thereof and call upon your witnesses other than Allah, if you should be
truthful.”¹⁸ The Quranic exegete Muhammad Ali Al-Shabuni explains the
call for witnesses as follows: “And call upon your assistants and helpers
who can give support to you in opposing the Quran, apart from Allah,
glorified and exalted be He.”¹⁹ This verse emphasizes that the Quran may
not be opposed, although it can be tested with the aid of philosophers,
theologians, and thinkers of whatever caliber and originating in whatever
civilization.
Naturally, we know from empirical experience that this is easier said
than done. Under the circumstances of a weak umat, one lacking in
authority, someone will glibly say that all our backwardness has been
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caused by the Quran, which stands in the way of human progress. If
the Quran urges mankind to be intelligent, why then for hundreds of
years has the Muslim umat been shunted away from the mainstream of
civilization, the good and the bad? Regardless, Muslims not infrequently
identify themselves “as the best of all umats,”²⁰ in spite of having fallen
flat on the ground. In connection with this topic, the criticism by Sutan
Takdir Alisjahbana (sta), leveled at the Muslim umat in the Constituent
Assembly (1956–1959), is worth reflecting on: “The chosen creatures who
embrace the chosen religion cannot be weak, poor, and backward. That
would be a betrayal of the religion itself.”²¹ This criticism was very sharp,
but, I feel, delivered in all sincerity, even though in those constitutional
debates sta rejected Islam as the basis of the state. For sta, the weak,
poor, and backward conditions of the umat were the signs of betrayal by
its adherents of the religion that was believed to be the best and truest
religion of all. Why had the Muslim umat fallen into such conditions
as expressed by sta? No one theory can give a complete answer to this
question. The late Fazlur Rahman, in one of his lectures at the University
of Chicago in the 1980s, lamented the far-from-progressive condition of
the Muslim umat when he said, “We live in a different kind of Islam, not
in Quranic Islam.”²² What did he mean? We need to explore this further.
In contrast to the accusation of some experts who link the ignorance
of the Muslim umat to the Quran, Rahman argued the opposite.
It is precisely because the Quran is no longer understood properly
and intelligently that the Muslim umat is oppressed, ignorant, and
impoverished. We are beaten in the race of civilizations and our fate in
the hereafter is by no means assured. The Quran is of course still read,
and is even a runner in the race, so to speak, but the spiritual atmosphere
of the world of Islam, as I see it, is by no means equal to the image given
in this holy scripture. That image portrays a life that is just, intelligent,
prosperous, peaceful, secure, and free – all of which is the realization of
the dictum “a blessing for the universe.” In its current position, however,
the Muslim umat seems to have trouble differentiating between the
straight road that must be traveled and the twisting road that must be
avoided, let alone spreading the blessings of the Quran more widely. In
our hands, the Quran no longer functions as al-furqan, the criterion that
differentiates between the right and the wrong roads.²³
But the Quran forbids the Muslim community from sitting passively,
“with hands on lap,” and lamenting its bad fortune. There still is a strong
belief among us that we must rise up and no longer be squeezed into a
narrow and stifling back alley. After having been hammered by history for
centuries, sooner or later the various Muslim worlds will surely come to
an overall awareness of the need for enlightenment. That is, on condition
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that the initiative for “arousing” God’s attention must be made in the
form of brave and creative works to penetrate and dispel the miasma of
stagnation.²⁴ In this connection, the old saying, “brave because you’re
right, afraid because you’re wrong,” must be changed to “being brave is
right, being afraid is wrong.” This is not just a change in the wording but a
change in the thought paradigm to facilitate a breakthrough. Because the
Quran is an open scripture, therefore logically the Muslim community
must appear to be an open umat. Open, and bold enough to admit all its
ugliness and weaknesses so as to promptly set about correcting them in
all sincerity. Leave behind the pride in fakery, use accurate parameters
so we may reflect ourselves as intelligently as possible, hiding nothing,
as I have said so often. Speak out and admit frankly that the past of the
Islamic umat is filled with history’s infamies as well as the wonderful
creativity of its thinkers. A balanced approach toward the past is the only
approach that is just and proper. Otherwise, the picture will be distorted,
dishonest, and misleading.
This transparency I call for means there remain no hidden weaknesses
such as those that have been with us for decades now, if not centuries,
and have been purposely concealed out of shame. A humanity that
is prepared to laugh at itself shows that it has awakened from a long
and deep sleep. This is important, because living in false pride is proof
of dishonesty and a lack of self-confidence. Readiness to see oneself
openly is a form of courage in assessing one’s naked reality. Admission of
one’s own weaknesses and readiness to correct them is a prerequisite for
moving forward to a better future.
In the realm of abstract intellectual thinking, the Islamic culture of
which we are heirs is now almost completely the product of Muslims’
past interactions and clashes with various elements of other civilizations:
Hellenist, Persian, Roman, Turkish, and Indian. Philosophy, theology,
Sufism, and the political thinking that then blossomed in the Islamic
world were due to the stimulation of that creative interaction. This did
not always go smoothly, but it did enrich the treasure house of Islamic
civilization that flourished for about five centuries, from the eighth to
the thirteenth of the Common Era.
During this period, the Islamic world, whether in Southwest Asia,
North Africa, or Europe, was admitted to be the most advanced and
civilized region.This period is usually crowned the Golden Age of Islamic
Civilization, although not without a qualifying footnote in the form of
friction between the famous thinkers of the different schools of Islamic
jurisprudence. These were not merely intellectual clashes, but also not
infrequently wars between the Muslims themselves. In Indonesia, their
resonance was not strongly felt, perhaps because of the geographical
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location of Nusantara in the East, separated as it was from the centers of
intellectual strife in Southwest Asia, North Africa, and Spain, in an era
when communications were still primitive.
Because of Nusantara’s position far in the East, the Islam of Indonesia
has its own strengths and weaknesses. Its strength is that it can make a
fresh beginning without being burdened by ideological friction that at its
worst results in mutual slandering or even anathematizing opponents
as kafir (unbelievers). The condition for making a fresh beginning is
for Indonesian Muslims to equip themselves with a broad and deep
knowledge, a quality that still needs to be struggled over in Indonesia.
Its weakness is that Islam in Indonesia is supported by adherents who,
for the most part, do not understand the Arabic language, including
the readings during the congregational prayer. And yet to understand
the authentic sources of Islam, command of Arabic is a requisite. This
shortcoming can be overcome, so long as a person wants to study. This
statement does not necessarily mean that understanding Arabic means
a better understanding of Islam. That very much depends on whether
or not ability in Arabic is used to understand religion and history in an
intelligent and honest way within the framework of a just and civilized
humanism.
The second question is, will God be silent even if the umat of
Muhammad lacks the power to protect and maintain the Quran? The
evidence of history shows that over the past fourteen centuries, the text
of the Quran has been preserved. Every time soiled hands try to destroy
it, the Muslim umat will always emerge to set matters right, because the
memorizers (huffaz) of this holy scripture will guard against all possible
harm to the Quran. As far as I know, throughout history the Quran, with
its thirty sections, 114 surahs, and over six thousand lines, has been the
only holy scripture that can be memorized.
The facts of the matter cannot be denied. Experience shows that
memorizing Chairil Anwar’s famous poem “Karawang Bekasi,” which
is only thirty-two lines in length, is quite difficult. How much more
so it would be to memorize thousands of lines?²⁵ Why is the Quran
memorizable? There is no easy rational answer to this, but empirical
experience is forced to admit it. Rationally speaking, memorizing the
Quran by rote is really somethingmiraculous. Beginningwith the Prophet
and his companions, the memorizers of this holy scripture carry on this
practice to the present day and will surely continue to do so in the future.
What’s more, there are a number of pesantren in Indonesia, for example,
that specialize in developing this culture of memorizing. The weakness
of this culture is that ability to memorize the Quran is not balanced by
the ability to understand this holy scripture.
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But the above question demands a further answer, because the
expression “protect the Quran” is not only limited to the purity of the
text, but also to ability of the Muslim umat to carry its message to the
world. We can debate long and hard about this problem of ability. What
is clear is that the Muslim umat, beginning in the eighteenth century, no
longer counted for much globally, even though the Ottoman Turks were
still sovereign; for the process of disintegration within was also underway
there. Some of the regions of Nusantara had begun to be colonized as
early as the beginning of the seventeenth century. Other regions were
subdued gradually.
Islam and Religious Sincerity
Why must we talk about sincerity when we discuss religion or religions?
What is sincerity? Can the relations between the religious faithful
continue amicably and peacefully without sincerity? This is one of the
key questions for which we must find the answer within the framework
of Islam, humanity, and Indonesian identity, which are the main focus of
this work.²⁶
I shall begin with an exploration of sincerity and its implications.
Ketulusan, the Indonesian word for “sincerity,” from the root word tulus,
contains the meanings “honesty, purity, truthfulness, devotion.” Tulus
and ikhlas are also frequently joined together to mean “pure of heart,
honest.”²⁷ Ikhlas comes from the Arabic root kh- l-s, which means “pure,
clean, unadulterated, free.” Ikhlas means “sincere devotion, honesty,
truthfulness.”²⁸ The English word “sincere” (Latin: sincerus) means “pure
and clean, trusted, free from trickery and pretense, honest, genuine,
pure, and straightforward of speech.”²⁹ It so happens that the idea of
ketulusan means substantially the same thing; all these words contain
within them the ideas of purity, honesty, and cleanliness. A proper religion
must possess these main values. Otherwise, religion is no more than a
ceremonial show, all symbol and no substance.
Now let us look at what the Quran says about who among humankind
is sincere and what are the signs of this sincerity. According to the Quran,
the prophets and Messengers are those who are tulus ikhlas, pure of heart,
free from envy, pretense, and all the ills that can bring down the edifice
of human nature.³⁰ In the same way, all religious followers are ordered
by God to be tulus and truthful in understanding and practicing their
religion, whatever it may be.³¹ Without ketulusan, a religion would mean
nothing before God and would even mislead others as well as oneself. It
seems that there is almost no civilization on the face of the earth that
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does not understand these concepts in much the same way. Religion will
then emphasize and exalt the meaning of the word ketulusan. Putting
it another way, ketulusan is the part that fuses with primordial human
nature, a nature that has never been contaminated.
A person who is tulus – sincere – when giving something to another
person does not look to receive anything in return except the blessing of
Allah, not the blessing of man. In the language of the Quran: “We feed
you only for the countenance of Allah. We wish not from you reward
or gratitude.”³² Such an attitude of the faithful is of course taught by
other religions as well, because giving without ulterior motive may fully
originate in the doctrine of Heaven, although after arriving on earth it has
been distorted by the partiality and weakness of mankind. Giving without
ulterior motive is surely supported by the strength of true sincerity.
We do not easily come across this true sincerity inmodern and secular,
not to say atheistic, civilization. But religion certainly will not surrender
to those worldly challenges. In traditional Abrahamic monotheism, Islam
is the youngest religion, after Judaism and Christianity. Therefore, the
Muslim umat must learn as much as possible from its “older brother
religions” in confronting the attacks of atheistic secularism, even as
we know that these older brothers themselves have been sent reeling
from these attacks. Nietzsche’s words that appeared for the first time
in The Gay Science, “God is dead,” present a reading of this philosophy
about increasingly nihilistic³³ modern civilization, at a time when the
European churches seem powerless.What is interesting is the observation
of Nietzsche that it is Religious Man, pious and filled with devotion, who
has slaughtered God. “For Nietzsche,” writes Gianni Vattimo, “the entire
process of nihilism can be summarized with the death of God, or with
the bankruptcy of the highest values.”³⁴
The paradoxical statement that the pious have killedGod needs serious
attention on the part of the religious umat. In the context of the Muslim
umat, is our religious attitude really tulus (sincere) if we do not defend
the principle of a just and civilized society but instead allow the poor and
the orphans to be abandoned and neglected in their misery, as apparently
is the general trend of Indonesian society? Centuries before Nietzsche
was born, the Quran flung out this question: “Have you seen the one who
denies the Recompense? For that is the one who drives away the orphan
and does not encourage the feeding of the poor.”³⁵ In other words, in the
eyes of the Quran, the one who cares not for the suffering of others is a
liar.
The twin of sincerity (ketulusan) is truthfulness (kejujuran). Without
exception, all religions teach honesty, even if not all their followers are
honest. These qualities are the fruit of a sincere faith. This is a matter of
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the heart and not the work of calculations by the brain. In daily life, I not
infrequently meet with friends who profess different religions, but I feel
the heart-to-heart contact is a very close one. Why? Because sincerity
is there, and honesty. Differences of belief do not become obstacles to
the linking of two human hearts. And if that is the case, then sincerity
(ketulusan) is indeed of great value.
Indonesia does not lack experience in political cooperation between
adherents of different faiths. Modern Indonesian history has recorded
close and productive comradeship carried on by major figures of the
Masyumi with Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, and other leaders. The
closeness of Natsir or Prawoto Mangkusasmito with I.J. Kasimo, Herman
Johannes, A.M. Tambunan, or J. Leimena, both during the revolution for
independence and afterwards, is still fresh in our collective memories.
As is that between Burhanuddin Harahap and the Balinese Hindu
Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung. Kasimo even joined with Masyumi and
psi (Indonesian Socialist Party) leaders in trying to oppose Sukarno’s
authoritarian political system during the Guided Democracy era (1959–
1965), even though in the end they were frustrated because that system
was also supported by the military and certain other political parties.
Perhaps, quite apart from the foundation of their sincere friendships,
there was another factor that more and more tightened the bonds of
friendship: that is, they all possessed idealism and personal integrity.
They all were genuine moralists who had been born in the womb
of the Indonesian nation. Ultimately, J. Leimena was coopted by the
authoritarian system, although that does not diminish the respect that
the Muslim umat has felt for him.
Sweet memories such as this have somewhat disappeared from
subsequent generations in the past three decades. I see a number of
possible reasons. First, later generations never experienced the revolution
for independence, which succeeded in building up comradeship among
the generation of Natsir-Kasimo-Johannes, and others. Later on we
had the 1966 Movement, but it appears that the personal integrity of
its leading figures was not as firm as that of the preceding generation.
Second, the seductions of power politics were more formidable in the
years that followed the Natsir-Kasimo-Johannes era; its temptations truly
contaminated one’s sincerity. Third, the issue of Christianization during
the New Order period (1966–1998) has increased mutual suspicion,
especially between the adherents of Islam and Christianity.
We most certainly cannot allow feelings of mutual suspicion to exist
and to grow. The results could shatter the body and soul of this nation.
The destruction of lives and property that occurred in Maluku (1999–
2002) must awaken us all to correcting ourselves, so that provocateurs
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cannot easily wreck the feelings of brotherhood among us that it has
taken so long to build. In that conflict-ridden region, the clashes were not
initially religion-based, but rather instigated by economic and political
interests. But then religion was manipulated for the unhealthy objectives
of stirring up emotions and exploiting solidarity.
If religion is misused the results can be very destructive and even
fatal. It is easy for people to kill each other in the name of religion.
Such phenomena happen not just between the followers of different
religions but among believers of the same religion. Such situations become
extremely complex. When religion is misused this way, sincerity and
honesty as authentic proof of faith become powerless, and thewhisperings
of satans take over to plunge the religious communities into calamity
and mutual destruction.
The next question is, will we always need religion? To illustrate religion
as a source of the doctrine of sincerity, I should nowdiscuss somemusings
by A.J. Toynbee (1889–1975) on the function of religion in the age of
technology, which is ever more sophisticated yet ever more malignant.
This historian was a Christian and an admirer of Mahatma Gandhi.
Toynbee wrote thirty pages to answer this central question: Is religion a
perennial need?³⁶ To facilitate his response, Toynbee raised a number of
sub-questions within the framework of strengthening the position of
religion as an eternal need for mankind. These sub-questions included:
Why are we here? For what reason are we here? Is life a blessing or a
curse?
According to Toynbee, religion is an effort to give answers to these
urgent questions, inasmuch as science and philosophy are unable to
provide complete answers. “Religion,” he said, “is an attempt to discover
how to reconcile ourselves to the formidable facts of life and death.”³⁷
What worried this British historian is how difficult it is to discover Homo
sapiens in modern civilization. How little we show wisdom in controlling
ourselves and in ordering our relations with each other, he writes. In the
event that we do succeed in surviving in the midst of this technological
revolution, only then will become Homo sapiens, in truth and in name.³⁸
If we connect Toynbee’s concept of Homo sapiens, which, wemight say,
means “the intelligent one,” to our discussion about Islam and religious
sincerity, we will see a clear red thread running through the two. Sincerity
is the basic characteristic that fuses with the character of Homo sapiens.
The person who claims to be intelligent but is dishonest in his or her
deeds is making a false claim. So, too, is someone who trades in religion
in the name of God. At the same time this person plays dangerous games
with the truth, he or she is disavowing the concept of sincerity. Treating
your religion as commodity to be bought and sold tarnishes that same
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religion, for once it is traded, religion degenerates into a worldly good
of no value. In this situation, religion no longer is perennially needed.
That is the reason Toynbee categorizes religions into “higher religions,”
which are those religions oriented to Heaven, and “lower religions,” those
religions that cleave to the earth and busy themselves on behalf of low
interests. Nationalism, for Toynbee, is part of the lower religions, which
often trigger conflicts between countries.³⁹
We return to the issue of relations between and among religious
adherents. I have seen that it is often the case that among religious
communities quantity is emphasized over quality. For the former, the
total number of followers is the important thing, even at the cost of
mediocre quality. So it comes as no surprise that their people think of
ways of getting the most fellow-members. If necessary, they herd the
inhabitants of the earth like livestock into having the same faith as they
do. Such an arrogant and intolerant attitude is harshly criticized by the
Quran in the following verse: “And had your Lord willed, those on earth
would have believed – all of them entirely. Then, [O Muhammad], would
you compel the people in order that they become believers?”⁴⁰
This verse, and still more others, strictly forbid people from using
force, whether gently or harshly, in religion. Elsewhere in the Quran,
the pluralism of religions and cultures from thousands of years ago is
a hard fact of history, and thus must be respected and acknowledged
with thanks. This is because, when seen in a wider perspective, such
phenomena have enriched the universal edifice of humankind, so long
as we are capable of managing them. But the small-minded see the
historical fact of pluralism in religion, culture, customary law, ethnicity,
and civilization as a threat to their existence. If such narrow views are
allowed to dominate in society, religion will no longer be a blessing but a
curse and a doctrine of compulsion. Ethical systems born out of them
will surely be authoritarian and will attempt to monopolize the truth.
If that happens, how difficult will this life be? God has created diversity,
but humanity instead chooses honesty-killing uniformity. Genuine
friendship can only be built on a foundation of firm belief that engenders
sincerity and honesty. As to the issue of relationships across religious
lines, I would offer this formula: “Be varied in your friendship and be
friends in your differences.” Otherwise I am afraid that religion will
no longer function as a source of tranquility and peace, but rather be
source of discord, disorder, and even war. Therefore, the Quran warns:
“So take warning [from the experience of the past], O people of vision.”⁴¹
The genuine Homo sapiens are those who know well how to glean deep
wisdom from the human experience, experience gained in layer upon
layer of centuries and eras. History in this sense is a laboratory of wisdom.
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But how dearly bought is that wisdom! And, too, how often history is
written for the benefit of the rulers, so that when we search for wisdom,
falsehood is what we find.
Symbolism: Salt and Lipstick
Comparing salt to lipstick, as I interpret it, comes from something
Mohammad Hatta said in 1976 in the context of teaching the Muslim
umat of Indonesia to be wiser in struggling for the Islamic politics they
aspire to. The Muslim umat, according to Hatta “should use the science of
salt: it is tasted but not seen. This is different from the science of lipstick:
seen but not tasted!”⁴² Even if Hatta may not have further explained
what he meant by this, for me it is a guide to a cultural strategy that it is
exceedingly important for the Muslim umat of Indonesia to reflect on
deeply. The science of salt and lipstick is a part of the response by Hatta
to this question from Z. Yasni: “Mr. Hatta, what pushed you to form a
new party, the pdii [Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia – the Indonesian
Islamic Democratic Party]?” Hatta replied, “The main objective was to
educate the Muslim umat in Indonesia on how to have political parties
with an Islamic basis in a responsible democratic life in a state that is
founded on the Pancasila.”⁴³
This idea of Hatta’s was very clear. Its objective was to educate the
Muslim umat to be skillful and clever in carrying itself in its fight for
the teachings of Islam in Indonesia. To be frank, my brain and my
heart have wrestled long and hard with these thoughts of his, given
the actual sociological conditions in Indonesia. I finally arrived at the
conclusion that Hatta’s idea should be greeted positively, because of
course it embodies the crucial issue that has for decades burdened our
Muslim umat when speaking about the relationship of Islam and politics.
As I have said repeatedly, if people want to fight for Islamic teachings in
Indonesia, use “the science of salt, not the science of lipstick.” When salt
dissolves into food, it leaves no visible trace, but its effect in the taste
is certainly decisive. In contrast, the lipstick worn by women is eye-
catching red, but it is tasteless. Hatta was very sharp in perceiving the
connection between Islam and the Indonesian soul. So far, I have yet to
find such advice from anyone else, including from the top leaders of the
Islamic parties in the past, let alone today.
These words by Mohammad Hatta were so strategic in interpreting
and dissecting the link between Islam and Indonesianness that I am
going to take several pages here to discuss them. Who does not know
Mohammad Hatta, the leader with a character as strong as coral? He was
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as well a moralist seldom matched in modern Indonesian history, an
authentic Pancasilist leader in theory and practice. I would definitely
react if any group called Hatta a secularist, simply because of the matter
of the “seven words” that went missing from the Jakarta Charter in the
summer of 1945.
With his sincere belief, Hatta was unwilling to witness Indonesian
Islam as lipstick, visible but not tasteable, occupied with ceremony but
lacking in substance, bellowing “Allahu akbar!” while wrecking and
defaming other people. For Hatta, faith was something subtle that teaches
humankind to be civilized and to possess an elegant courtesy in human
intercourse.
To see Hatta’s character from a distance, let us look at what Arnold
Mononutu, a companion of Hatta’s since 1923 in the Netherlands, had to
say, and then we will consider Sultan Hamengkubuwono ix’s impression
of him.
In April 1923, when the Indische Vereeniging was about to change
its name to pi (Perhimpunan Indonesia), Mononutu was invited by
Alex Maramis to be present at The Hague to witness this name change.
Mononutu at first doubted whether Hatta and his friends in the pi would
want him there, because he was “neither Indonesian nor Dutch.” What
happened next? Mononutu was accepted with great warmth. This is the
testimony of that Christian nationalist figure: “I was greatly moved that I
was accepted as I was by Bung Hatta, Soebardjo, Nazir Sutan Pamuntjak,
Iwa Koesoemasoemantri – the leaders of the pi. From then on, I no
longer danced and drank liquor at the hotels, and I worked only for
Indonesia, from 1923 in the pi up until now [1984]. From that moment,
Perhimpunan Indonesia gave me an Indonesian nationality! From 1923,
Bung Hatta became my loyal comrade until he passed away.”⁴⁴
This statement proves that it was the pi in 1923 that infused the “virus”
of nationhood into Arnold Mononutu. Before that, he was only a young
Minahasan who did not feel he was Indonesian – Indonesia as a nation,
of course, had not appeared before the 1920s. Because he was directly
affected by Hatta’s strong character, Mononutu gave up his playboy life in
Europe.⁴⁵
When Hatta visited Paris, he would usually work in Mononutu’s room
at the Hôtel du Progrès. One day, Hatta wanted to borrow Monunutu’s
typewriter. “Arnold,” he said, “lend me the typewriter. I want to type
a letter.” Because the typewriter had already been pawned, this was
Mononutu’s reaction:
I made a pretense of looking for it. Bung Hatta watched me and said,
“Ach, Arnold, the typewriter’s not something small.Why are you looking
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for it like that? Where is it?” I was forced to admit that Soebardjo and I
had pawned it and the money had been spent on messing around in
bars. Hatta got really angry and exclaimed, “That’s national property,
and you had the nerve to interfere with national property! That is
absolutely no good!!”⁴⁶
Mononutu was quite honest about the past, even though it was very
spotty, as one might say. Mononutu did not want to pretend he had been
pure; he examined himself critically as he really had been. This is the
sign of a great-spirited person.
And now the testimony of Sultan Hamengkubuwono ix about Hatta
when the capital of the republic had to move from Jakarta to Yogyakarta
to continue the revolution. Here is what he had to say:
While the other leaders were busy relating their travels, Bung Hatta
was totally absorbed in the political situation. After his own exhausting
journey, the first thing he asked was about the fighting spirit of
the people in Yogya. Could the economy of the people support the
struggle for independence? Did they understand what it meant to
be independent? He said very little about himself. I got the positive
impression that what he put above all else was our struggle and the
condition of the people. This really impressed me. If everyone had had
his spirit, there would have been no power in the world that could have
crushed our revolution for independence.⁴⁷
Now that we have seen the testimonies of these two national figures
about Hatta, the next thing will be an analysis of “the science of salt”
and “the science of lipstick” in the context of the history of modern
Indonesia. It was Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) among the Indonesian
intellectuals who gave quite serious thought to the right form for the
relationship of Islam to Indonesian identity. Very unlike the Muslim
leaders of the older generation, Nurcholish did not want to drain away
any more energy in pitting Islam against Pancasila. He saw that they
were not truly in opposition. As Nurcholish wrote, “Some Islamic values
are actually found in the national ideology, especially Pancasila.”⁴⁸ He
even added that “so far, Pancasila appears to be satisfactory and now,
practically speaking, it constitutes the single ideology of the nation.”⁴⁹
But, he continued, Pancasila, in the hands of irresponsible politicians,
has been a bitter experience for this nation, in that it has strayed from its
real function “as a foothold and a common value.”⁵⁰ Yet although it has
been misappropriated, for the Indonesian nation “the basis of Pancasila
is a factor that gives color and character to each political or social idea
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that grows in its soil.”⁵¹ In support of Hatta’s view, for Nurcholish “the
principle of God the One and the Only is the primary principle and the
main one that spotlights and becomes the source in human life.”⁵²
As I have said earlier, the acceptance of Pancasila as the philosophical
foundation of the state by the younger Indonesian Muslim thinkers
has been a conscious acceptance, neither from calculation of power
politics, nor to replace Islam with Pancasila, which in any case would be
impossible. These thinkers are an educated generation who live in times
far different from the earlier years that were preoccupied by exhausting
clashes over the foundation of the state. Lines of thinking and intellectual
strategies are now different: “The science of salt is more important than
the science of lipstick.” They value Hatta as the visionary father of the
nation when they peer into the future of Indonesia. They know that
it cannot be torn apart by useless and tedious philosophical debates,
and that the spirit of the sharia in the form of justice for all the people
is far more important than the official form, devoid of content and
quality.
This, of course, suggests another question, if the “science of salt” is also
not effective in improving the character and morals of the Indonesian
nation, then what science must we look for to do this? Those who profess
“the science of lipstick” will surely let out loud cries: “Weʾve reminded
you all along that you won’t get anywhere with the cultural approach
without formal protection by a constitution like the Jakarta Charter.”
This succinct argument does make sense, but if we want to think calmly
and with an eye to history, the facts speak differently. Let us take the
example of Pakistan, which, following its proclamation of independence
in 1947, was driven by the energy and spirit of Islam, and which in 1957
officially called itself the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Apart from having
become a nuclear power, Pakistan in actuality is not better than our
Pancasila Republic. Fighting between political parties never stops, there
have been a string of military coups, and corruption there is no less awful
than in Indonesia. Do our friends who advocate “the science of lipstick”
close their eyes to a reality such as this one? Jamaat-e Islami (the Islamic
Congress), the party created by Abul Aʿla Maududi (1903–1979), which
was so enthusiastic and hard-working with the purely Islamic label,
never received significant backing from the Pakistani people. The zigzag
course of the party between opposing and supporting the government
has brought it to a steady loss of authority.
Meanwhile, in the global order, the world of Islam is still very nervous
and vulnerable. “The science of lipstick” is on display everywhere, while
“the science of salt” seems to be ignored. The late Fazlur Rahman, in one
of his classes at the University of Chicago early in the 1980s, bemoaned
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how problematic the world of Islam was, even to the point of uttering
these words: “We live in a different kind of Islam, not in a Quranic Islam.”
I have often repeated this tragic statement in different forums to show
just how wide the gap is between the ideals of the Quran and the reality
of the fragmented brotherhood of the Muslim umat – for nothing is
more emblematic here than how difficult it is for this umat to raise up
the spirit of brotherhood that this holy scripture so explicitly and keenly
commands. Look at what is happening in Palestine, Afghanistan, and
Iraq, which are being torn apart by bloody strife between ethnic factions.
It is as if these dramas are the gift of the world of Islam to the twenty-first
century. It really is a tragedy.
Of course we can validly accuse others of playing us off against our
fellow Muslims. But we must not forget that these others can only create
turmoil in our ranks because our ranks are themselves in turmoil. When
corruption fills the umat, that is the very time that external foes are the
most eager to weaken us, if not destroy us, and then rob us of our wealth.
We are often powerless. Indeed, a number of Muslim countries really
do have great assets coveted by foreigners, in the form of tremendous
mineral wealth that has highly strategic value in the “game of global
chess”: oil, coal, gold, and timber. All of that has been in foreign gunsights
for decades now, particularly oil, a large proportion of which is buried in
Muslim soil.
A basic question is, with so much potential wealth, why are the
majority of Muslim countries impoverished, while a minority of them
prosper? The answer is simple: the sense of inter-umat solidarity has long
been feeble. There are drops of needed assistance here and there for the
poor of the umat, not to empower them, but only to keep them from
starving to death. That is why we feel so deep and piercing a heartache at
seeing such wealth; instead of bringing our hearts ever closer, as fellow
Muslims, to help each other, it drives us farther and farther apart. Not
infrequently, oil is made into an instrument by rich Muslim countries to
oppress and force other Muslim peoples to submit to hegemony, for the
sake of power politics.
Over the course of the history of the umat, Islam as the cement of
brotherhood is so often neglected, as if this religion has lost its energy to
unite us. Even more ironic is the fact that Muslim countries that are rich
in oil often surrender their purses to be squeezed by foreigners, who are
unwilling to see Islam emerge as a force in determining the direction of
global civilization. The strange thing is, those who are squeezed actually
feel protected. The rich region of Southwest Asia has long been under the
strong influence of the United States, even while this region’s political
rhetoric speaks out against foreign domination.
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The Islamic world has yet to awaken to the commands of its religion
to emerge as the arbiter of human civilization. How far we are from that
position! Truly, we “live in another Islam.” But as Muslims, we naturally
may not lose hope, no matter how dark the path we have to tread. The
divine word of Allah in the Surah Yusuf tells us: “[They continued] until,
when the messengers despaired and were certain that they had been
denied, there came to them Our victory, and whoever We willed was
saved. And Our punishment cannot be repelled from the people who are
criminals.”⁵³ This is a sign to the Muslim umat to continue acting and
working sincerely, earnestly, and creatively as we await the assistance
that, sooner or later, must come. We believe that surely this umat, after
being bludgeoned by history, will understand in time, and Islam will
again be the great force in joining together the hearts that have been
scattered. The Quran still awaits the Muslim umat to consult it to find
solutions to the many complex problems that confront humanity, as I
will now explain further.⁵⁴
The Global Map: Between Hope and Alarm
If, when we scrutinize the face of Islam, we see that it is still marred
and blemished at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we also see
that the map of global civilization is far from perfected if seen from
the system of prophetic values.⁵⁵ In fact, these values are all the more
cast adrift, whether in the stream of secularism and atheism, or in the
current of religious fundamentalism. Richard Falk, professor emeritus of
international law at Princeton University, and an anti-Zionist American
Jew, wrote this in early 1998, two years before the turn of the century:
Theadvent of the newmillennium leads us, at the very least, to embolden
the imagination. It is a marker thrown on the shore in the darkness of
night while the river of history rushes by. We see no more and no less
than what imagination allows, especially our deepest hopes and our
most dreaded fears. This millennial passage encourages extremes of
expectation: the end of the world or the beginning of a new order.⁵⁶
This excerpt is very poetic. The river of history has flowed for well over a
decade since Falk’s words appeared. The world has indeed not yet ended,
but a new order, more friendly and bringing hope to all of humanity, has
yet to show its face. SeveralMuslim nations such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Palestine are still lashed by suffering. The hope for full independence for
Palestine has not yet been realized. Indonesia, the biggest Muslim nation,
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still has not recovered from its various social illnesses. The arrogance of
the superpower state is not abating. Religion and the values of sincerity
have long ceased to be important considerations in relations between
civilizations. Economic considerations and power politics appear to have
replaced religion as the highest moral reference points. It is as if God has
no place and is “powerless” in the modern world.
The world has indeed been set loose and turned on its head. If the
European Middle Ages are viewed as disrespecting the dignity of human
beings in the interest of God, then, especially since the Renaissance, the
situation has swung to the other pole. Thus, in the interest of humankind,
“the great idea about God was repressed inmodern culture,” as the French
thinker Maurice Clavel has said.⁵⁷ Of course, formal acknowledgment of
and respect for God still appear, including on some countries’ money,
but human actions have long disregarded God. God is still stamped
on us coinage (“In God We Trust”),⁵⁸ but neo-imperialist wars against
powerless nations go on and on, under a thousand pretexts. The United
Nations has long been barren of ideas to stop the barbaric aggressions of
the strong countries. Will the course of this twenty-first century offer a
scintilla of hope? This is hard for us to answer, even if we have never lost
hope.
Significant religious figures have often gathered to find a common
point to formulate the contribution of religion to peace, but so far without
effect. Between 2000 and 2007, I, too, have joined these global ecumenical
meetings. They were inspired by deep concern, but what could spiritual
leaders do in the face of rulers who were deaf to them? At the same time,
we must admit the bitter fact that it is far from clear that an atmosphere of
peace has been realized within the religions themselves, quite apart from
modern secularism’s longstanding indifference to what is called faith. On
September 7–9, 2003, in Aachen, Germany, an international meeting
was organized with the theme “War and Peace: Faiths and Cultures
in Dialogue.” In this meeting, I delivered a paper titled “Indonesian
Islam and the Muhammadiyah’s Humanitarian Mission.” It laid open my
determination in the circle of the world’s religious notables to find a new
formula for world peace. The main obstacle is the rulers who prefer to
stir up war. In a world lacking in morals, it will be very difficult for us to
see the establishment of the dictum: Right is might. What we find is just
the opposite: Might is right.
Our present century is clamped in a vise between atheistic secularism
and hope for peace with God. We eagerly await the creation of a new
balance whereby humankind is still in the honored position, but Heaven
is invited to address the world again; the present imbalance weighs
us down like a shoulder pole we have lost the strength to carry. In
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1937, two years before the outbreak of World War ii, Albert Einstein
reminded humanity of the similar functions of religion, the arts, and
the sciences:
All religions, arts and sciences are branches of the same tree. All these
aspirations are directed toward ennobling man’s life, lifting it above the
sphere of mere physical existence and leading the individual toward
freedom. It is no mere chance that our older universities have developed
from clerical schools. Both the church and the university – insofar
as they live up to their true function – serve the ennoblement of the
individual. They seek to fulfill this great task by spreading moral and
cultural understanding, renouncing the use of brute force.⁵⁹
The reality that stretches out before us at the beginning of the twenty-
first century is not the prevalence of moral and cultural understanding,
but quite the opposite, the use of brute force by the strong against the
weak, resulting in thousands of innocent victims. The main targets this
time are a number of Muslim nations, as I have said. Science is used, not
to “glorify mankind,” as Einstein had hoped in his testimony above, but
to annihilate it.
President George W. Bush was the person most responsible at the
beginning of the twenty-first century for the practice of that cruelty and
malignancy. The irony is that Bush sees himself as a religious person,
even a devout one. This fanaticism, with the credo of “[you are] either
with us or against us,” has divided the world into two sharply opposed
camps – but because of America’s invulnerability, the other camp, which
includes the United Nations, is powerless. What is so very bizarre is that
about 30 to 40 percent of those who voted for Bush often see this regime
as acting in the interest of a religion of Biblical prophecy and the second
coming of Jesus Christ.⁶⁰ How absurd it is that, for the sake of oil, gas,
and other energy, religion has been bartered by American Christian
fundamentalist circles, just as Muslim fundamentalist groups have done.
Bush and Osama, both fundamentalists, have made the world unsafe:
Bush with his neo-imperialist acrobatics, Osama with his theology of
death.
The destruction of Iraq is the result of the adventures of Bush and his
neocon advisers in the imperialistic foreign policy circles of the United
States. Bringing down Saddam Hussein was only a pretext to control
Iraq’s petroleum at its source. Noam Chomsky, an American anti-war
expert, has harshly criticized the invasion of Iraq by America and its
allies. He has said that people are made to believe that America would
have liberated Iraq even if its main products “were lettuce and pickles, and
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the main energy source of the world were in central Africa.”⁶¹ What he
meant was that, if Iraq did not have a strategic energy source in the form
of oil, America would not have even glanced sideways at it, a country that
had a high civilization before and during the Abbasid Empire.Then, when
asked about Bush, Chomsky answered that Bush was only the symbol of
the people who surrounded him as “the most dangerous administration
in American history.”⁶² In Bush’s hands, democracy was used as a cloak
for the desire to oppress other people who were powerless and themselves
too afraid to provoke America.
In a survey published simultaneously in the United Kingdom, Canada,
and Mexico on November 4, 2006, President Bush was viewed by a large
majority of respondents as “a danger to world peace,” ranking second
after Osama bin Laden.⁶³ As I see it, Bush should be classified as a war
criminal. His escapades have truly alarmed the world, including the West
itself. If such adventurism is not stopped, the fast-flowing river of history,
to borrow Falk’s words, will gradually fill the world with blood and
tears, and civilization will no longer be distinguished from barbarism.
Fortunately, in the 2006 midterm elections for the us Senate and the
House of Representatives, the Republican Party was defeated, a sign that
the Bush administration had been rejected.⁶⁴ It is too late to punish Bush;
that is not how democracy works. Two years later, in the election of the
American president on November 4, 2008, the Republican candidate
was defeated by Barack Obama, who became the first black president of
the United States.
To return to the question of democracy – whether or not there is a better
alternative to democracy for providing people with the freedom to assess
a would-be leader. This is the dilemma of democracy: people must be
patient with this system, and sometimes must even suffer the results
of the evil acts of an elected leader. Evil must be rejected with moral
and intellectual force when it invokes the name of democracy and basic
human rights. A superpower must not tyrannically manipulate humanity
out of greed for wealth and power. Humanity that is still pure surely
opposes criminal acts, no matter who does them, regardless of religion
and politics.
In an interview by the Pravda journalist Lisa Karpova, Kent Mesplay
of the American Green Party was asked about the difficulty of identifying
an alternative presidential candidate from a third party in the United
States. This is a country where everything political has been bought up
by the Republican and Democratic parties: democracy with a two-party
system has prevented other forces from emerging. Lisa Karpova asked
him, “As we can see, the present system acts very much against third
the future of religion 209
parties. What steps do you think are needed to break the stranglehold of
this two-party system?” This was Mesplay’s reply:
The first step would be to allow candidates equal time and access to
media coverage …. Running for office is a money-grab, with backup
provided by the committees in the two parties that accept funding and
direction from corporations [e.g., debates are not regulated impartially
but rather deemed expensive “in kind” political contributions, and are
corporate-driven in contents and appearance]. So, getting the money
out of politics is important, such as by publicly funded campaigns. Still,
rather than just have taxpayers subsidize advertising agencies, it would
be better to reinstitute equal access laws. Also, having proportional
representation and, as a step to this, preferential voting such as
i.r.v. [instant run-off voting, with ranked choices on the ballot for
a single seat] will help improve representation and alternative party
access.⁶⁵
Mesplay’s hopes express an ideal, to be sure, but would unquestionably
be very difficult to realize at a time when politics is dominated by money
and the law sides with corporations. But that ideal system of democracy
needs to be aspired to and put into action so that politics does not
transform into a commodity, as seen in almost every system of Western-
style democracy and in other countries that imitate these systems. In
Indonesia too, this money-game sickness is now an open secret, whether
in electing members to seats in the legislature or leaders to the executive
branch. As a result, a leadership candidate who is good but poor is almost
sure to have no chance. This is a real tragedy! If people become impatient
spectators at the corrupt game of politics, there will surely arise greater
and greater waves of apathy, a dark advertisement for democracy in
Indonesia.
Thus, it is not surprising why approximately half the people in the
United States do not participate by voting in presidential elections. The
citizens of this important country are fed up with the waste of taxpayer
money in these elections. The domination by the two parties seems to
have become an obligatory axiom in the us political system. An identical
situation occurs as well in the United Kingdom with the dominance of
the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, which simply rotate in
office from election to election.
Several Muslim countries have become the prey of brute force, to use
Einstein’s words. In regard to this problem, at the end of January 2008
I came out with a Resonansi column titled “Fukuyama, Neocons, and
Mayhem.” Here is an excerpt:
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Why are these three terms lined up to form the title of Resonansi today?
The answer is that they will be the core of what I will be presenting to
my readers. The last sentence in my Resonansi of June 8, 2004, was,
“It is not just the American people who have been fooled by Bush,
but the whole world has been, too. This is the modern civilization
(or more correctly, the barbarity) under the leadership of the White
House, which has intervened in other states, on the basis of public
deceit.”
Thanks to this trickery, it would appear that barbarism and tumult
have obtained approval among some of the public so that Bush was
reelected president of the United States in 2004. Now [early 2008],
after the abscess of this mendacity has been increasingly exposed,
George W. Bush, who has just been called Ehud Olmert’s vassal by Uri
Avnery, the former member of Israel’s Knesset, peace activist and anti-
Zionist, has long since lost the authority to say anything at all about the
imperialist foreign policy of his country.
Bush was the hero of the neocons (the “neoconservatives”), who
pushed him into attacking Iraq, which spread disorder and suffering.
Andwhat about Francis Fukuyama?This influential writer is a us citizen,
born in Chicago in 1952 to Japanese parents. His father studied the
sociology of religion at the University of Chicago. Fukuyama received
his PhD from Harvard. There he got to know Benazir Bhutto, who
was assassinated on December 27, 2007. One of the neocon “brains,”
Paul Wolfowitz, former American ambassador in Jakarta, had been
Fukuyama’s mentor and friend for decades. However, the us invasion
of Iraq, which Fukuyama opposed, severed their association, and
from 2004 Fukuyama became an apostate from the neocon ideology
when he supported the Democrat John Kerry in his run for the
presidency.
Fukuyama is a first-rate sociopolitical philosopher who had origi-
nally been praised by the neocon group. After he cut himself off from
them, all kinds of accusations were leveled against him, including that
of antisemitism. When he was still in the neocon environment, his con-
troversial work The End of History and the Last Man (1992) was attacked
by British political philosophers as the work of a palace philosopher
advocating global capitalism. In this work, Fukuyama appears to be
the chief defender of capitalism and liberal democracy as the acme of
history. But by taking such a position, he allowed himself to sink into
the vicious cycle of blind fanaticism.
History seems to have stopped with no longer anything superior
to capitalism and liberal democracy, which under the Bush regime
destroyed the pillars of civilization that had initially been so glorified
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by the original neocons. As a result, the neocons now have nothing to
offer to the public, thanks to Bush’s dark foreign policies.
I need to insert here that there are as well fanatic evangelicals
supporting Bush who are very close to Zionism. For these Christian
evangelicals, to quote Martin Kramer, “The American Interest” in
Azure (Ideas for the Jewish Nation 26, 2006): “Israel is, for them, the
manifestation of a divine plan, and they support it as a matter of faith.”
So it is not at all surprising why Bush, as Avnery sees it, is nothing
more than Olmert’s vassal, in view of his weakness in confronting the
pronouncements of the leader of Zionist Israel.
Another view of Fukuyama’s that dealt an insightful blow to the
neocon contemporary political doctrine was that “Islamic terrorism is
not an existential threat to the United States, that political Islam has
demonstrated itself to be a failure everywhere it has taken power, and
that the Islamic terrorist movement had been largely a failure prior
to 9/11. Those attacks, as well as the Iraq war, gave it a new lease on
life,” as quoted by Robert S. Boynton in The American Prospect online
(September 18, 2005).
In short, the 9/11 tragedy and the invasion of Iraq have given the
breath of a longer life to these radical movements. But this tragedy,
which also gave the Bush name the bounce it needed for a second
election victory, after that [gave Bush] an increasingly “fallen” name,
fallen because the opportunity to govern was not used to create a culture
of global wisdom, as I had proposed to him when we met in Bali on
October 23, 2003. Rather than building a civilization, the neocons have
instead created an empire of barbarity and arrogance on the face of the
earth.⁶⁶
TheUnited States under Bushwas truly isolated from the global discourse,
a foreign policy burden that was very difficult for his successor in 2009
to overturn. Slightly encouraging was the fact that the young people of
America were becoming aware of how bad had been the impact of the
foreign policy adventures of the neocons. Not just bad for the rest of the
world, but bad also for the American people who had been deceived by
their leaders. I have repeatedly presented the idea, in various forums
and media, that an imperialistic foreign policy is not just obsolete, but
also legalizes barbarism in the name of democracy and basic human
rights. Here is the failure of America’s foreign policy that forces its will
on powerless nations. That power has never been able to learn, nor does
it want to learn, from its many postwar failures. After the collapse of the
Soviet Union the United States become the sole superpower, and before
long it suffered a relapse of its historical amnesia. Power often does blind
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the powerful and kill the conscience, so that what we call global wisdom
never claims its appropriate place in the foreign policy of the superpower
that is steadily losing its authority.
There are writers who predict that the United States, as the only
superpower of the post-Cold War era, will be destroyed just like its
former rival, the Soviet Union. But according to the analyst Fareed
Zakaria, what will occur is not the destruction of the United States as a
nation-state, but instead the loss of its authority as a superpower to dictate
to the world, because of “the rise of the rest” – especially in the areas of
economics and investment. Zakaria notes that the biggest investment on
earth is now in Abu Dhabi; the biggest movie industry is in Bollywood,
not in Hollywood; the tallest building is in Taipei, and (as I write this)
soon to be in Dubai; the biggest public company is in Beijing, not in New
York; the biggest passenger plane is made in Europe, not in the United
States. All these factors by themselves tell us that America’s days as the
single global superpower have now ended.⁶⁷ Naturally, all these facts
make America, so haughty for so long, very worried, but, I wonder, are
the elite of that country smart enough to learn from history? As we read
in the theories of Ibn Khaldun, whoever has reached the top has nothing
to do except go back down. Humankind’s biggest problem throughout
history is that the supporters of civilization are unaware that the position
at the top is now headed for collapse, sooner or later.
In the history of Islam, we have the case of the Ottoman Empire,
which lasted almost seven centuries but finally was unable to escape
the iron law of history. This empire collapsed in 1924, never to arise
again. Its decay had gone on for some three centuries. The American
elite generally are interested in history, but now that their power is at its
peak they have become careless and inattentive, as though their nation’s
exalted position will last forever. Was President Barack Obama, with his
philosophy of change, able to transform the gloomy face of America in
the global order? Such enormous challenges are not easily overcome.
Chapter 5 Islam, Humanity,
and Indonesian Identity
This work was written at a time when the map of global humanity
presented a particularly ominous picture, one very far from an image
of justice and conviviality. The genocide in the Gaza Strip at the end of
December 2008 and through January 2009, a barbarity that was criticized
worldwide, was allowed to continue for twenty-two days. Even within
Indonesia the situation was far from calm and hopeful. In the formulation
of the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, “In a society, justice is only called
justice where there is no difference between those who are near to us
and those who are far from us.”¹ Here, “we” and “they” must be seen
from the perspective of a humanism that is sound and unimpaired,
not a bogus humanism. The inequality between rich countries and the
rest of the world is vast. The Islamic world, which controls a decisive
proportion of the world’s oil energy reserves, has not yet awakened
sufficiently to play its historical role, owing to poor leadership. I find
this situation alarming. Others, too, who are honest and clear-headed
in their thinking are surely aware of it, but the magnitude of the problem
has thwarted them. Fortunately, they still speak out on behalf of justice
for all.
Those at the apex of the pyramid of power are generally not inter-
ested in the serious problems that the Muslim umat must face in
achieving a just and civilized society. They are not even genuinely inter-
ested in defending the dignity of their own people, whose conditions
continue to deteriorate. Their energy is drained by the never-ending
struggles of power politics. These rulers think nothing of selling the
dignity and sovereignty of an entire nation to foreign interests just
to earn foreign exchange to cover the corruption-riddled and chron-
ically deficit-saddled national budget. Indonesia is well known in the
ranks of such countries for its many sales of state assets, but it con-
tinues in this path. Our nation still has a “low birth rate” of political
visionaries who are ready to defend this country consciously and respon-
sibly.
But, as the analysis presented in this book shows, Islam, Indonesian-
ness, and humanity can not only walk together, but these three values
can unite in building a uniquely Indonesian “pleasure park.” These three
“value forces”must be complementary. In this pleasure park, the universal
character of Islam appears in the form of a just and civilized human-
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ity. Islam is the religion embraced by the majority of the population of
Nusantara, and all movements of an Indonesian character must always
bear in mind this socio-historical reality in the interest of security and
peace.
The success of this religion in achieving its noble aim must be pursued
in noble and civilized ways. Off this path, Islam will halt at the level of
soulless ritual, while its main mission will have fallen along the wayside.
What remains will only be its skeleton in a formal, if not monstrous,
shape, silent as to the subtle, refined, and refreshing values of humanity.
It would no longer be an Islam that lives and brings life, nor indeed,
prophetic Islam or Quranic Islam, which is always the inspiration for
doing what is best for all creatures: Did not Allah create death and life to
test who amongst us is best in deed?²
Even without evaluating the various sociological factors scientifically,
I now see, after years of observation, two possibilities for all radical
movements on the left or the right: First, there are movements that will
never grow, their energy dissipated in fruitless pursuits, even if they act
in the name of God. Second, there are movements that are born to fail,
lasting only till the first harvest season and then disappearing, leaving
behind much historical trauma and many victims. The pki throughout
Indonesia and di/tii (Darʾul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia – the House
of Islam/the Indonesian Army of Islam) in Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi
are examples; their historical legacy has not been long gone from us. We
will never know for sure to how many lives were cut short and how much
of the people’s property was stripped from them in the name of “belief ” or
of Marxism. If movements like these represent the mainstream, then you
can imagine the fate of Islam in Indonesia. Perhaps all that will remain
will be memories. Luckily, its mainstream still advances in reason and
conscience, even though the pull of power politics frequently weakens
the main mission of this mainstream. At a time when politics has become
a livelihood, there are naturally not many leaders who can survive in the
sphere of idealism.
W.S. Rendra’s proposal of a “Culture Machine” [Mesin Budaya]
representing the people’s sovereignty for shaping a just and creative
Indonesia of the future interests me. In his speech upon being awarded
the title of Doctor Honoris Causa from Gadjah Mada University on
March 4, 2008, Rendra proposed the following: “The ‘Cultural Machine’
that is the people’s sovereignty, just, humanitarian, and appreciative of
the dynamics of life, is the ‘Cultural Machine’ that can stimulate the
vitality and creativity of the members of society within this state. But the
‘Cultural Machine’ that is the rulers’ sovereignty, which oppresses and
colonizes, is elitist, not populist, and is very dangerous.”³
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Rendra is speaking to the level of the state in Indonesia that is not
much changed since the colonial period. “The rulers’ sovereignty” nearly
always defeats “the people’s sovereignty.” “People’s sovereignty” is another
name for a healthy democracy. The historian Anhar Gonggong makes
a point about the relationship between democratic institutions and
their protagonists that is well worth reflecting on: healthy democracy is
maintained “not only by having the institutions of a democratic state,
but particularly by the emergence of leaders of character and personal
integrity in those institutions.”⁴ Asmentioned repeatedly here, democracy
always demands political players of honesty, responsibility, broad-
mindedness, and, obviously, integrity. This integrity is what Indonesia
needs to form and nurture in its political players, for the building of a
democratic system that will always be on the side of the common good.
At the same time, in society, we perceive a culture of harshness
displayed by a small group of people lacking in wisdom. This has given
rise to a widespread negative reaction holding that Islam is no longer the
source of blessings, as has been often said; that instead, Islam has been
forced to become the source of calamity and of violence by irresponsible
people teaching mistaken and ahistorical interpretations. Muslims must
bring meritorious deeds to confront them. This means that we must be
able to provide a better alternative if we assess a system as unjust or un-
Islamic. This can only be accomplished by great minds that are sincere,
patient, and intelligent. It is not the work of rioters or demonstrators with
cries of “Allahu akbar!” but of one who is noble, serious, and properly
directed. The weakness of Islamic civilization in this century is an umat
that still fails to offer a system of life that realizes the dictum, “a blessing
for the universe.” This great historical claim awaits the appearance of
young people who are talented, inclusive, and broad-minded, who
have humanitarian commitments that are genuine and knowledge-
based. Creating an Islam in Indonesia that shows a friendly face to its
surroundings is the main task that cannot be forgotten for even a second.
The mainstream as represented by the nu and Muhammadiyah, with
all its various shortcomings, has nevertheless been a trade mark for
Islamic movements that are moderate, modern, open, inclusive, and
constructive. This does not mean that there are no scoundrels in this
mainstream, but they have not put their stamp on it and they are usually
sidelined from the inner management and leadership. Their thinking
seems too foreign to be able to fuse with a mainstream that is Indonesian
in character and promotes a friendly Islam. Contemporary Indonesia
is fortunate because these two big currents are not moving apart, but
rather coming closer to complement each other’s strengths and cover
each other’s weaknesses and shortcomings.
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Although the strength of the nu is almost entirely concentrated in Java
and South Kalimantan, its national influence must always be considered.
Naturally, the instinct for power politics of some of its leading figures often
disrupts the advance of the nu as a cultural and intellectual movement.
This problem has forced the nu to rethink the future framework of
Indonesian Islam. For me, cultural movements have to be supported
by bold intellectual qualities, but also accompanied by patience and
sympathy. The nu has charted an extraordinary path in intellectual
development, thanks to the modern education that has spread far into
the world of the pesantren.
In the meantime, Muhammadiyah, which is slightly more impervious
to the temptations of power politics, has the slogan, “Muhammadiyah
doesn’t go anywhere, but is everywhere.” In reality, such a position
cannot always be maintained, to say nothing if a top cadre is involved
in national politics. Experience during the rather chaotic Reform era
presents strong proof of that statement. Naturally, it would be ideal if the
nu and Muhammadiyah were led by cultural power that was cohesive
but not allergic to politics. Taking part in power on these two cultural
bases would be decisive in influencing the path of Indonesian history,
before, now, and in the future.
As to the young intellectuals of the nu and theMuhammadiyah, I hope
they devote their innovative and creative thinking to an Indonesian Islam
in the post-Muhammadiyah and post-nu paradigm. I have often been in
dialogue with and associated with young people in this mainstream. My
conclusion is that they have a very open attitude, quite different from the
elder generation. We have to understand that Muhammadiyah and the
nu are not religions, but rather movements to achieve the aims of Islam –
which include the entire dimension of human existence – to uphold
justice, brotherhood, and community in pluralistic Indonesian society.
Therefore, seeing the shining intellectual development among the
young people of these two major streams, we may ponder whether
perhaps it is only a question of time before the leadership falls into their
hands in a democratic fashion. With that in mind, these young folk
should not lose hope when faced with leaders whom they view as neither
visionary nor engaged, and they should beware of running off to form
new splinter groups. These would be very difficult to grow, and all the
while they consume so much energy and thought in the effort.
In my view, the wise approach would be for them to stay within the
wave of the mainstream. They should maintain strong, but respectful,
critical powers, while creating a field conducive to the appearance of a
new generation of leaders possessing moral and intellectual integrity
that is recognized on all sides. The young members of the nu and
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Muhammadiyah must constantly conduct intensive dialogue in their
efforts to formulate and settle the form of the relationship of Islam and
Indonesian identity. Movement in that direction has commenced, but
we still need a sharper vision so that the Islamic image that appears is
that of an Islam that shelters and protects all groups. The war drums
being beaten by a small clutch of individuals must be confronted with
the drumbeats of peace, justice, courtesy, inclusiveness, and pluralism.
In this effort we employ means that are fully authoritative because we are
certain of the principle of truth that we hold.
What I have written here is far from perfect; these young people and
the young people of other religions will perfect it for me. My message to
them is to keep up their spiritual stamina and sincere commitment to a
just and prestigious Indonesia. We look to the structuring of Indonesia as
a “dwelling,” to borrow the expression of Jakob Oetama, “to provide that
feeling of comfort in our lives together as a nation and as a state”⁵ – not
an Indonesia torn to pieces by centrifugal forces or the clash of parochial
interests in the name of faction, religion, ethnic group, and history.
Indonesia is still in the process of becoming an intact and united
nation. Indonesia is not a given. Rather, it has to be constantly and
ceaselessly struggled for. Our negligence since Proclamation shows that
we take a frivolous attitude toward maintaining and guarding this thing
that is no given. It is a sign of thinking that everything is in order. This
parochial point of view is one of the reasons why Indonesia frequently
faces sociopolitical explosions that drain energy and attention, and, not
infrequently, blood.
The potential within the nu and Muhammadiyah for guarding the
integrity of the Indonesian nation is really extraordinary. That the older
leadership occasionally feels uncomfortablewith the doings of these youth
is nothing strange. After all, every progressive intellectual breakthrough is
sure to create shock and possibly even suspicion; provided the ideas being
offered stand on a sufficiently strong religious and rational foundation,
however, the old order will quietly go along. We generally see this
occurring because of the generation gap in reading, information, and the
scope of social intercourse. Young people are perhaps more ravenous
in devouring new and fresh reading material, while the old cling to the
treasury of classics whose relevance to new developments is uncertain.
This appears to be the historical tendency in almost all Muslim countries.
Islamic civilization cannot be allowed to become the proverbial dry
sirih leaf on the stone, that is, “reluctant to live and afraid to die.” We
need courage for making a breakthrough by standing with both feet
on religious arguments that are understood properly and intelligently,
textually as well as contextually. Let us not make an idol of classical
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Islamic exegesis so that no one has the courage to interpret Islam in
a new, fresh, and responsible way. Such new interpretations must be
valid in scientific terms, but still remain within the parameters of sincere
belief.
All Islamic movements in Indonesia must always remember and
carefully take into consideration that clashes that carry the scent of
religion, ethnicity, and culture must not happen again in the future. The
price to be paid is too high. To a certain extent these have already wrecked
the atmosphere of our lovely pleasure park of Nusantara. Indonesia, a
nation-state that is less than a century old and has experienced the bitter
and the sweet, must learn as skillfully as it can and pluck wisdom from a
past that is filled with beautiful experiences and things of great value.
Because Indonesians have chosen democracy as their political system
and have struggled in its name for a century now, since the beginning
of the national movement, we cannot be half-hearted in defending it,
however exhausting it can be.
Once again, democracy in the hands of political adventurers can be
a source of disaster and suffering, as has been well demonstrated by
America’s imperialist foreign policy under President George W. Bush,
who used various false pretexts to destroy other nations. Similar abuses
of democracy happen everywhere on earth. But here is another question:
has any political system in history been known to establish equality
among people except democracy? The Islamic political system in the
period following the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (after 661ce), even
though there were some who still governed properly as caliphs, was no
more and no less than a system of monarchs who trampled the principles
of basic human rights and the freedom of humankind, deviating in both
very far from the egalitarian teachings of the Quran.
If we speak about Islam, Indonesianness, and humanity, it means we
have entered a domain that is deep and wide. The future of Indonesia
we are to build must be accomplished in such a way that anyone who
lives in Nusantara feels true pleasure and security, because the principle
of justice is valid for all. There will be no discrimination of any kind.
Because the majority of the population is Muslim, its responsibility is to
create an Indonesia that is just and presents a friendly face, an Indonesia
that is very great, in line with the great numbers of this population. But
such a responsibility will be hard to carry out if the quality of the Muslim
umat remains below what it should be, impoverished, badly educated,
and volatile. Some even espouse the doctrine of a quick death because
they are not being brave enough to live, a doctrine of madness and chaos.
In my opinion as a Muslim, even people of no faith must be protected
by the state so long as they obey the constitution and the statutory laws
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prevailing in Indonesia, and so long as similar provisions also are in
effect for those who acknowledge profession of a faith. The state has no
right to punish someone of no faith, so long as this person has not broken
the law. Having or not having faith is one’s free choice, as long as that is
conducted honestly and with full responsibility, and it is not exclusionary.
In this perspective, converting from one religion to another or choosing
not to have a religion is a basic human right that must be respected.
Classic Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), which condemns apostates to death,
must be reexamined, as it goes against the spirit of the Quran, even if
Allah is angry at those who change their faith.
Perhaps the picture I am drawing here is too idealistic, but isn’t
progress nothing more than dynamic and creative movement toward
the ideal? The more a reality nears the imagined ideal, then it is our
task to shift that ideal to a higher level, and so continue on like that
without stopping. The moment reality fuses with the ideal, we might say
that civilization-building has reached a dead end, if not indeed begun
to decay. Therefore, the historical dialectic must always be examined
so that worn-out elements are put aside without hesitation or placed
in the museum of history, while those that are positive and fresh are
allowed to unite with new elements in a synthesis that invigorates life.
The Quran commands: “O you who have believed, respond to Allah and
to the Messenger when he calls you to that which gives you life. And
know that Allah intervenes between a man and his heart and that to Him
you will be gathered.”⁶ This command calls out for humankind to move
toward a life that is meaningful, pleasant and creative, under the divine
shelter of theology and prophethood – not to futile death, even in the
name of God.
The Quran must be understood holistically, and the red thread of
its teaching followed, so that before our eyes stretches out a clear view
of the world that is refined, beautiful, and filled with a sense of justice
and with blessings for all creatures, without exception. Perhaps such
an ideal may be unattainable on the face of this earth. Still, the wheels
of civilization must move tirelessly in that direction, even if the way
is choked by brambles and thorns. What we call the struggles of life
consist in pushing aside those brambles and thorns, bravely and wisely.
Whenever the Muslim umat can present the colors of life replete with
humanistic values, that is the essence of the mission that invigorates,
the true mission. Caliph Umar bin Khattab’s carrying out the mission
through excellent example is what made the Palestinians, who were
still not Muslim at that time, weep when he was about to return to
Medina. They seemed to be saying, “Umar, do not leave Palestine,
even if we and you are not of the same faith.” Can Indonesian Islam
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bring the nation into the future under the umbrella of “a civilized and
just sense of humanity,” where non-Muslims feel free and comfortable
living in Nusantara? A Protestant clergyman from North Sulawesi
once asked me, “What does ‘properly religious’ mean?” to which I
quickly answered, “To be authentic in one’s own religion, in accordance
with one’s own holy scripture, understood properly and with complete
sincerity.”
In order to strengthen our Indonesianness and humanity, we should
no longer look at the Jakarta Charter from a formal and legal perspective,
but rather we need to take its spirit by establishing justice for all, without
discrimination, throughout Nusantara. At the same time, Pancasila must
open the door as widely as possible to accept the moral sources of the
religions that flourish in Indonesia. And Islam must provide the greatest
contribution. Why Islam? Not simply because it is practiced by the
majority of the population, but because the quality of its teaching makes
that very much a possibility. None of the five principles of Pancasila, if
understood properly and fully, need to be questioned from the angle
of Islamic theology. Yet the first sila, “God, the One, the Only,” will
become an empty principle if justice and prosperity for all do not
become the reality in Indonesia. The traumas of the past, when Islam
was involved in power politics, must never recur. To put it differently,
the Islam that must be offered is an Islam that is prepared to walk hand
in hand with the values of Indonesianness and the values of civilized
humanity.
Thus, a proper religious attitude must be seen in the honest, whole-
hearted, and broad-minded behavior of the religion’s adherents. The
differences in each theological system must not be used to diminish the
quality of friendship between communities, but rather should be made
into a source of mutual enrichment in the religious experience of the
Indonesian nation. So, the proposal of this book – to place Islam in the
framework of Indonesian identity and humanity – may be something
for all groups to reflect on, so that we will be ready to speak with each
other in language that is sincere, tolerant, and constructive. Constructive,
I mean to say, of an Indonesia that is sovereign, endowed with self-
esteem, just, and prosperous – not an Indonesia that is like a kampong
(village) with no kampong head, mocked and manipulated by foreign
powers.
In the context of Indonesian Muslim thinkers’ concerns about the
future of Islam in the framework of Indonesian identity and humanity,
the words of Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana are still worth pondering. sta
spoke them at the end of his oration on February 11, 1975, at the Building
of National Awakening, in Jakarta:
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If we look at and compare various expressive cultures, that is, cultures
that are ruled by intuition, feelings, artistic and religious fantasies,
perhaps the culture of Islam, professed by the majority of Indonesians
and which is strong in its religious, scientific, and economic values,
seems intended and searches for the answers to human questions of the
twentieth century.
But to do that, it may be that the great Islamic thinkers must return to
formulating a balance between religion and science, between the secret
sanctity of life and the universe with the reality of the empirical world.
Who knows, in this age, Indonesia with the largest number of Muslims
in the world, may lead the Islamic community of the whole world in
facing the times that are coming.⁷
sta’s optimism about the future of Islam is a qualified optimism and
not an automatic one. The expression “a balance between religion and
science” outlines one condition required for Indonesian Islam to appear to
lead. For sta, in scrutinizing the map of Indonesian Islam, “the approach
through the deductive method is what must be constantly put to the test
by the inductive method in the form of empirical experience. In other
words, Islamic doctrine that has religious, economic, and scientific value
must be brought down to earth to give a basic answer to the questions
confronting the human umat in this century and in the ones to come.”⁸
I have said many times that to make Islam the deciding factor in
Indonesia’s future, the legal-formal approach will not be effective because
it is blind to the sociological reality of this diverse and rich nation. Only
a person who cannot read a map would attempt to import to Indonesia
the experiences of contemporary Arabia or Afghanistan with Islam as a
political and cultural force. It could have only one ending: failure. The
sociocultural maps of these counties are very different from the map of
Indonesia. Therefore, domestic Indonesian sharia regulations cannot be
imposed by force, as this would invite unrest and suspicion. And not just
suspicion. In practice, such local regulations themselves do not bring
virtue and justice. Yet is the final purpose of sharia not to establish justice
and prosperity for all?
Those imports, whether inspired by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, the
Jamaat-e Islami of Pakistan, or the Hizb Al-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) of
Palestine, whether they bear the banner of the transnational caliphate or
of the jihad ideology of Afghanistan, will wither in the soil of Indonesia.
The cultural makeup is very different in Indonesia, which will surely
reject them. The experience of communism, which tried to subjugate
Indonesia, also ended in national catastrophe, while at a global level this
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ideology was led to the gallows of history. In short, the soil of Nusantara
is not fertile for extremist political ideologies in any format, right, left,
or center. Historical experience shows that the chemical makeup of
Indonesian culture rejects all forms of extremism. Nonetheless, we are
aware that forms of extremist ideology will still appear sporadically so
long as the justice demanded by the Pancasila does not descend to earth
in Nusantara, as a result of the defective consciences of the nation’s elite.
In their hands Pancasila is turned into amoral political rhetoric. This is
the main reason why the Indonesian nation finds it so very difficult to
rise up authentically and with dignity.
Thus, the next task is to fill the Pancasila with prophetic values that are
rich in morality, ethics, the sources of the law, and eschatological doctrine
that would be impossible for humans alone to devise. In the face of these
great questions, the Pancasila must stand ready to admit its limitations
and to govern itself within the confines of Indonesianness, even though
the universal elements of the other four sila can be developed much
further.
If the Pancasila remains a play of the lips, while its principles are
ignored in civic, national, and state life, it is very difficult to imagine any
improvement in Indonesia’s future. Indonesia has been independent for
sixty years, and I have seen almost no administration that truly took the
side of the impoverished masses. In the period of Liberal Democracy in
the 1950s, two or three cabinets proposed very good programs for the
people’s welfare, but they had no time to implement them. Interparty
squabbling was the major reason for the instability and brief lifespan of
the cabinets in that period.
Constructing an edifice of Islam within the framework of Indone-
sianness and humanity is more the work of proselytization and culture
than of politics. Through the approach based on proselytizing and cul-
tural activity, the basic values of Islam, of the “Indonesian soul,” and
of humanity can be defined carefully and patiently for the long term.
If these basic values are strong, then their effect will also be felt in the
political realm, that is, in the emergence of the politics of solidarity,
not the politics of force that pushes others to the side. Politics led by
prophetic values is sure to take the road of peace and justice, even when
its actors have different ideologies.
Differences of outlook in the framework of Indonesianness and
humanity must be made the motive force for finding a better meeting
ground in social, national, and state life. Here is where we find the main
key for strengthening the nation’s spirit of integration. We must always
keep in mind that Indonesia is a young nation still searching for more
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appropriate forms through an approach that is intelligent, honest, and
responsible. My great desire, before I close my eyes for the last time, is
that there will begin to appear, however faintly, the signs of an Indonesia
of justice, dignity, and cohesiveness. If such signs do appear, I will feel
that my appeals have not been in vain. As someone fascinated by history,
I am very aware that to build an Indonesia comprising thousands of
islands is no simple task, but that it is nevertheless not impossible. All
depends on the good intentions and the capabilities of the people of our
nation. Do they want to see Indonesia last for time without end, or fall
apart because of leaders who lack vision?
Why do I have hope in the young people of Indonesia? The answer is
simple: I still see the potential in our nation’s idealistic and knowledgeable
young people for leading us toward the goal proclaimed at the time of
our independence. I have mentioned this goal several times already.
It is the creation of justice for all, prosperity without favoritism, and
sincere brotherhood between fellow members of the nation, whatever
their ethnicity or religion. This nation now awaits their presence: young
people of sensitivity, of conscience. I only hope that we do not have to
wait long.
As the author of this book I am fully aware that building such a vast
Indonesia is no simple task. But have our experiences of success and
failure over so many decades not been enough to make us a nation that
has come to its senses? We need not only great minds, but also, and
perhaps even more urgently, a clean conscience, as clean as the water
of Lake Matano in Sorowako, Sulawesi. Many intelligent minds have
been born, but intelligent and sincere hearts must be struggled for. How
to marry brain and heart – that is the task for our entire educational
system in a not-too-distant future. Development of the brain can give
birth to great scientists and technologists. That is not enough, though.
It must be accompanied by development of the heart to bring forth
wisdom and disinterested sympathy. Indonesia, a large heterogeneous
and pluralistic nation, greatly needs leaders who have that intelligence
and wisdom. Indonesia’s weakness ever since independence lies in its
insufficient attention to the dimension of the heart.
In the hands of leaders with these qualities, the “chemical compound”
that binds Islam – supported by the other religions that exist in Indone-
sia – to the values of Indonesianness and humanity will allow this nation
to find its genuine and harmonious identity. This compound will give
Pancasila the spiritual foundation of resilient prophethood. An Indonesia
of the future that is sound and complete needs a spiritual-cultural base
that is strong in its endeavors to support the standing and dignity of the
nation for the long run, the limitless run.
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The spirits of the founders of the Indonesian nation and state will
smile in delight in the land beyond if their successors are intelligent,
wise, and sensitive of conscience. But these same spirits will weep if
the next generations have no more use for the noble values that were
engraved in the spirit of this nation from the moment of its formation
in the 1920s. This work is my attempt to bring back those great values
to guard the course of this nation in a world that is not always friendly.
Before my closing appeal, permit me to quote from “Between Karawang
and Bekasi,” written in 1949 by Chairil Anwar. This well-known poem
is a deeply felt remembrance of those who are not with us but whose
services for the nation and state were truly extraordinary:
We are but scattered bones,
which now belong to you.
It is you who decide their value:
Whether we died for freedom, victory, hope,
or for nothing at all.
We do not know, cannot say.
You are the ones who must now speak.
We speak to you in the stillness of a silent night
When the chest feels empty and the wall clock ticks.
Remember, do remember us,
Carry on, carry on our lives.⁹
Afterword
I am quite optimistic concerning the future of Islam in the framework
of Indonesian identity and humanity, but only if the umat places greater
importance on quality in all dimensions of life. The Quran teaches the
importance of quality for ensuring a bright future: “How many a small
company has overcome a large company by permission of Allah.”¹ Pay
close attention to the meaning of this verse, which at first was addressed
to the small army of King Saul as it confronted the much larger army of
Jalut (Goliath). The tested army of Saul was small in numbers. The others
under Saul’s banner wanted to surrender to Goliath’s army, but in the end,
the victory went to the minority who obeyed Saul’s command when they
crossed a river. That order was that his army was not to drink their fill, but
only a little. The victory of the minority was again seen in Muhammad’s
time at the Battle of Badr, at the beginning of the Hijra years: the lesser
army of the Muslims defeated the large Quraysh army. We see that a
minority can win the day if it possesses the needed conditions. It is obvi-
ous here that physical and spiritual quality determine the successes and
victories of a community – and this does not exclude theMuslim commu-
nity in Indonesia. But sadly theMuslimmajority in Indonesia for themost
part live in poverty and ignorance. How to succeed, when the level of edu-
cation puts in doubt the ability of most of them to finish primary school?
The leaders of this umat therefore must always be deeply aware of
the need to improve its conditions if we truly want to see the future
of Indonesia on the side of Islam. If it is to succeed, Islam must be
understood as an Islam that shelters and protects all people. Minority
groups must feel safe and at peace living in Indonesia because they are
treated fairly and as true fellow citizens and patriots. Their rights must
be fully guaranteed, with no discrimination. In other words, the Islam
that must be cultivated and developed is a protective spiritual force, not
a threatening one. This is the goal of jihad, and also of ijtihad. We must
put a stop to the use of violent methods to achieve our objectives, once
and for all.
My very final word is that this work is intended to raise a call that
rises to the surface from a deep spiritual awareness: Long live a united
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Pemikiran dan Kepemimpinan Prof. Suyanto, PhD [In the jungle of moral
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relating to female leadership at the conference was a continuation of the 1976
Legal Consideration Congress on Pious Women in Islam, which included
a discussion of “Women of Islam in the Political Field.” The 2010 National
Conference issued a final decision or fatwa, which has yet to be formalized,
that states, in part:
The book Adabul Marʾah Fil Islâm … (1982) states that women can become
leaders at various levels, such as school principals, company directors, …
mayors, judges, and ministers …. It is stated that “religion does not criticize or
block the progress of men or women so long as it does not release the person
from devotion to Allah.”Adabul Marʾah Fil Islâm also does not regard the hadith
of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), transmitted by Abu Bakrah,
… to be a correct reason for prohibiting women from becoming leaders. This
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not find any naskh verses of the Quran or hadith that forbid Muslim women
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that were normally held by women, as stated in Adabul Marʾah Fil Islâm, there
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published when I was at the University of Chicago.
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